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INTRODUCTION
In 1978 Congress comprehensively revised federal bank-
ruptcy laws for the first time in forty years.' In addition to sig-
nificantly changing many substantive provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Reform Act (1978 Act) also
expanded the jurisdiction and enhanced the status of bank-
ruptcy courts.2 Disputes related to bankruptcy that previously
could be adjudicated only in a state or federal district court,3
and which frequently delayed completion of the underlying
bankruptcy proceeding,4 now could be decided by the bank-
ruptcy court.5 To ensure that litigants' rights to a jury trial
would not be lost as a result of this jurisdictional expansion,
Congress provided for the preservation of preexisting jury trial
rights.6
In 1982, however, the Supreme Court upset Congress's re-
structured bankruptcy system. In Northern Pipeline Construc-
tion Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,7 the United States Supreme
Court held that the provision of the 1978 Act expanding the
bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction violated article III and thus was
unconstitutional. The Court reasoned8 that this broad jurisdic-
1. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
2. Id. § 241(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2668-69 (originally codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1471 (1982), codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (Supp. I1 1985)).
3. Prior to the 1978 Act, most actions to collect the assets of the bank-
ruptcy estate from third parties had to be pursued in nonbankruptcy courts.
See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 382 and accompanying text.
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1982) (repealed 1984).
6. See id. § 1480.
7. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
8. The Court disagreed as to the proper scope of the decision. The plu-
rality opinion, after extensively reviewing the Court's precedents concerning
the exercise of judicial power by judges lacking article III's protections, con-
cluded that "the broad grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts contained
in 28 U.S.C. § 1471... is unconstitutional." Id. at 87. The concurring Justices
preferred to limit the decision to the specific conclusion that "so much of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978 as enables a Bankruptcy Court to entertain and decide
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tional grant violated article III because it permitted bankruptcy
judges, who lacked the tenure and salary protections mandated
by article III, 9 to hear and decide state common law actions
without the parties' consent.'0 When Congress eventually re-
sponded to the Court's decision, it retained the non-article III
status of bankruptcy judges but reduced their authority over ju-
dicial proceedings to comply with article III's apparent require-
ment that the essential attributes of judicial power be vested
only in article III courts. 1" Simultaneously, and without expla-
nation, Congress replaced the 1978 Act's jury trial provision
with a provision narrowly focused on specific categories of
cases.
12
In the wake of these developments, the constitutional sta-
tus of jury trials in bankruptcy is confused. Lower courts'3 and
legal scholars' 4 are divided over the existence of a statutory or
Northern's lawsuit over Marathon's objection [is] violative of Art. Mi." Id. at
91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
9. See infra notes 348-51 and accompanying text.
10. 458 U.S. at 87 (plurality opinion); id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
11. Congress responded to Northern Pipeline by enacting the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal 'Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat.
333. For a discussion of how this Act reduced the authority of bankruptcy
judges, see infra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1411 (Supp. HI 1985).
13. Most of the judicial examination of the questions considered by this
Article has been at the district and bankruptcy court levels. Two recent court
of appeals decisions, however, have considered the issue of the right to jury
trial in bankruptcy under the current law. See Huffman v. Perkinson (In re
Harbour), 840 F.2d 1165 (4th Cir. 1988), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W.
3755 (U.S. Apr. 25, 1988); Nordberg v. Granfinanciera, S.A. (In re Chase &
Sanborn Corp.), 835 F.2d 1341 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 56 U.S.L.W. 3841
(U.S. June 13, 1988) (No. 87-1716). Both courts held that a defendant to a
fraudulent conveyance action has neither a constitutional nor a statutory right
to a jury trial. See infra note 227. As this Article went to press, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Nordberg. Accordingly, one can hope for a resolu-
tion of some of the issues addressed in this Article during the Supreme Court's
1988 Term.
14. See, e.g., S. BERNSTEIN, BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE AFTER THE AMEND-
MENTS ACT OF 1984, at 39-47 (1984); 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY I 3.01[7], at 3-
92 to 3-101 (15th ed. 1987) [hereinafter COLLIER]; B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK,
BANKRUPTCY LAw MANUAL 6-30 (1985); Greenfield, The National Bankruptcy
Conference's Position on the Court System Under the Bankruptcy Amend,
ments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, and Suggestions for Rules Promul-
gation, 23 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 357, 361-62, 368-70 (1986); Hendel & Reinhardt,
Evolution of Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction After the Bankruptcy Amend-
ments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 90 COM. L.J. 272 (1985); King, Juris-
diction and Procedure Under the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984, 38 VAND.
L. REV. 675, 702-08 (1985); Norton & LAeb, Jurisdiction and Procedure Under
the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments, 1985 ANN. SuRv. BANKR. L. 53, 162-64;
Sabino, Jury Trials in the Bankruptcy Court. A Continuing Controversy, 90
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constitutional right to a jury trial in bankruptcy and the cir-
cumstances under which a- bankruptcy judge is authorized to
conduct a jury trial. Indeed, the diversity of opinion could
hardly be more extreme. One view is that there exists no right
to a jury trial in almost any bankruptcy matter 15 and that it
would be unconstitutional for a bankruptcy judge to conduct a
jury trial under any circumstances. 16 Others contend that a
bankruptcy judge is fully authorized to conduct jury trials and
that jury trial rights in bankruptcy matters are identical to
those that exist in nonbankruptcy federal courts. 17
The complex statutory and constitutional questions under-
lying these disagreements about jury trials in bankruptcy are
the subject of this Article. Part I of this Article reviews the
legislative and judicial developments giving rise to the current
controversy. Part II analyzes the narrowly worded bankruptcy
jury trial statute enacted by Congress in 1984.18 This statute,
however, is silent as to most bankruptcy matters. Part III thus
considers whether the seventh amendment provides litigants a
constitutional right to a jury trial in bankruptcy. This Part
analyzes whether Congress may eliminate seventh amendment
rights merely by reassigning the adjudication of those matters
from federal district courts to bankruptcy courts. Finally, Part
IV addresses the constitutionality of permitting bankruptcy
COM. L.J. 342 (1985); Note, The Availability of Jury Trials in Bankruptcy
Courts, 4 BANKR. DEv. J. 257 (1987); Comment, The Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984: The Impact on the Right of Jury Trial in
Bankruptcy Court, 16 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 535 (1985).
15. This Article uses the term bankruptcy matter to refer to any case or
proceeding falling within the scope of bankruptcy jurisdiction as conferred by
28 U.S.C. § 1334 (Supp. III 1985). Thus the term includes the bankruptcy
"case," any civil proceeding "arising under" the Bankruptcy Code, and any
civil proceeding "arising in" or "related to" a bankruptcy case.
16. See, e.g., Terry v. Proehl (In re Proehl), 36 Bankr. 86, 87 (W.D. Va.
1984); Cameron v. Anderson (In re American Energy), 50 Bankr. 175, 181
(Bankr. D.N.D. 1985); Allard v. Benjamin (In re DeLorean Motor Co.), 49
Bankr. 900, 912-13 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985); King, supra note 14, at 702-08.
Authorities taking this restrictive view recognize a jury trial right only in
the narrow category of cases expressly identified by 28 U.S.C. § 1411-personal
injury and wrongful death tort claims. See infra note 97 and accompanying
text.
17. See, e.g., Price-Watson Co. v. Amex Steel Corp. (In re Price-Watson
Co.), 66 Bankr. 144, 145 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986); McCormick v. American In-
vestors Management (In re McCormick), 61 Bankr. 595, 596 (Bankr. D. Nev.
1986); Leird Church Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Union Nat'l Bank (In re Leird
Church Furniture Mfg. Co.), 61 Bankr. 444, 44445 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1986); S.
BERNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 39-47; Comment, supra note 14, at 546, 554-55.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1411.
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judges to conduct jury trials. Here the Article examines
whether a jury trial before a non-article III bankruptcy judge
constitutes a trial by jury within the meaning of the seventh
amendment and, if so, whether article III of the Constitution
permits a fixed-term bankruptcy judge to exercise this author-
ity. Answering the latter question requires consideration of the
current bifurcated system of bankruptcy procedures in light of
the Supreme Court's uncertain article III precedents.
The Article concludes that the seventh amendment re-
quires a jury trial for certain matters currently adjudicated in
the bankruptcy courts. In many of the cases in which such
rights exist, however, authorizing a non-article III bankruptcy
judge to preside over the jury trial produces a serious constitu-
tional conflict. Article III's requirement that the decisions of
non-article III courts be subject to de novo review cannot be
reconciled with the seventh amendment's prohibition against
the reexamination of jury verdicts. To avoid this conflict and to
assure compliance with both constitutional provisions, the Arti-
cle proposes that jury trials of such matters be conducted only
by article III district judges.
I. DEVELOPMENTS UNDERLYING THE CURRENT
CONTROVERSY
A. JURY TRIALS UNDER THE 1898 ACT
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (1898 Act),19 the prede-
cessor of the 1978 Act, the forum where the case was brought
determined whether a jury trial was available. Proceedings
falling within the bankruptcy court's summary jurisdiction20
19. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, §§ 1-70, 30 Stat. 544 (as amended) (re-
pealed 1979).
20. Under the 1898 Act, bankruptcy courts possessed exclusive jurisdiction
over all administrative matters arising in the course of bankruptcy proceed-
ings. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Bray, 225 U.S. 205, 217 (1912).
They also had the exclusive right to determine title to and possession of assets
within their custody. J. MAcLAcHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANK-
RUPTCY 205-06 (1956). Finally, bankruptcy courts could rule on matters sub-
mitted to them with the consent of the parties, even if the disputes involved
property not within the courts' custody. Harris v. Avery Brundage Co., 305
U.S. 160, 164 (1938). These three categories of proceedings comprised the
bankruptcy courts' summary jurisdiction. Use of this term to describe the au-
thority of the bankruptcy court may have developed because many of the mat-
ters traditionally brought before bankruptcy courts were nonadversarial and
were resolved informally. See J. MACLACHLAN, supra, at 203-08; Gibson, Re-
moval of Claims Related to Bankruptcy Cases: What Is a "Claim or Cause of
Action"?, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1986); Treister, Bankruptcy Jurisdiction Is
1988]
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were generally conducted by bankruptcy referees21 without the
aid of a jury.22 All other bankruptcy-related disputes were re-
solved by plenary suits2 3 in a state or federal district court.2 In
these courts the right to a jury trial was determined either by
the seventh amendment or by nonbankruptcy state or federal
law.25
There were, however, two statutory exceptions to the rule
barring jury trials in summary proceedings. First, a person
against whom an involuntary bankruptcy petition was filed
could demand a jury trial on the questions of insolvency and
commission of acts of bankruptcy.26 Second, a 1970 amendment
It Too Summary?, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 78, 78-81 (1966); see also infra notes 206-
10 and accompanying text (discussing bankruptcy courts as courts of equity
when they exercised summary jurisdiction under the 1898 Act).
21. Under the 1898 Act, federal district courts were the statutorily desig-
nated "courts of bankruptcy." Ch. 541, § 1(8), 30 Stat. 544, 544. The duties of
the bankruptcy courts, however, were generally carried out by bankruptcy
referees appointed by the district courts. See id. §§ 33, 38-39, 30 Stat. 555-56.
Referees were later designated bankruptcy judges. Fed. Bankr. R. 901(7), 11
U.S.C. app. at 1358 (1976).
22. See, e.g., 2 COLLIER, supra note 14, 1 19.07 (14th ed. 1976); D. COWANS,
BANKRurrcy LAw ANiDf PRACTIcE § 836 (1963); J. MACLACHLAN, supra note 20,
at 204; Levy, Trial by Jury Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 12
CoNN. L. REv. 1, 3-5 (1979); Comment, Jury Trials in the Bankruptcy Court,
1982 ANN. SuRv. BANKR. L. 417, 418-21.
23. See infra note 213.
24. Under § 23 of the 1898 Act, a district court generally could hear only
those plenary suits over which it would have possessed jurisdiction in the ab-
sence of bankruptcy proceedings. Ch. 541, § 23, 30 Stat. 544, 552 (as amended)
(repealed 1979). Notwithstanding the lack of federal jurisdiction in the ab-
sence of bankruptcy, district courts were granted jurisdiction concurrent with
state courts to hear certain suits brought by a trustee. See id. § 60, 30 Stat. 544,
562 (recovery of preferences); id. § 67, 30 Stat. 544, 564 (avoidance of fraudu-
lent conveyances); id. § 70, 30 Stat. 544, 565 (avoidance of transfers voidable by
bankrupt's creditors). District courts also maintained jurisdiction of any other
suit by the trustee or receiver against an adverse claimant if the defendant
consented to the district court's jurisdiction. Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S.
367, 377 (1934). Although the district court was sometimes referred to as a
bankruptcy court when it heard plenary suits brought by the bankruptcy
trustee, it actually sat as a district court rather than as a court of bankruptcy.
Therefore a district judge rather than a bankruptcy referee presided over the
cases. See, e.g., 2 COLLIER, supra note 14, 1 23.1517] (14th ed. 1976); J. MAC-
LACHLAN, supra note 20, at 213; see also infra notes 212-23 and accompanying
text (discussing legal nature of plenary actions under 1898 Act).
25. See, e.g., In re Baudouine, 101 F. 574, 575 (C.C.N.Y. 1900); Allen v.
Gray, 201 N.Y. 504, 508-09, 94 N.E. 652, 654-55 (1911); 2 COLLMR, supra note 14,
19.07 (14th ed. 1976); Levy, supra note 22, at 5; Comment, supra note 22, at
420.
26. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 19, 30 Stat. 544, 551 (as amended) (re-
pealed 1979). Section 19(a) provided:
A person against whom an involuntary petition has been filed shall be
[Vol. 72:967
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to the 1898 Act provided for jury trials in proceedings before
the bankruptcy court to determine the dischargeability of
debts.27 Although some disagreed about its intended scope,28
this provision generally was not applied to the discharge issue
itself. Rather, the provision was interpreted to apply to legal is-
sues, such as liability or damages, that remained to be resolved
if the claim was nondischargeable. 29 Beyond these narrow cate-
gories, however, the 1898 Act provided no jury trial rights. In
addition, it was generally believed that there was no constitu-
tional entitlement to a jury trial in summary proceedings.3 0
entitled to have a trial by jury, in respect to the question of his insol-
vency,... and any act of bankruptcy alleged in such petition to have
been committed, upon filing a written application therefor at or
before the time within which an answer may be filed.
Id. An involuntary petition was required to allege the commission of one of
the "acts of bankruptcy" specified in § 3 of the Act. Most of these acts re-
quired a showing of the alleged bankrupts insolvency at the time of commis-
sion. Id. § 3, 30 Stat. 544, 546; see 1 COLIER, 1 3.05 (14th ed. 1976); J.
MAcLAcHLAN, supra note 20, at 35.
27. Act of Oct. 19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-467, § 7c(5), 84 Stat. 990, 993 (re-
pealed 1979). In this Act Congress authorized bankruptcy courts to determine
the dischargeability of debts and, if the debt should be found nondischarge-
able, to resolve the remaining issues between the bankrupt and the creditor.
Permitting this litigation to take place in the bankruptcy court, rather than in
state court as had previously been the practice, generated concern that the
parties would be deprived of the right to a jury trial. Accordingly, the Act pro-
vided that "[n]othing in this subdivision c [authorizing bankruptcy court deter-
mination of dischargeability] shall be deemed to affect the right of any party,
upon timely demand, to a trial by jury where such right exists." Id. § 17(c)(5),
84 Stat. 990, 993; see S. REP. No. 1173, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1970).
28. Professor Countryman maintained that § 17(c)(5) did not grant a right
to a jury trial on the threshold question concerning whether a particular debt
was or was not dischargeable. He argued that the provision merely preserved
previously existing jury trial rights. Since there had never been a right to a
jury trial on the discharge issue itself, he concluded that none was created by
this statute. Countryman, Jury Trials on Dischargeability-A Reply to Refe-
ree Herzog, 46 AM. BANKR. L.J. 305, 305-07 (1972); Countryman, The New Dis-
chargeability Law, 45 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 34-43 (1971). Bankruptcy Referee
Herzog disagreed. He read the statutory language and the legislative history
of § 17(c)(5) as indicating a congressional intent to provide for jury trials on
the dischargeability issue. Herzog, The Case for Jury Trials on the Issue of
Dischargeability, 46 AM. BANKR. L.J. 235, 241-43 (1972).
29. See, e.g., In re Swope, 466 F.2d 936, 938 (7th Cir. 1972) (per curiam),
cert denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973); Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Merrill (In re Mer-
rill), 433 F. Supp. 455, 457-58 (N.D. Ala. 1977), modified, 594 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir.
1979); In re Copeland, 412 F. Supp. 949, 953-54 (D. Del. 1976); In re Hinchey,
349 F. Supp. 116, 118 (D. Or. 1972); In re Palfy, 336 F. Supp. 1268, 1270-71 (N.D.
Ohio 1972).
30. See, e.g., Beery v. Turner (In re Beery), 680 F.2d 705, 710 (10th Cir.),
cernt denied, 459 U.S. 1037 (1982). In a proceeding under the 1898 Act, the
court stated that "the right to a jury trial in bankruptcy proceedings is purely
1988]
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The 1898 Act was silent as to who should conduct the jury
trial in the two exceptional situations in which the statute es-
tablished such a right. In 1960 the Judicial Conference passed a
resolution expressing its sense that bankruptcy referees should
not conduct jury trials.31 The bankruptcy rules promulgated by
the Conference in 1973, however, expressed a contrary view.
The rule governing involuntary petitions provided that if an al-
leged bankrupt demanded a jury trial, the referee was to pre-
side unless the bankrupt's demand specified that a district
judge conduct the trial or a local rule required a district judge
to conduct it.32 Although the Rule governing dischargeability
seemed to favor the conduct of jury trials by a district judge, it
too permitted referees to conduct jury trials.33 It provided that
the trial of an issue for which a jury trial had been demanded
would take place before the district judge unless a local rule
provided otherwise.3 4 The Advisory Committee notes ex-
plained that the local rule could provide for a referee to con-
duct the jury trial in the bankruptcy court.35
B. JURY TRIALS UNDER THE 1978 ACT
When Congress revised the bankruptcy laws in 1978,36 it in-
statutory. There is no constitutional right to such trial as bankruptcy proceed-
ings are equitable in nature." Id.; see 2 COLLIER, supra note 14, 11 19.02, .07; D.
CowANs, supra note 22, § 836; Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Rules Under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act, 1981 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 13, 28; Comment, supra
note 22, at 419.
31. Report of the Proceedings of a Special Session of the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States, 22 ANN. REP. PRoc. JuD. CoNF. U.S. 375, app. at 396
(1960).
32. The Rule provided in part: "If the [jury trial] demand specifies that a
district judge conduct the trial or if a local rule of court so provides, the trial
shall be placed on the calendar of the district court as a jury action; otherwise
the referee shall conduct the jury trial." Fed. Bankr. R. 115(b)(1), 11 U.S.C.
app. at 1298 (1976).
33. Fed. Bankr. R. 409, 11 U.S.C. app. at 1329 (1976).
34. The Rule stated in part: "The trial of an issue for which a jury trial
has been demanded shall be placed on the jury calendar of the district court
when it is ready for trial unless (1) the bankruptcy judge determines after
hearing on notice that the issue is not triable of right by a jury or (2) a local
rule of court provides otherwise." Fed. Bankr. R. 409(c), 11 U.S.C. app. at 1329
(1976).
35. See 12 COLLIER 409.1 (14th ed. 1976). The precise number of jury tri-
als that were conducted by referees pursuant to these provisions is unclear.
36. Bankruptcy Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). For
discussions of the legislative history of the 1978 Act, see generally Butler, A
Congressman's Reflections on the Drafting of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, 21
WM. & MARY L. REV. 557 (1980); Klee, Legislative History of the New Bank-
ruptcy Law, 28 DE PAUL L. REV. 941 (1979). The legislative history of the 1978
[Vol. 72:967
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cluded among its reforms a new jury trial provision.37 This pro-
vision stated:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, this
chapter and title 11 do not affect any right to trial by jury, in a case
under title 11 or in a proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or
related to a case under title 11, that is provided by any statute in ef-
fect on September 30, 1979.
(b) The bankruptcy court may order the issues arising under
section 303 of title 11 [governing involuntary bankruptcies] to be tried
without a jury.3 8
A Senate Committee report accompanying the 1978 Act ex-
plained that section 1480(a) "continues any current right of a
litigant in a case or proceeding under title 11 or related to such
a case, to a jury trial."39 A House Report also stated that
"[b]ankruptcy courts will be required to hold jury trials to adju-
dicate what are under present law called 'plenary suits,' that is,
suits that are brought in State or Federal courts other than the
bankruptcy courts. '40
The intent of subsection (b) is plain. It expressly and in-
tentionally reversed the jury trial practice for involuntary
bankruptcies under the 1898 Act. Rather than being one of the
few situations in which a right to a jury trial in bankruptcy was
statutorily granted, involuntary bankruptcies were singled out
as situations in which the bankruptcy court was explicitly au-
thorized to deny a jury trial.4 '
Act has been compiled in a multivolume set, A. RESNICK & E. WYPYSKI, BANK-
RUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1979).
37. Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 241(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2671 (1978) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1480 (repealed 1984)). The jury trial provision was derived from a
proposal made by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States. Composed of members of Congress, judges, and bankruptcy practition-
ers, the Commission was established by Congress in 1970 to "study, analyze,
evaluate and recommend changes" that should be made in the nation's bank-
ruptcy laws. S.J. Res. 88, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REc. 22,115-16 (1970).
The Commission reported to Congress in 1973 with an analysis of the problems
in the existing bankruptcy laws and the text of a proposed new bankruptcy
statute. COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNrTED STATES, RE-
PORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPrCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. pts. 1-2 (1973) [hereinafter COMMISSION
REPORT].
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1480 (1982) (repealed 1984).
39. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong.; 2d Sess. 157, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5787, 5943. The Senate Report referred to proposed 28
U.S.C. § 1875, which was worded similarly to § 1480 with respect to the scope
of the jury trial right. See S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 293 (1977).
40. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADimN. NEWS 5963, 5973.
41. See Davis v. Central Bank (In re Davis), 23 Bankr. 773, 777 (Bankr.
1988]
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The impact of subsection (a) on preexisting law, however,
was less easily determined. The provision was subject to con-
flicting interpretations that divided both courts and commenta-
tors. One line of authority concluded that Congress intended
only to preserve jury trial rights in existence prior to the effec-
tive date of the 1978 Act and did not intend to create new jury
trial rights.4 2 These cases held that applying section 1480(a) re-
quired a determination whether the case would have been tria-
ble to a jury under the 1898 Act. This required the court to
analyze whether the matter would have been brought as a sum-
mary or plenary proceeding, and if the latter, whether it would
have been entitled to a trial by jury under state or federal
law.43  Other courts, concluding that Congress intended to
9th Cir. 1982) (holding that bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in de-
nying debtors' demand for jury trial of issues raised by involuntary petition);
B. WEIrRAuB & A. RESNICK, supra note 14, at 6-30 (§ 1480(b) "departed from
the former law in that the court was given the power to order that all issues
arising with respect to the grounds for an involuntary petition be tried without
a jury"); Levy, supra note 22, at 11 (under § 1480(b) there is no right to jury
trial of any issues arising under § 303).
42. See Huffman v. Brandon (In re Harbour), 59 Bankr. 319, 325 (W.D. Va.
1986) (§ 1480(a) "merely preserved the right to trial by jury that existed prior
to the enactment of the 1978 bankruptcy code"); McLouth Steel Corp. v. Mar-
blehead Lime Co. (In re McLouth Steel Corp.), 55 Bankr. 357, 361 (E.D. Mich.
1985) (language and legislative history of § 1480(a) indicate "the new statute is
to have no impact on the right to a jury trial"); Farmers & Merchants Nat'l
Bank v. Aylesworth (In re Arnett Oil), 44 Bankr. 603, 604 (N.D. Ind. 1984)
(legislative history indicates that "Section 1480(a) contemplated the preserva-
tion of any right to a jury trial in a proceeding arising under Title 11 that was
in effect on September 30, 1979"); Masto v. Coast Trading Co., (In re Coast
Trading Co.), 31 Bankr. 666, 666 (Bankr. D. Or. 1982) ("[Ihe Code preserved
the rights to a jury trial under the old Act and it did not expand these rights
to new or different areas of litigation."); In re Lafayette Radio Elecs. Corp., 7
Bankr. 187, 188 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980) ("§ 1480 contemplated the preservation
of any right to a jury trial... that was provided by any statute in effect on
September 30, 1979.") (emphasis in original).
Commentators sharing this view of § 1480(a) included B. WEINTRAUB & A.
RESNICK, supra note 14, at 6-30 (§ 1480(a) "preserved the same right to a trial
by jury that existed before its enactment," other than with respect to involun-
tary petition issues); Kennedy, supra note 30, at 28 (§ 1480(a) "seems calcu-
lated, whether inadvertently or otherwise, to require the bankruptcy court to
draw the old time-worn distinction [between summary and plenary jurisdic-
tion] for the purposes of determining the right of a jury trial"); Comment,
supra note 22, at 434 ("preferable" view is that "there is no right to a jury trial
in the bankruptcy court unless such a right existed before September 30,
1979").
43. See, e.g., Coast Trading Co., 31 Bankr. at 666 ("The first step in decid-
ing whether one has a right to a jury trial is to make a determination of
whether the instant complaint would have been a summary or a plenary ac-
tion."); Belfance v. Sizzler Family Steak Houses (In re Portage Assocs.), 16
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abandon the summary/plenary dichotomy when it enacted the
1978 Act, held that the analytical method required under sec-
tion 1480(a) was the same as that applied by the district courts
in a civil case.44 The court was required to analyze both the na-
ture of the claim and the relief sought. If equitable in nature,
there was no right to a jury trial. If legal, however, there was a
jury trial right regardless of whether there would have been
such a right under the 1898 Act.45
1. The Summary/Plenary Approach
A slight majority of courts adopted the summary/plenary
method of analysis.46 A typical example of this line of cases is
Bankr. 445, 447 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982) ("[A] bankruptcy court must first de-
termine whether the action in question would have been a summary or ple-
nary proceeding if brought under the former Act."); Zimmerman v. Mozer (In
re Mozer), 10 Bankr. 1002, 1004 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981) (analysis must begin
"with an inquiry as to whether... the matter... would have been categorized
as a 'plenary' or 'summary' suit"); cf. Pettigrew v. Graham (In re Graham), 747
F.2d 1383, 1389 n.12 (11th Cir. 1984) (agreeing that analysis required determi-
nation whether there would have been right to jury trial under 1898 Act but
concluding that Congress meant to preserve only jury trial rights that existed
in federal court, not state court).
44. See Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers
Org. (In re Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org.), 23 Bankr. 271, 275
(D.D.C. 1982) ("[Continuing the summary/plenary jurisdictional distinction to
determine a party's right to a jury trial seems at odds with the stated purposes
of the new Bankruptcy Code."); Interfirst Bank Dallas v. Basin Refining (In re
Basin Refining), 30 Bankr. 578, 583 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983) ("Mhe right to a
jury trial under 28 U.S.C. § 1480 ... is governed by the nature of the cause of
action since by adopting the Bankruptcy Code Congress intended to abolish
the cumbersome and time consuming determination of what cases and proce-
dures were summary or plenary."); In re Newman, 14 Bankr. 1014, 1015
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("Now that the distinction between summary and ple-
nary actions has been eliminated..., the right to a jury trial in bankruptcy
will depend upon the nature of the cause of action."); Pinson v. Reynolds (In
re First Fin. Group), 11 Bankr. 67, 69 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1981) ("[The same
principles which govern jury trials in district court logically apply to bank-
ruptcy courts."). Professor Levy agreed with this view of § 1480. Levy, supra
note 22, at 10 (stating preference for interpretation of § 1480 as extending the
right to jury trial "to any issue whose nature would have entitled a party to
jury trial, without regard to the 'summary-plenary' issue").
45. For discussions of the analytical method employed by federal courts
under the seventh amendment in nonbankruptcy cases, see generally J.
FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 483-503 (1985); F.
JAiEs & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 409-47 (3d ed. 1985); 5 J. MOORE, J.
LuCAS & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 38-33 to 38-90 (2d ed. 1987 &
Supp. 1987-1988); 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCE-
DURE §§ 2301-2307 (1971 & Supp. 1987).
46. See Graham, 747 F.2d at 1388; McLouth Steel Corp., 55 Bankr. at 361-
62; Hadar Leasing Int'l Co. v. D.H. Overmyer Telecasting Co. (In re D.H.
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Hadar Leasing International Co. v. D.H. Overmyer Telecasting
Co. (In re D.H. Overmyer Telecasting Co.). 47 A repossession ac-
tion was commenced in the bankruptcy court by the lessor of
the property, who had previously filed a proof of claim in the
debtor's chapter 11 proceeding. The debtor counterclaimed for
damages, and the lessor demanded a jury trial. The bankruptcy
court denied the jury demand and the district court affirmed.
After concluding there was no constitutional right to a jury
trial in a bankruptcy court,48 the district court held that section
1480 likewise conveyed no right to a jury trial in this bank-
ruptcy setting, even though outside of bankruptcy the demand
for damages might have given rise to a jury trial right.49 Ac-
cording to the court, section 1480(a) required it to determine
"whether the issues presented in the pleadings would have
been triable by a jury under the former Bankruptcy Act."50 It
noted that under the 1898 Act "the bankruptcy court was
granted summary jurisdiction over the issues concerning the
debtor's property which was in the actual or constructive pos-
session of the bankruptcy court."5 1 The court thus concluded
Overmyer Telecasting Co.), 53 Bankr. 963, 979-80 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Arnett Oil,
44 Bankr. at 604; Country Junction, Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co. (In re Country
Junction, Inc.), 41 Bankr. 425, 430 (W.D. Tex. 1984), affl'd, 798 F.2d 1410 (5th
Cir. 1986); Atlas Fire Apparatus v. Beaver (In re Atlas Fire Apparatus), 56
Bankr. 927, 935 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986); Lombard-Wall, Inc. v. New York City
Hous. Dev. Corp. (In re Lombard-Wall, Inc.), 44 Bankr. 928, 936 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1984), rev'd, 48 Bankr. 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); McLouth Steel Corp. v.
AJF, Inc. (In re McLouth Steel Corp.), 38 Bankr. 316, 317 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1984), affl'd, 55 Bankr. 357 (E.D. Mich. 1985); First Int'l Servs. Corp. v. Apollo
Sign Co. (In re First Int'l Servs. Corp.), 37 Bankr. 856, 859 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1984); Beck v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp. (In re Sunair Int'l), 32 Bankr. 142, 144
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983); Coast Trading Co., 31 Bankr. at 666-67; Jahn v. Lamb
(In re Lamb), 29 Bankr. 950, 950-51 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983); Salomon v.
Luzar (In re Black & Geddes, Inc.), 25 Bankr. 278, 280 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982);
Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org. (In re
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org.), 22 Bankr. 212, 213 (Bankr. D.D.C.),
aff'd, 23 Bankr. 271 (D.D.C. 1982); Kransdorf v. Murray (In re Fidelity Am.
Fin. Corp.), 20 Bankr. 115, 116-17 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); Hadar Leasing Int'l
Co. v. D.H. Overmyer Telecasting Co. (In re D.H. Overmyer Telecasting Co.),
18 Bankr. 107, 108 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982); Portage Assocs., 16 Bankr. at 448;
Mozer, 10 Bankr. at 1004-05; Lafayette Radio Elecs. Corp., 7 Bankr. at 188.
47. 53 Bankr. 963 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
48. Id. at 979. The court relied on Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966),
which it read as holding that "there is no constitutional right to a jury trial in
a bankruptcy court because such proceedings are equitable in nature." 53
Bankr. at 979. The Katchen decision is discussed extensively in Part III of this
Article. See infra notes 136-98 and accompanying text.
49. 53 Bankr. at 980.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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that there would have been no right to a jury trial for this ac-
tion under the prior Act and hence no right to a jury trial
under section 1480(a).52
2. The Pure Seventh Amendment Approach
The alternative interpretation of section 1480(a) was also
well represented in case law.53 For instance, in Martin Baker
Well Drilling v. Koulovatos (In re Martin Baker Well Drill-
ing),54 the plaintiffs moved to strike the defendants' demand
for a jury trial.55 In determining whether defendants were en-
titled to a jury trial under section 1480(a), the bankruptcy court
rejected the summary/plenary line of cases.56 It concluded that
"[t]his approach runs counter to Congress' basic aim of elimi-
nating the enormous volume of wasteful litigation under the
old Act over summary jurisdiction."57 The court believed it
"unlikely that Congress intended to abolish the sum-
mary/plenary distinction as to jurisdiction, while retaining the
same distinction as the basis for determining jury trial
52. Id. The court also held that the lessor's demand for a jury trial should
be denied because, by filing a proof of claim against the estate, it had "volunta-
rily submitted to the summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court." Id.
Other courts, sharing this interpretation of § 1480, reinforced their analy-
sis by citing House and Senate reports that discuss the preservation of existing
jury trial rights. See, e.g., Portage Assocs., 16 Bankr. at 447-48; see also infra
note 70 (discussing positions taken by the House and Senate on preserving the
jury trial right).
53. See Nickinello v. Roberson (In re Huey), 23 Bankr. 804, 804 (Bankr.
9th Cir. 1982); Lombard-Wall, Inc. v. New York City Hous. Dev. Corp. (In re
Lombard-Wall, Inc.), 48 Bankr. 986, 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Air Transp. Ass'n of
Am. v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org. (In re Professional Air Traffic
Controllers Org.), 23 Bankr. 271, 274 (D.D.C. 1982); Pereira v. Checkmate
Communications Co. (In re Checkmate Stereo & Elecs.), 21 Bankr. 402, 408
(E.D.N.Y. 1982); Busey v. Fleming (In re Fleming), 8 Bankr. 746, 748 (N.D. Ga.
1980); Young v. Peter J. Saker, Inc. (In re Paula Saker & Co.), 37 Bankr. 802,
807 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); Martin Baker Well Drilling v. Koulovatos (In re
Martin Baker Well Drilling), 36 Bankr. 154, 155-56 (Bankr. D. Me. 1984); In-
terfirst Bank Dallas v. Basin Refining (In re Basin Refining), 30 Bankr. 578,
583 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983); Gagel v. Kingston Greene Partners (In re GWF
Investment), 24 Bankr. 435, 436 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); Boroff v. Carriero (In
re Carriero), 21 Bankr. 132, 133 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982); Pettigrew v. Graham
(In re Graham), 16 Bankr. 606, 610 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981); In re Newman, 14
Bankr. 1014, 1015 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981); Pinson v. Reynolds (In re First Fin.
Group), 11 Bankr. 67, 69 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1981); Brown v. Frank Meador Bu-
ick (In re Frank Meador Buick), 8 Bankr. 450, 455 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1981).
54. 36 Bankr. 154 (Bankr. D. Me. 1984).
55. Id. at 155. The plaintiffs sought recovery for preferential and fraudu-
lent transfers, conversion, fraud, and defamation. Id.
56. Id. at 155-56.
57. Id. at 155.
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rights."5 8 Instead, the court held that "under the Bankruptcy
Code, the same right to jury trial exists as exists in other fed-
eral courts."5 9 Accordingly, the court determined which of the
plaintiffs' claims were legal rather than equitable and granted
the jury demand as to them.60
The Martin Baker Well Drilling court made no attempt to
reconcile its method of analysis with section 1480's language,
which merely disclaimed any intent to "affect" jury trial rights
"provided by any statute in effect on September 30, 1979."61
Other courts that rejected the summary/plenary method of
analysis, however, adopted the suggestion of a commentator
that the word "statute" be interpreted as including the seventh
amendment.62 If an action carried a right to a jury trial under
the seventh amendment,63 these courts reasoned, then section
1480 preserved that right when the action was tried in
bankruptcy.6
58. Id. at 156.
59. Id.
60. Id. The court granted the jury demand with respect to the counts
seeking damages for conversion, fraud, misrepresentation, interference with
contractual relationships, and defamation. Id. at 156 n.2. Ironically, the
summary/plenary method of analysis would have yielded the same result
under § 1480. That result would obtain because the action by the debtor in
possession would have been pursued by a plenary suit under the 1898 Act, in
which action there would have been a right to a jury trial. See, e.g., Belfance v.
Sizzler Family Steak Houses (In re Portage Assocs.), 16 Bankr. 445, 448
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982) (granting jury demand under § 1480 because, under
1898 Act, trustee would have had to bring plenary suit in which there was a
right to a jury trial). Another case illustrates why the method of analysis em-
ployed by the court under § 1480 was sometimes crucial to the ruling on the
jury demand. See Lombard-Wall Inc. v. New York City Hous. Dev. Corp. (In
re Lombard-Wall Inc.), 48 Bankr. 986, 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding right to
jury trial because counterclaim against creditor was legal in nature), revg 44
Bankr. 928 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (denying jury demand because action would
have been within bankruptcy court's summary jurisdiction since creditor filed
claim against estate).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1480(a) (repealed 1984).
62. See Levy, supra note 22, at 9-10. Professor Levy argued that it was un-
likely that Congress meant to preserve jury trial rights granted by statute but
not common law jury trial rights protected by the seventh amendment. He
suggested that to circumvent this problem, courts could "interpret the word
'statute' as including constitutional provisions. Since bankruptcy courts are
federal courts, the seventh amendment to the United States Constitution then
would apply and would fill the gap." Id. at 10.
63. The analysis applied in nonbankruptcy courts under the seventh
amendment is discussed infra note 132 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., Pinson v. Reynolds (In re First Fin. Group), 11 Bankr. 67, 69
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1981) (adopting Professor Levy's interpretation of § 1480);
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Although not always fully acknowledged,6 5 a pure seventh
amendment reading of section 1480 would have resulted in a
vast expansion of jury trial rights beyond those existing under
the 1898 Act. For example, under the 1898 Act it was well es-
tablished that claims against the bankruptcy estate were re-
solved by summary proceedings without the aid of a jury.66
The summary/plenary interpretation of section 1480 therefore
led to the conclusion that jury trial rights were not conveyed
under the 1978 Act with regard to such claims, because none
had previously existed either under a statute or under the sev-
enth amendment. A pure seventh amendment reading of sec-
tion 1480, by contrast, would have examined the constitutional
entitlement to a jury trial outside the bankruptcy context. This
analysis would suggest that so long as the creditor asserted a
legal claim for damages against the estate, the claim would be
Brown v. Frank Meador Buick (In re Frank Meador Buick), 8 Bankr. 450, 454
(Bankr. W.D. Va. 1981) (same).
Interestingly, some courts that adopted the summary/plenary approach to
§ 1480 agreed that the term statute should be read to include the seventh
amendment. They distinguished their analysis, however, by considering
whether there would have been a constitutional right to a jury trial of the ac-
tion in bankruptcy prior to the adoption of the 1978 Act. Thus their analysis
took into account authority holding that there was no constitutional right to a
jury trial of summary proceedings under the 1898 Act. See, e.g., First Int'l
Servs. Corp. v. Apollo Sign Co. (In re First Int'l Serv. Corp.), 37 Bankr. 856,
859-60 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1984).
Still other courts seemed to get tangled up in the language of § 1480. For
example, the district court in Country Junction, Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co. (In
re Country Junction, Inc.), 41 Bankr. 425 (W.D. Tex. 1984), alff'd, 798 F.2d 1410
(5th Cir. 1986), started out by stating that § 1480 required a determination of
whether there would have been a right to a jury trial under the 1898 Act. Id.
at 430. This preference action, the court concluded, would have been a plenary
action under the 1898 Act and thus possibly entitled to a jury trial. Rather
than concluding that this result was preserved by § 1480, however, the court
reasoned that because the case was now subject to the broadened "summary
jurisdiction" of the bankruptcy courts under the 1978 Act and 1898 Act, there
was no right to a jury trial in summary proceedings, there was no such right
under § 1480. Id.
65. But see Levy, supra note 22. Professor Levy admitted that application
of a seventh amendment analysis to § 1480 "has the effect of greatly increasing
the number of jury trials to be conducted by the bankruptcy courts beyond
those cases in which there would have been both a right to plenary jurisdiction
and an issue as to which a right to jury trial exists in such proceedings." Id. at
8.
66. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307 (1939) ("[Ihe bankruptcy
court in passing on allowance of claims sits as a court of equity."); In re Equity
Funding Corp. of Am., 396 F. Supp. 1266, 1276 (C.D. Cal.) (exercise of sum-
mary juridiction over claims against bankrupt's subsidiaries, which court
viewed as claims against bankruptcy estate, held not to violate seventh amend-
ment), qff'd, 519 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1975).
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triable by a jury. The fact that such a claim previously had not
been triable by a jury when asserted in the bankruptcy context
would be irrelevant.6 7
67. See American Universal Ins. Co. v. Pugh (In re Pugh), 72 Bankr.
174, 176 (D. Or. 1986) (creditor arguing that, due to elimination of
summary/plenary dichotomy, § 1480 should be interpreted to allow parties
"'the same right to jury trial as they would have in other federal courts, re-
gardless of how their actions would have been characterized prior to the
Code'" (quoting from Appellant's brief)), aff'd, 821 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1987);
In re Newman, 14 Bankr. 1014, 1015 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("Now that the
distinction between summary and plenary actions has been eliminated .... the
right to a jury trial in bankruptcy will depend upon the nature of the cause of
action."); First Fin. Group, 11 Bankr. at 69 ("[Ihe right to jury trials under
the Code must be determined by the nature of the cause of action and not by
the historical nature of the court."); Frank Meador Buick, 8 Bankr. at 455
("This Court need only look to the right of trial by jury generally and does not
need to determine a right of trial by jury with the inordinate burdens placed
upon the Court with summary jurisdiction under the Act of 1898."); Comment,
supra note 14, at 541 (courts adopting this interpretation of § 1480 "have con-
cluded that under the Code, the same right to a jury trial exists as in other
federal courts").
Allowing jury trials for the adjudication of disputed claims follows logi-
cally from the position taken by the courts that applied a pure seventh amend-
ment analysis to § 1480. Nevertheless, there is no reported instance of a court
granting a jury trial under such circumstances. But c. In re Kaufman, 78
Bankr. 309, 311-12 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1987) (lifting automatic stay to permit liq-
uidation of claim against estate in state court, where creditor will be entitled
to jury trial). Despite broad assertions that jury trial rights in bankruptcy are
equivalent to those existing in federal district court, these courts may really
have been advocating what has been identified as a third interpretation of
§ 1480: "As to [the essential administrative tasks of the bankruptcy court],
there was no right to a jury trial. But as to disputes between a trustee and
adverse claimants, one was to look to nonbankruptcy law to determine
whether there was a jury trial right." D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, CASES,
PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 964 (1985).
Perhaps these courts recognized a distinction between claims against the
estate and claims by the estate against third parties. They may have viewed
the allowance and disallowance of claims against the estate as essential admin-
istrative tasks that would continue to be resolved without a jury, regardless of
whether they would have been triable by a jury outside of bankruptcy. As for
legal claims asserted by the estate against third parties, however, the pure sev-
enth amendment interpretation of § 1480 recognized the existence of jury trial
rights, even though under the 1898 Act such claims would have come within
the bankruptcy court's summary jurisdiction-for example, a preference claim
against someone who had previously filed a proof of claim against the estate.
Although this interpretation is less sweeping than one that applies the seventh
amendment without distinction, it too results in an expansion of jury trial
rights over those existing under the 1898 Act. Thus it too can be questioned as
being inconsistent with the language and legislative history of § 1480. See in-
fra notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
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3. Legislative History of Section 1480
The legislative history of section 1480, though sparse and
generally uninformative, fails to support the pure seventh
amendment approach to interpreting the provision.68 Instead,
Congress appears to have enacted the provision to ensure that
by expanding the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction and by al-
lowing matters to be adjudicated there that previously had been
tried in state or federal district court, it would not infringe on
the parties' existing rights to jury trial.69 Congress accordingly
adopted a provision that simply preserved jury trial rights in
68. As with many other provisions of the 1978 Act, the provision for jury
trials in bankruptcy originated with the Commission on Bankruptcy Law of
the United States. The Commission's jury trial provision would have elimi-
nated the right to a jury trial of involuntary petition issues, but in all other
instances would have preserved "the right to a jury trial of any issue ... as
recognized and enforced prior to the effective date of the Act." CoMMIssIoN
REPORT, supra note 36, pt. 1, at 45 (§ 2-207(b)). The Commission explained
that
[I]f either party would have been entitled to a jury trial of the issues
remaining after a determination of nondischargeability pursuant to
§ 17c of the present Act, or of the issues in a plenary action to recover
on a cause of action enforceable by the trustee under §§ 60b, 67d, 70a,
or 70e, he may demand such a trial in accordance with applicable
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
Id. at 46. Thus, the Commission identified proceedings in which a right to a
jury trial existed and stated that those rights would be continued, even though
its proposal required the trial to be convened in the bankruptcy court.
Although the Commission's proposed language was modified slightly, no one
in Congress ever proposed or expressed a desire to broaden the scope of the
provision beyond that suggested by the Commission. See infra notes 69-70.
69. The jury trial provision was rarely mentioned during the lengthy
hearings leading up to enactment of the 1978 Act. The statements of two wit-
nesses who testified before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights are revealing, however. Daniel Cowans, a former bank-
ruptcy judge and treatise author, stated that he did not foresee any constitu-
tional limitations on the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts "unless, somehow or
other, someone were deprived of a jury trial right." Bankruptcy Act Revision:
Hearings on H.R. 31 and 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 1st & 2d Sess. 316
(1975-1976). Similarly, Professor Shapiro of Harvard Law School, responding
by letter to an inquiry from the subcommittee, stated his belief that there was
strong support for permitting a non-article III court to adjudicate bankruptcy
matters, provided that "the right to trial by jury is not violated." Id. at 2702.
Although both witnesses were ultimately proved wrong in their views con-
cerning article III, see Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982), their testimony suggests that Congress may have
been motivated by the need to preserve constitutionally protected rights. Cer-
tainly there is nothing in the legislative history to suggest a contrary motive.
There was never any suggestion during any of the hearings related to the 1978
Act that creating new jury trial rights beyond those already existing under
current law was desirable.
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existence prior to the effective date of the 1978 Act. Nothing in
the language of section 1480 or its legislative history suggested
that Congress desired to expand the right to jury trials beyond
the preexisting practice.70
Interpreting section 1480 to reflect Congress's intent to
preserve preexisting jury trial rights required courts to deter-
mine whether a particular action would have been triable by a
jury under the 1898 Act.71 Criticism of this interpretation
rested primarily on Congress's explicit intent to eliminate the
distinction between summary and plenary jurisdiction.72 Con-
gress undeniably meant to eliminate this troublesome distinc-
tion by its broad jurisdictional grant to the bankruptcy courts.73
This does not mean, however, that resort to the distinction is
70. As noted previously, the House Judiciary Committee report explained
that § 1480(a) "continues any current right of litigants in bankruptcy cases,
and cases related to bankruptcy cases, such as plenary actions, to a jury trial,"
H. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 448 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6404, and that it "requires that the right of jury
trial be preserved as it is under present law," id. at 12, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5963, 5973 (footnote omitted). The report further
stated that "[b]ankruptcy courts will be required to hold jury trials to adjudi-
cate what are under present law called 'plenary suits,' that is, suits that are
brought in State or Federal courts other than the bankruptcy courts." Id.
Similarly, the Senate Judiciary Committee report explained that the jury trial
provision "continues any current right of a litigant in a case or proceeding
under title 11 or related to such a case, to a jury trial." S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 157, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEwS 5787,
5943.
71. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Busey v. Fleming (In re Fleming), 8 Bankr. 746, 748 (N.D. Ga
1980) (noting elimination of distinction between summary and plenary juris-
diction and concluding that "the sole inquiry now is whether the Seventh
Amendment... provides a right to jury trial on the contested issues"); Martin
Baker Well Drilling v. Koulovatos (In re Martin Baker Well Drilling), 36
Bankr. 154, 156 (Bankr. D. Me. 1984) ("[lt is unlikely that Congress intended
to abolish the summary/plenary distinction as to jurisdiction, while retaining
the same distinction as the basis for determining jury trial rights."); In re
Newman, 14 Bankr. 1014, 1015 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("Now that the distinc-
tion between summary and plenary actions has been eliminated... the right
to a jury trial in bankruptcy will depend upon the nature of the cause of
action.").
73. See, e.g., SEN. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5783, 5804 ("It is the purpose of [the jurisdic-
tional provisions] to eliminate entirely the present jurisdictional dichotomy be-
tween summary and plenary jurisdiction."); H. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 445 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6400
("Actions that formerly had to be tried in State court or in Federal district
court, at great cost and delay to the estate, may now be tried in the bank-
ruptcy courts. The idea of possession or consent as the sole bases for jurisdic-
tion is eliminated.").
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inappropriate in determining jury trial rights. Indeed, the lan-
guage and the history of section 1480 seem to require such an
approach.7 4 Moreover, the seventh amendment serves as a fa-
miliar analogy for an analysis of jury trial rights resting on his-
torical jurisdictional concepts. Under the seventh amendment,
distinctions between law and equity long abolished elsewhere7 5
remain significant in determining when there is a right to a
jury trial.76 The distinction continues to be relevant in the jury
trial context because the seventh amendment is expressed in
terms of preserving jury trial rights existing at the time the
seventh amendment was ratified.77 Applying a similar analysis
to the 1978 Act, one could recognize that Congress intended to
eliminate the summary/plenary distinction in the Act's jurisdic-
tional grant. Yet one could conclude that section 1480 never-
theless required a determination of what rights existed under
that prior jurisdictional scheme because it spoke merely of "not
affecting jury trial rights. '78 Although the analysis is cumber-
some, it is supported by the language and history of section
1480.79
Both the summary/plenary method and the pure seventh
amendment approach to interpreting section 1480 permitted the
conclusion that statutory jury trial rights existed in certain
74. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
75. The adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure resulted in the
merger of law and equity in the federal courts. See FED. R. Civ. P. 2.
76. See, e.g., J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 45, at 485
("The historical test in the federal courts after law and equity merged meant
that claims formerly triable 'at law' were entitled to a jury and those formerly
maintainable 'in equity' did not merit a jury as of right.") (footnote omitted);
Luneburg & Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries and Expert Nonjury
Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping with the Complexities of Modern Civil Lit-
igation, 67 VA. L. REV. 887, 901 (1981) ("[D]espite the merger of law and equity
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the historical distinction between
legal and equitable actions remains crucial to seventh amendment problems.")
(footnotes omitted).
77. See, e.g., J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 45, at 488
("[Clontinued utilization [of seventh amendment's historical test] seems re-
quired to honor the constitutional mandate."); Luneburg & Nordenberg, supra
note 76, at 901 ('"he seventh amendment by its own terms was intended to
'preserve' the right to trial by jury; thus, its application has long been gov-
erned by an historical test.") (footnote omitted).
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1480(a) (repealed 1984).
79. Cf. McLouth Steel Corp. v. Marblehead Lime Co. (In re McLouth
Steel Corp.), 55 Bankr. 357, 361-62 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (concluding that "[u]sing
the summary/plenary framework to determine the right to a jury trial does
not interfere with Congress' intent to eliminate time consuming jurisdictional
battles," but instead is consistent with that intent because it does not create
even more delay by expanding jury trial rights).
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bankruptcy matters.8 0 Although the exact number of jury tri-
als conducted under section 1480 is not known,8 ' there are over
a dozen reported decisions granting jury trials under this provi-
sion.8 2 When a jury trial was granted, there was apparent
agreement that the bankruptcy judge was authorized to con-
duct it.8 3
C. NORTHERN PIPELINE AND ITS AFTERMATH
The uncertainty concerning jury trials in bankruptcy was
exacerbated in 1982 by the Supreme Court's plurality decision
holding the 1978 Act's jurisdictional scheme unconstitutional.84
80. Under the pure seventh amendment method of analysis, any issue
that was legal rather than equitable in nature was entitled to be tried by a jury
under § 1480. Under the summary/plenary method of analysis, any issue that
was legal in nature and would have been pursued by a plenary proceeding
under the 1898 Act was triable by a jury.
81. The Administrative Office of the Courts did not compile statistics con-
cerning the number of jury trials conducted in the bankruptcy courts under
§ 1480. Telephone interview with Mary Boone, Bankruptcy Statistics Branch
of the Administrative Office of the Courts (June 5, 1987).
82. See Nickinello v. Roberson (In re Huey), 23 Bankr. 804, 805 (Bankr.
9th Cir. 1982); Lombard-Wall Inc. v. New York City Hous. Dev. Corp. (In re
Lombard-Wall Inc.), 48 Bankr. 986, 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Farmers & Merchants
Nat'l Bank v. Aylesworth (In re Arnett Oil), 44 Bankr. 603, 604 (N.D. Ind.
1984); Young v. Peter J. Saker, Inc. (In re Paula Saker & Co.), 37 Bankr. 802,
811 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); Martin Baker Well Drilling v. Koulovatos (In re
Martin Baker Well Drilling), 36 Bankr. .154, 156 (Bankr. D. Me. 1984); Ra-
venna Indus. v. Reliable Patternworks (In re Ravenna Indus.), 34 Bankr. 314,
316 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983); Beck v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp. (In re Sunair
Int'l), 32 Bankr. 142, 146 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983); Jahn v. Lamb (In re Lamb),
29 Bankr. 950, 953 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983); Salomon v. Luzar (In re Black &
Geddes, Inc.), 25 Bankr. 278, 281 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); Gagel v. Kingston
Greene Partners (In re GWF Inv.), 24 Bankr. 435, 436 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982);
Belfance v. Sizzler Family Steak Houses (In re Portage Assocs.), 16 Bankr.
445, 449 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982); Brown v. Frank Meador Buick (In re Frank
Meador Buick), 8 Bankr. 450, 455 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1981); Jensen v. Patterson
(In re Patterson), 6 Bankr. 149, 150 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980).
83. See, e.g., Huey, 23 Bankr. at 805 (remanding to bankruptcy court for
jury trial, holding that § 1480 superseded local rule requiring district court to
conduct jury trials); Lombard-Wall Inc., 48 Bankr. at 993 (holding that action
"must be tried by a jury in the bankruptcy court"); R. JORDAN & W. WARREN,
BANKRUPTCY 1058 (1985) (1978 Act "contemplated that bankruptcy judges
could conduct jury trials"); King, supra note 14, at 703 (under § 1480 "trial
before a jury would be held in the bankruptcy court because of the pervasive
jurisdiction granted to that court in section 1471(c)").
84. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982). In the plurality opinion, Justice Brennan concluded that the 1978 Act
violated article III of the Constitution by vesting the "'essential attributes of
the judicial power"' in bankruptcy judges who lacked lifetime tenure and pro-
tection against salary diminution. Id. at 87 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285
U.S. 22, 51 (1932)). The plurality rejected arguments that the broad exercise of
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In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., the Court rejected the argument that bankruptcy courts
should be viewed as adjuncts to the district court, reasoning
that "the bankruptcy courts exercise all ordinary powers of dis-
trict courts, including the power to preside over jury trials."8 5
Some courts interpreted this statement to mean that it is un-
constitutional for non-article III bankruptcy judges to conduct
jury trials. 86 An Emergency Rule proposed by the Judicial
Conference that apparently shared this view was adopted by all
district courts after the Northern Pipeline judgment went into
effect.8 7 The rule expressly prohibited bankruptcy judges from
jurisdiction by bankruptcy judges could be viewed as consistent with either the
congressional creation of article I legislative courts, id. at 63-76, or the permis-
sible utilization of adjuncts to article M courts, id. at 76-87. Justice Rehnquist,
in a concurring opinion joined by Justice O'Connor, concluded more narrowly
that the 1978 Act violated article III insofar as it authorized a bankruptcy
judge to hear and decide the type of bankruptcy-related, state-law claims then
before the Court. Id. at 89-92. Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor concluded,
however, that this impermissible grant of authority was "not readily severable
from the remaining grant of authority to bankruptcy courts," and thus they
concurred in the judgment. Id. at 91-92; see also infra notes 347, 357 (discuss-
ing Northern Pipeline decision).
85. 458 U.S. at 85 (plurality opinion).
86. See, eg., Cameron v. Anderson (In re American Energy), 50 Bankr.
175, 181 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985); Terry v. Proehl (In re Proehl), 36 Bankr. 86, 87
(W.D. Va. 1984).
87. The Supreme Court initially stayed its judgment in the Northern Pipe-
line case until October 4, 1982, to give Congress "an opportunity to reconsti-
tute the bankruptcy courts or to adopt other valid means of adjudication,
without impairing the interim administration of the bankruptcy laws." 458
U.S. at 88 (plurality opinion). It later extended the stay through December 24,
1982. 459 U.S. 813, 813 (1982). Although Congress still had not acted by that
date, the Court declined to stay its judgment any further. The decision be-
came effective on December 25, 1982. 459 U.S. 1094, 1094 (1982).
The Judicial Conference anticipated that Congress would not reconstitute
the bankruptcy courts before the Northern Pipeline stay terminated. It di-
rected the Administrative Office of the Courts to provide each circuit with a
model rule that could be adopted by each district court to "permit the bank-
ruptcy system to continue without disruption in reliance upon jurisdictional
grants remaining in the law as limited by Northern Pipeline." Vihon, Delega-
tion of Authority and the Model Rule: The Continuing Saga of Northern Pipe-
line, 88 CoM. L.J. 64, 76 (1983) (reprinting the resolution of the Judicial
Conference of Sept. 23, 1982, and the emergency rule sent out by the Adminis-
trative Office of the Courts). The rule was based on the assumption that the
grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction to the district courts remained intact and that
district courts could constitutionally delegate some of their duties to bank-
ruptcy judges. Id. at 77. Under the Emergency Rule, bankruptcy judges could
conduct proceedings and enter final judgments in some bankruptcy matters,
subject to the district court's right to withdraw the reference of the matter
from the bankruptcy judge and subject to the district court's de novo review.
Id. at 78. Bankruptcy judges, however, were prohibited from entering judg-
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conducting jury trials.88 Although courts continued to recog-
nize the existence of jury trial rights under section 1480, deci-
sions under the Emergency Rule required the district judge to
conduct any jury trials that took place.8 9
Further confusion resulted in August 1983 when revised
Bankruptcy Rules took effect.90 Among the new rules, which
had been approved by the Supreme Court and Congress, was
Rule 9015, governing the procedure for demanding and con-
ducting jury trials.91 Some courts interpreted Rule 9015 to
reauthorize jury trials in the bankruptcy courts, even though
the emergency rule continued in effect in all districts.92 Faced
with what they viewed as a conflict between the Emergency
Rule and Rule 9015, several bankruptcy courts held that Rule
9015 superseded the locally adopted Emergency Rule.93
ments or dispositive orders without the parties' consent in any "related pro-
ceedings." Id. These were defined as "those civil proceedings that, in the
absence of a petition in bankruptcy, could have been brought in a district court
or a state court." Id.; see Countryman, Emergency Rule Compounds Emer-
gency, 57 AM. BANK. L.J. 1 (1983); King, The Unmaking of a Bankruptcy
Court: Aftermath of Northern Pipeline v. Marathon, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
99, 115-17 (1983).
88. Subsection (d)(1) of the Emergency Rule, as distributed by the Ad-
ministrative Office of the Courts, provided that "the bankruptcy judges may
not conduct: ... (D) jury trials." See Vihon, supra note 87, at 78.
89. See, e.g., Ravenna Indus. v. Reliable Patternworks (In re Ravenna In-
dus.) 34 Bankr. 314, 316 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983); Beck v. Fairchild Aircraft
Corp. (In re Sunair Int'l), 32 Bankr. 142, 144 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983); Jahn v.
Lamb (In re Lamb), 29 Bankr. 950, 953 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983).
90. See 461 U.S. 975, 975 (1983) (prescribing Bankruptcy Rules and declar-
ing that they should take effect on Aug. 1, 1983).
91. See Fed. Bankr. R. 9015, 11 U.S.C. app. at 140 (Supp. IV 1986).
92. Rule 9015 did not expressly provide that bankruptcy courts could con-
duct jury trials. It nevertheless used the word court, id., which was defined by
Rule 9001 to include bankruptcy courts established under the 1978 Act, Fed.
Bankr. R. 9001, 11 U.S.C. app. at 136 (Supp. IV 1986). Accordingly, some
courts read Rule 9015 as indicating that jury trials could take place in bank-
ruptcy courts. See Lombard-Wall Inc. v. New York City Hous. Dev. Corp. (In
re Lombard-Wall Inc.), 48 Bankr. 986, 992 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("[R]ule 9015 ...
permits the bankruptcy courts to hold jury trials."); Young v. Peter J. Saker,
Inc. (In re Paula Saker & Co.), 37 Bankr. 802, 809 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (rule
9015 "affords no room for any construction that bankruptcy courts are not to
conduct jury trials but are to refer all such matters to the district courts");
Martin Baker Well Drilling v. Koulovatos (In re Martin Baker Well Drilling),
36 Bankr. 154, 158 (Bankr. D. Me. 1984) (incorporating Fed. Bankr. R. 9001(2),
which defines court to include the bankruptcy court, into rule 9015); Nashville
City Bank & Trust Co. v. Armstrong (In re River Transp. Co.), 35 Bankr. 556,
559 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983) ("Rule 9015 .. . contains absolutely no hint that
the United States bankruptcy court's exclusive power to hold jury trials in
bankruptcy cases and proceedings ... is abridged or curtailed....").
93. See, e.g., Paula Saker & Co., 37 Bankr. at 809 (holding that "local dis-
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II. JURY TRIAL RIGHTS UNDER THE 1984
AMENDMENTS
Whether there existed a right to a jury trial in bankruptcy
thus remained unsettled in the years following adoption of the
1978 Act. Courts were divided on the extent to which section
1480 established rights to a jury trial, and, after Northern Pipe-
line Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,94 it was un-
clear whether bankruptcy judges could conduct jury trials.
Any hopes that Congress would act to clarify the confusion
when it responded to Northern Pipeline, however, were ulti-
mately disappointed. The jury trial provision enacted by Con-
gress as part of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984 (1984 Amendments) 95 only further con-
fused matters.
Apparently repealing section 1480,9 the 1984 Amendments
included a new jury trial provision. Section 1411 declares:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, this
chapter and title 11 do not affect any right to trial by jury that an in-
dividual has under applicable nonbankruptcy law with regard to a
personal injury or wrongful death tort claim.
(b) The district court may order the issues arising under section
303 [governing involuntary bankruptcies] of title 11 to be tried with-
out a jury.97
Rather than resolving the important question of what bank-
ruptcy matters are entitled to be tried by a jury, the current
statute merely addresses the issue with respect to narrow cate-
gories of cases. Beyond these categories the statute is conspicu-
trict court rules cannot prevail over nationwide uniform rules promulgated by
the Supreme Court in the exercise of its exclusive authority"); Martin Baker
Well Drilling, 36 Bankr. at 158 ("In case of such a conflict [between local rule
and rule 9015], the new Bankruptcy Rules must prevail."); River Transp., 35
Bankr. at 559 ("Because the new bankruptcy rules continue to allow bank-
ruptcy judges to preside over jury trials, they must override the contrary
premise contained in the local rule.").
94. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
95. Pub. L. No. 98-343, 98 Stat. 333 (codified at various sections of 11 and
28 U.S.C.).
96. The effect of the 1984 Amendments on § 402(b) of the 1978 Act, which
included the jury trial provision, is difficult to ascertain because several of its
provisions appear to work at cross-purposes. Compare id. § 113, 98 Stat. 333,
343 (§ 402(b) shall not become effective) with id. § 121, 98 Stat. 333, 345
(§ 402(b) shall take effect on the date of enactment of the 1984 Amendments).
Most courts and commentators sensibly conclude, however, that § 1480 was re-
pealed outright or by implication by the 1984 Amendments. See, eg., Ameri-
can Universal Ins. Co. v. Pugh (In re Pugh), 72 Bankr. 174, 177 (D. Or. 1986);
King, supra note 14, at 703 n.79.
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1411 (Supp. 11 1985).
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ously silent about the extent of jury trial rights and the
authority of bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials.
Not surprisingly, courts struggling to interpret and apply
section 1411 reach conflicting conclusions concerning the exist-
ence of jury trial rights in bankruptcy.98 Although these courts
dutifully cite section 1411 as the governing statute,9 many fre-
quently ignore the statute and analyze whether there exists a
constitutional right to a jury trial.'00 The tendency to leap to
constitutional analysis may be due to the belief that the statute
confers no jury trial rights in the particular case or to the belief
that analysis under the seventh amendment is easier than try-
ing to make sense of the inscrutable section 1411. Even those
courts that do attempt to interpret section 1411 are divided as
to its meaning. Some conclude that the statute grants the right
to a jury trial only for the types of claims actually specified in
subsection (a).101 Others hold that section 1411 preserves jury
trial rights for all cases according to seventh amendment prin-
ciples.102 Congress's failure to address comprehensively the
question of jury trial rights in bankruptcy has thus produced
confusion in the lower courts' 0 3
A. SECTION 1411's PUZZLING LANGUAGE
The wording of section 1411 causes confusion because of its
narrow scope and uncertain implications. Subsection (a) per-
mits jury trial for "personal injury and wrongful death tort
98. See iqfra notes 170-98 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., Acolyte Elec. Corp. v. City of New York, 69 Bankr. 155, 182-
84 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986); Leird Church Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Union Nat'l
Bank (In re Leird Church Furniture Mfg. Co.), 61 Bankr. 444, 445 (Bankr.
E.D. Ark. 1986); Otte v. Monsanto Co. (In re McCray's Farm Supply), 57
Bankr. 423, 424 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1985); Mauldin v. Peoples Bank (In re
Mauldin), 52 Bankr. 838, 840 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1985).
100. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 99.
101. See Jefferson Nat'l Bank v. I.A. Durbin, Inc. (In re I.A. Durbin, Inc.),
62 Bankr. 139, 146 (S.D. Fla. 1986); Morgan v. Lefton (In re Hendon Pools), 57
Bankr. 801, 802 (E.D. Mich. 1986); Nordberg v. Republic Nat'l Bank (In re
Chase & Sandborn Corp.), 55 Bankr. 538, 539 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985); Cameron
v. Anderson (In re American Energy), 50 Bankr. 175, 180 (Bankr. D.N.D.
1985).
102. See, e.g., Wolfe v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n (In re Wolfe), 68
Bankr. 80, 87-88 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986); Energy Resources Co. v. Rosen (In re
Energy Resources Co.), 49 Bankr. 278, 281 n.2 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985); Ler-
blance v. Rodgers (In re Rodgers & Sons), 48 Bankr. 683, 687 (Bankr. E.D.
Okla. 1985).
103. See also infra notes 290-308 and accompanying text (discussing confu-
sion in case law over authority of bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials).
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claim[s].' '1 0 4 By preserving jury trial rights for this limited
class of cases, Congress may have meant that all other bank-
ruptcy matters should be tried without a jury.10 5 If that is the
correct interpretation of subsection (a), however, then subsec-
tion (b) seems superfluous. At the same time, the authorization
in subsection (b) to try involuntary bankruptcy issues without a
jury suggests that in its absence the right to a jury trial would
exist.10 6 If true, how does one discern the source and scope of
that right?
B. LEGisLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 1411
Compounding the confusion concerning section 1411's
meaning is the sparse history surrounding its enactment. In
the deliberations prior to enacting the 1984 Amendments, Con-
gress's discussion of the jury trial question was limited. At the
same time, the explanations of section 1411 that can be found in
the record are conflicting.
1. House and Senate Proposals
In response to the Northern Pipeline decision, bills were
introduced in Congress to restructure the bankruptcy courts.
Several House bills that proposed giving article III status to
bankruptcy judges would have essentially reenacted section
1480 without change. 0 7 There was virtually no discussion of
the jury trial provision in the committee reports accompanying
these bills.'0 8 In the Senate a 1983 bill introduced by Senators
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1411(a) (Supp. HI 1985).
105. See, eg., B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, supra note 14, at 6-32 ("Does
[§ 1411(a)] mean that all other issues are not to be tried by a jury? Or did Con-
gress intend that common law and statutory rights to trial by jury will con-
tinue to determine this question?") (emphasis in original); King, supra note 14,
at 706-07 ("[Sjection 1411(a) would be totally redundant if the right to jury
trial continued to exist in other types of disputes.").
106. See, ag., R. JORDAN & W. WARREN, supra note 83, at 1057-58 (enact-
ment of § 1411(b) "is some indication that Congress believed that after the
1984 Amendments the same rights of jury trial that existed under the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act are continued, except as specifically altered by § 1411(a)");
Greenfield, supra note 14, at 362 ("Section 1411(b) would appear to be
unnecessary.").
107. See H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CoNG. REC. H1727 (daily ed.
Mar. 19, 1984); H.R. 3, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H31-32 (daily ed.
Jan. 3, 1983); H.R. 6978, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H5884 (daily ed.
Aug. 12, 1982).
108. See H.R. REP. No. 9, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. REP. No. 807,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). There was no committee report accompanying
H.R. 5174.
1988]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Thurmond and Heflin proposed retaining the non-article III
status of bankruptcy judges, but contained a slightly reworded
jury trial provision.10 9 The committee report explained, how-
ever, that the reworded provision was intended to continue the
jury trial practice existing under section 1480.110 It thus ap-
pears that prior to enacting the 1984 Amendments there was no
congressional sentiment on the part of the relevant congres-
sional committees to change existing jury trial rights in
bankruptcy.
The bill ultimately enacted was amended on the House
floor by a substitute amendment proposed by Representatives
Kastenmeier and Kindness. l The amendment proposed re-
pealing section 1480 but did not suggest any replacement provi-
sion.1 2 There is no explanation in the record for this omission.
It is thus unclear whether the absence of a replacement provi-
sion was inadvertent or was based on a determination that
there should be no statutorily conferred rights to a jury trial in
bankruptcy.
When the House-passed bill was sent to the Senate, how-
ever, Senator Thurmond sought to amend it by adding the jury
trial provision that had been part of the Senate bill." 3 The de-
109. See S. 1013, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S4259 (daily ed. Apr.
7, 1983). This bill proposed adding at 28 U.S.C. § 1477 the following provision:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, this
chapter and title 11 do not affect any right to jury trial.
(b) The district court may order the issues arising under section
303 to be tried without a jury.
Id.; see S. REP. No. 55, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1983) (text of S. 1013).
110. S. REP. No. 55, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1983) ("Section 1477 of S. 1013
regarding jury trials is basically the same as section 1480 of existing law, ex-
cept that the language of the section has been simplified."); id. at 43 ("Section
1477 as added by the bill, is virtually the same to [sic] the jury trial provisions
of section 1480 of the 1978 Act.").
111. See H.R. 5174, 98th Cong. 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. H1789-92 (daily ed.
Mar. 20, 1984).
112. See id. at H1789-92. Section 113 of the bill provided that § 402(b) of
the 1978 Act "shall not take effect." Id. at H1791. The existing jury trial pro-
vision, § 1480, was among the sections covered by § 402(b); thus this provision
had the effect of repealing § 1480.
113. See 130 CONG. REC. S6082 (daily ed. May 21, 1984). Senator Thormond
explained this addition as follows:
We have also added a provision regarding jury trials.... It simply
states that nothing in chapter 87 of title 28 or in title 11 affects any
right to trial by jury. It does not affect in any way current law deter-
mining when a party is entitled to a jury trial.
Id.
The jury trial provision of this amendment was virtually identical to the
jury trial provision originally in S. 1013. See supra note 109; 130 CONG. REC.
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bate over this amendment further confused the issue. Senator
Heflin, discussing the meaning of section 1480, asserted that
"[w]hen Congress passed this provision as part of the [1978 Act],
it intended to maintain the status quo on jury trial rights as
such rights had existed prior to the expansion of the Bank-
ruptcy Court's jurisdiction." 4 He explained, however, that be-
cause the courts developed conflicting interpretations of section
1480,1 5 a reworded jury trial provision was needed. "The pur-
pose of this change is to eliminate any possible ambiguity as to
Congress' original intent in connection with the preservation of
rights to jury trials.""16
Senator Heflin's statement that the intent underlying sec-
tion 1480 had been to "maintain the status quo" and "not... to
alter rights to jury trials which might have existed under State
or Federal law prior to 1978"" 7 supports a summary/plenary
analysis of the provisionUs Senator Heflin, however, also gave
a contrary explanation of section 1480's intent:
Congress never intended that the filing of a bankruptcy petition by a
debtor act as an escape hatch from jury trials.
Thus, where a debtor, creditor or noncreditor third party would
have had a right to a jury trial on an issue of fact pursuant to Federal
or State law absent application of the bankruptcy laws, this amend-
ment ensures that such rights remain intact. This is true whether or
not an entity requesting a jury trial has filed a proof of claim with the
bankruptcy court." 9
By stressing the preservation of jury trial rights that would
have existed outside the bankruptcy context, Senator Heflin's
latter statement supports a pure seventh amendment approach
to analyzing section 1480.120 Such an approach does not simply
preserve the status quo. Rather, section 1480 expanded jury
trial rights beyond those existing under the 1898 Act if, as Sen-
ator Heflin suggested, it preserved the jury trial rights pos-
S6108 (daily ed. May 21, 1984). It was to be added at § 1411 of title 28, rather
than § 1477, however. Id.
114. 130 CONG. REC. S7618 (daily ed. June 19, 1984).
115. According to Senator Heflin,
[A]s drafted, the provision engendered confusion as to how to deter-
mine when a litigant was entitled to a jury trial. Moreover, courts dif-
fered on what was meant by the phrase "any statute in effect on
September 30, 1979." It was not clear whether "statute" encompassed
the U.S. Constitution as well as the various State constitutions.
Id. at S7618-19.
116. Id. at S7618.
117. Id. at S7618-19.
118. See supra notes 42-43 46-52 and accompanying text.
119. 130 CONG. REc. S7619 (daily ed. June 19, 1984) (emphasis added).
120. See supra notes 44-45, 53-60 and accompanying text.
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sessed by a creditor absent the debtor's bankruptcy.' 21
Considered together, Senator Heflin's statements illustrate sec-
tion 1480's ambiguity and create further uncertainty concerning
the intended meaning of the jury trial provision then being
considered.122
2. The Conference Committee Bill
A conference committee was convened to resolve the dif-
ferences between the House and Senate versions of the bank-
ruptcy amendments.123 The compromise bill that emerged
from the committee contained a new and narrowly worded jury
trial provision. Rather than preserving "any [existing] right to
trial by jury," as had the Senate version,'2 the bill addressed
only the preservation of jury trial rights for personal injury and
wrongful death tort claims.125 Because the conference report
contained only the text of the compromise bill,126 there is no of-
121. Under the 1898 Act, a creditor in effect lost jury trial rights when his
or her debtor filed for bankruptcy. With minor exceptions there was no right
to jury trial of summary proceedings, including those to determine the allow-
ance and disallowance of claims against the estate. See supra notes 19-30 and
accompanying text.
122. Senator Heflin's statements, coming over five years after the enact-
ment of § 1480, are of questionable authority as to the meaning of that provi-
sion. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 33 n.9 (1980) ("[Ihe views
of some Congressmen as to the construction of a statute adopted years before
by another Congress have 'very little, if any, significance.'") (quoting United
States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 170 (1968)). Nevertheless, his
colloquy with Senator Thurmond is entitled to some weight in interpreting the
reworded jury trial provision (§ 1411) then under consideration, because Sena-
tor Thurmond was the sponsor and floor manager of the bankruptcy amend-
ments bill. See, e.g., Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 728 (1983) (construction
given by bill's sponsor is authoritative guide to its interpretation); Bowsher v.
Merck & Co., 460 U.S. 824, 832 (1983) (same); Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S.
55, 63 (1980) (statements of "the sponsor and floor manager of [a] bill ... are
entitled to weight").
Senator Heflin inquired of Senator Thurmond whether he would agree
"that the intent of the amendment you are making [in § 1411] is only to sim-
plify the language of existing law and [that] there is no intention to effect any
substantive change." 130 CONG. REc. S7619 (daily ed. June 19, 1984). Senator
Thurmond agreed that Senator Heflin had correctly expressed the intent of
the wording change. Id.
123. Among other differences, the House had passed a bill containing no
jury trial provision, whereas the Senate-passed bill contained a jury trial provi-
sion that either preserved or expanded jury trial rights beyond those that had
existed in 1978. See supra notes 111-22 and accompanying text.
124. See 130 CONG. REC. S6108 (daily ed. May 21, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Thurmond) (language of proposed amendment).
125. Id. at H7472 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Rep. Rodino).
126. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 882, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984).
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ficial explanation for the change in the scope of the jury trial
provision.'2 Nevertheless, Congress enacted it in this form.
Senator DeConcini, who had been a member of the confer-
ence committee, later explained in an interview that the
broader Senate language was accidentally deleted from section
1411 by the bill's drafters. He believed that the conference
committee's intent had been to retain jury trial rights as they
existed under section 1480.12s Senator DeConcini's statement of
127. 130 CONG. REc. S8989, H7597, H7610 (daily ed. July 23, 1984) (enrolled
bills and joint resolutions signed). The floor debates on the conference com-
mittee bill also shed little light on the reasons for eliminating the broader jury
trial provision. In the House, Representative Fish, a member of the confer-
ence committee, explained merely that "[a] personal injury or wrongful death
tort claim against a bankrupt estate can be tried in a Federal district court
with a jury." Id. at H7490 (daily ed. June 29, 1984). He said nothing about jury
trial rights in other actions. In addition, Representative Kastenmeier, also a
conferee, explained the intent concerning wrongful death and personal injury
tort claims as follows:
[Mn those rare cases where the parties insist, a personal injury or
wrongful death case may be tried to judgment by a district court
judge. Finally, the conference report states that in this narrow range
of cases the parties do not lose any right to a jury trial that they may
have had if the claim had been cognizable outside the bankruptcy
context.
Id. at H7492 (emphasis added). Representative Kastenneier's reference to a
narrow range of cases in which jury trial rights are preserved suggests that no
other statutory rights to a jury trial were intended to be conveyed. On the
other hand, it is possible that he meant that only in this narrow category of
cases were jury trial rights existing outside of bankruptcy preserved, leaving
open the possibility that as to all other cases jury trial rights as they existed in
bankruptcy under the 1898 and 1978 Acts were preserved. If that was the con-
ference committee's intent, however, the provision as enacted failed to make
that clear. See inzfra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing alleged mis-
take in drafting § 1411).
In the Senate, Senator Thurmond explained that "[n]ew language on the
issue of jury trials is included." 130 CONG. REC. S8888 (daily ed. June 29, 1984).
He then read the language of § 1411(a) without giving any explanation for the
deletion of the broader Senate language concerning the preservation of jury
trial rights. Id.
128. Senator DeConcini explained-
Strange as it may seem, in light of the changes in language from the
text of the old law to the language of the new Section 1411(a), I be-
lieve there was no intent on the part of Congress to alter or modify
the rights to jury trial that might have existed under the Reform Act.
The change in statutory language came about as a result of com-
promises that the conferees settle[d] upon in resolving the issue of ab-
stention in personal injury and wrongful death cases. The question
arose as to whether or not the right to jury trial would be protected in
such cases when tried in the district courts. The conferees agreed
upon the importance of safeguarding this right to jury trial if it ex-
isted under applicable nonbankruptcy law. The language of Section
1411(a) as it now reads was crafted with that end in mind. However,
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the conference committee's purpose is plausible, especially
given the lack of evidence indicating a desire to eliminate jury
trial rights granted by the 1978 Act. 2 9 Nevertheless, in consid-
ering what weight, if any, 30 to accord Senator DeConcini's
statement, two factors are significant. First, there is no indica-
tion that any member of the House, which initially passed a bill
containing no jury trial provision, agrees with his views. Sec-
ond, despite Senator DeConcini's explanation that omitting the
broader language was a drafting oversight, the technical
amendments that he and Senator Dole later introduced did not
propose amending section 1411 to reinsert the language. 13 '
Thus Senator DeConcini's suggestion that Congress intended a
broader-than-enacted section 1411, even when considered along-
side similar indications in the legislative history, is not compel-
ling enough to permit reading into the provision words that
Congress did not enact. Instead, in cases other than those in-
volving personal injury and wrongful death claims, litigants in
bankruptcy-related actions must look to the seventh amend-
ment for a right to jury trial.
the conferees simply inadvertently failed to pick up the broader lan-
guage of the former provision. There was no desire on the part of any
of the conferees to limit the right to jury trial in other areas.
Dole/DeConcini Interviewed, 3 ABI NEWSL. 1, 3 (Winter 1984-1985).
The other participant in the joint interview, Senator Dole, did not dispute
Senator DeConcini's statement. His comments concerning § 1411, however,
addressed the intended placement of the provision governing the venue of
wrongful death and personal injury tort claims as the second sentence of
§ 1411(a), rather than as a separate provision at 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5). Id.
129. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
130. Senator DeConcini's after-the-fact, extracongressional statement is
not sufficiently reliable as an expression of congressional intent to warrant ig-
noring the language of § 1411 as enacted. See, e.g., Southeastern Community
College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411 n.11 (1979) ("[I]solated statements by indi-
vidual Members of Congress .... all made after the enactment of the statute
under consideration, cannot substitute for a clear expression of legislative in-
tent at the time of enactment."); Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725, 736 n.10
(1978) ("[A]s an expression of Congress' understanding as to the scope of the
preexisting... statute, such post hoc observations by a single member of Con-
gress carry little if any weight."); cf. Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 860
n.36 (1976) (characterizing as "not probative" Senator's explanation some 10
months after enactment of statute that his remarks had been erroneously
transcribed in Congressional Record).
131. See S. 529, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S2251 (daily ed. Feb.
27, 1985). Nor did the 1986 bankruptcy amendments make any changes in
§ 1411. See Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer
Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3097.
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III. THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT'S PROTECTION OF
JURY TRIALS IN BANKRUPTCY
Until recently the question of the right to a jury trial in
bankruptcy matters seemed relatively simple. Under the 1898
Act, it was assumed that the seventh amendment'3 2 was inap-
plicable to bankruptcy courts because they were courts of eq-
uity.13 The Supreme Court's 1966 decision in Katchen v.
Landy134 appeared to confirm this view. The 1978 Act ex-
panded the bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction, however, to include
matters previously encompassed by the seventh amendment's
132. The seventh amendment provides in part that "[i]n Suits at common
law... the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than accord-
ing to the rules of the common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII. Although sus-
ceptible to several interpretations, it is well established that the common law
referred to is the common law of England at the time of the amendment's rati-
fication in 1791. See, e.g., United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750) (Story, J.) ("[Tihe common law here alluded to is not
the common law of any individual state ... but it is the common law of Eng-
land, the grand reservoir of all our jurisprudence."). For the history surround-
ing the adoption of the seventh amendment, see Henderson, The Background
of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REv. 289, 291-99 (1966); Wolfram, The
Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 653-
730 (1973).
Because jury trials were available at that time only in courts of law, and
not in the courts of chancery, the seventh amendment is interpreted as pre-
serving jury trial rights only for actions of a legal rather than equitable na-
ture. See, e.g., Tull v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 1831 (1987). The Court in Tull
noted that the seventh amendment "require[s] a jury trial... in those actions
that are analogous to 'Suits at common law.' Prior to the Amendment's adop-
tion, a jury trial was customary in suits brought in the English law courts. In
contrast, those actions that are analogous to 18th-century cases tried in courts
of equity or admiralty do not require a jury trial." Id. at 1835 (emphasis in
original); see also Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830) ("By com-
mon law, [the seventh amendment's Framers] meant ... not merely suits,
which the common law recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but
suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradis-
tinction to those where equitable rights alone were recongized, and equitable
remedies were administered. .. .") (emphasis in original). Unfortunately, de-
termining the precise nature of complex actions in a modern federal court sys-
tem in which law and equity are administered by the same courts poses great
difficulties. See generally J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note
45, at 487-503 (analyzing Beacon Theatres and its progeny and discussing right
to a jury trial for statutory causes of action); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra
note 45, at 425-51 (discussing right to jury trial in a merged system).
133. See, e.g., J. MOORE & W. PHIiPS, DEBTORS' AND CREDrroRs' RIGHTs
6-1 to 6-2 (1966) (stating that there is no constitutional right to jury trial in
proceedings in bankruptcy or in controversies arising in proceedings in bank-
ruptcy); see also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
134. 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
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jury trial guarantee. With that expansion, the consensus of
opinion disappeared. Today courts and commentators are
deeply divided over whether the seventh amendment guaran-
tees jury trial rights in bankruptcy.135 Many of these diverse
opinions result from disagreement over the meaning and cur-
rent effect of Katchen.
A. KATCHEN V. LANDY
As stated by the Supreme Court, the issue in Katchen con-
cerned the subject matter jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
courts.136 The significance of the decision, however, derives
from its statements concerning the scope of the seventh amend-
ment. At the time, it was well established that there was no
right to a jury trial for matters falling within the bankruptcy
court's summary jurisdiction. The creditor, who sought a jury
trial, therefore argued that a finding in favor of summary juris-
diction was precluded by the seventh amendment. 37 The
Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that the bank-
ruptcy court had summary jurisdiction over the preference
counterclaim.138 In reaching its decision, the Court concluded
that there was no constitutional right to a jury trial of a prefer-
ence claim asserted as an objection to a claim against the bank-
ruptcy estate.139
Katchen was an officer of a bankrupt corporation. Four
months prior to the bankruptcy, he made several payments
from corporate funds on two corporate notes on which he was
an accommodation maker. 40 When Katchen later filed claims
against the bankruptcy estate, the trustee counterclaimed, as-
serting that the payments Katchen made on the notes consti-
tuted voidable preferences because they benefitted him by
reducing his potential liability as the accommodation maker.141
In addition, the trustee demanded judgment in the amount of
the preferences. Katchen argued that the bankruptcy court
135. See infra notes 172-98 and accompanying text.
136. Specifically, the Court characterized the issue as "whether a bank-
ruptcy court has summary jurisdiction to order the surrender of voidable pref-
erences asserted and proved by the trustee in response to a claim filed by the
creditor who received the preferences." 382 U.S. at 325.
137. Id. at 336.
138. Id. at 335.
139. Id. at 336-40.
140. Id. at 325. Katchen exercised "sole control" over the account from
which the payments were made. Id.
141. Id. at 325. For a discussion of the concept of indirect preferences, see
D. EPsTEIN & J. LANDERS, DEBTORS AND CREDrrORS 485 (2d ed. 1982).
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lacked jurisdiction to order the surrender of the preferences.142
The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the trustee, holding
that it had jurisdiction to determine the preference claim. 143
The bankruptcy court also determined that the payments made
by Katchen were preferential and entered judgment against
him in their amount.'" The Tenth Circuit affirmed en banc. 45
The Supreme Court recognized the dilemma posed by this
situation. On the one hand, although statutorily invested with
"'jurisdiction at law and in equity,' "146 bankruptcy courts are
"essentially courts of equity,... and they characteristically pro-
ceed in summary fashion to deal with the assets of the bank-
rupt they are administering."'147 On the other hand, if Katchen
had not filed his claims in the bankruptcy proceeding, the
trustee would have been forced to bring "a plenary action... in
the federal courts [where] the creditor could [have] demand[ed]
a jury trial.' 148 Thus the Court analyzed whether an equitable
bankruptcy court could determine this otherwise legal claim
without violating the seventh amendment.
The Court first determined that the trustee's preference
counterclaim fell within the bankruptcy court's summary juris-
diction.149 Such jurisdiction included the power to allow and
disallow claims, which necessarily encompassed the power to
determine the validity of debts alleged to underlie the claim.'50
The trustee was obligated to raise any objections to claims, and
the bankruptcy court was then obligated to rule on the
objections.15'
142. 382 U.S. at 325.
143. See id.
144. See id. The bankruptcy court also ruled that Katchen's claims against
the estate would not be allowed until the judgment against him was satisfied.
Id.
145. 336 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1964). The dissenters argued that the creditor
should not be forced to choose between the exercise of his right to file a claim
against the bankruptcy estate and his right to have the preference claim
against him determined by a jury. Id. at 541.
146. 382 U.S. at 327 n.2 (quoting § 2a of the 1898 Act, 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)
(1964)).
147. Id. at 327.
148. Id. at 327-28.
149. Id. at 335.
150. Id. at 329.
151. Id. "'The whole process of proof, allowance, and distribution is,
shortly speaking, an adjudication of interests claimed in a res,' . . . and thus
falls within the principle... that bankruptcy courts have summary jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate controversies relating to property within their possession."
Id. at 329-30 (quoting Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 573 (1947)).
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Having established the contours of the bankruptcy court's
summary jurisdiction, the Court noted that one possible objec-
tion to a claim, as set forth in section 57g of the 1898 Act, was
that the claimant had received a voidable preference that had
not been surrendered.152 If the trustee objected to a claim on
that basis, the claim could not be allowed until the preference
matter was resolved. The Court reasoned that a section 57g ob-
jection was thus "part and parcel of the allowance process and
[was] subject to summary adjudication by a bankruptcy
court."1
5 3
The Court then considered whether the bankruptcy court's
summary jurisdiction extended to the judgment entered against
Katchen for the payments on the notes. Rejecting the argu-
ment that such affirmative relief was only obtainable in a ple-
nary suit, the Court reasoned that in ruling on the claim
objection, the bankruptcy court could decide all other essential
issues.'5 It would have to decide, for example, whether
Katchen indirectly received a voidable preference, and in what
amount, to determine how much Katchen would have to sur-
render before his claim would be allowed. 155 Once the bank-
ruptcy court decided these issues, a plenary action would be a
"meaningless gesture" since principles of res judicata and col-
lateral estoppel would apply.-5 6 Instead, it was "well within the
equitable powers of the bankruptcy court to order return of the
preference during the summary proceedings on allowance and
disallowance of claims."'5 7 The Court's holding on the statu-
tory question, then, was that the 1898 Act conferred "summary
jurisdiction to compel a claimant to surrender preferences that
under § 57g would require disallowance of the claim.'15 8
152. Id. at 330. Section 57g provided: "The claims of creditors who have
received or acquired preferences, liens, conveyances, transfers, assignments or
encumbrances, void or voidable under this title, shall not be allowed unless
such creditors shall surrender such preferences, liens, conveyances, transfers,
assignments, or encumbrances." 11 U.S.C. § 93(g) (1964) (codified as amended
at 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) (1982)).
153. 382 U.S. at 330. The Court found support for this conclusion in other
parts of the 1898 Act, pointing to provisions allowing recovery, by means of
summary proceeding, of dividends previously paid creditors when claims were
later reconsidered and rejected. Id. at 331-32. The Court also cited decisions
upholding the bankruptcy court's summary jurisdiction to recover excess pay-
ments made to attorneys prior to bankruptcy. Id. at 333.
154. Id. at 333-35.
155. Id. at 334.
156. Id. at 334-35.
157. Id. at 334-35.
158. Id. at 335. The Court expressly declined to rule on a broader consent
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In response to Katchen's seventh amendment objection to
the finding of jurisdiction, the Court held that there was no
constitutional right to a jury trial of the preference claim in
this particular context. The Court reasoned that the preference
claim was presented as part of the essentially equitable process
of adjudicating claims against the bankruptcy estate.159 Under-
lying the Court's rejection of the seventh amendment argument
was the concept of transforming a legal claim into an equitable
one. According to the Court, the 1898 Act "converts the credi-
tor's legal claim into an equitable claim to a pro rata share of
the res, a share which can neither be determined nor allowed
until the creditor disgorges the alleged voidable preference he
has already received."'160 The trustee's preference counter-
claim, which would be viewed as an action at law if asserted by
way of plenary action, was now part of the equitable claim al-
lowance-disallowance proceeding and thus was not triable by a
jury.161
Finally, the Court rejected Katchen's argument that Bea-
theory that some lower courts had relied on to sustain summary jurisdiction
over trustees' counterclaims. Id. at 332-33 n.9. Section 23b of the 1898 Act pro-
vided that "[s]uits by the receiver and the trustee" could be brought only in
the courts where they could have been brought if a bankruptcy petition had
not been filed, unless the defendant consented to jurisdiction elsewhere (in-
cluding the bankruptcy court). 11 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1964) (repealed 1979). The
Court declined to consider whether Katchen had consented to suit in the
bankruptcy court, because it concluded that "determination of objections to
claims, whether or not affirmative relief is decreed, does not constitute adjudi-
cation of a suit by the trustee." 382 U.S. at 333 n.9. Instead, the Court said its
decision was "governed by the 'traditional bankruptcy law that he who invokes
the aid of the bankruptcy court by offering a proof of claim and demanding its
allowance must abide the consequences of that procedure.'" Id. (quoting
Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 573 (1947)). Accordingly, the Court ex-
pressed no opinion on whether the bankruptcy court's summary jurisdiction
empowered it to determine a trustee's demand for affirmative relief when "all
of the substantial factual and legal bases for [it] have not been disposed of in
passing on objections to the claim." Id.
159. 382 U.S. at 336. The Court explained:
[A]Ithough petitioner might be entitled to a jury trial on the issue of
preference if he presented no claim in the bankruptcy proceeding and
awaited a federal plenary action by the trustee, when the same issue
arises as part of the process of allowance and disallowance of claims,
it is triable in equity.
Id. (citation omitted). The Court further declared that since "the proceedings
of bankruptcy courts are inherently proceedings in equity, there is no Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial for determination of objections to claims, in-
cluding § 57g objections." Id. at 336-37 (citations omitted).
160. Id. at 336 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
161. Id. at 336.
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con Theatres v. Westover 162 and Dairy Queen v. Wood-63 re-
quired the bankruptcy court to order the trustee to pursue the
preference claim in a plenary proceeding. In such a proceeding,
Katchen would have been able to demand a jury trial.
Although the bankruptcy court possessed the power to issue
such an order, the Court held that precedent did not require it
to do so.16 The Dairy Queen doctrine, "if applicable at all,"
would apply regardless of whether the trustee sought affirma-
tive relief.165 The Court reasoned that unnecessary delays and
expenses would be incurred if every time a trustee presented a
section 57g objection, and a jury trial was demanded, the bank-
ruptcy proceedings were suspended while a plenary preference
action was pursued.166 Such a result would be inconsistent with
both the 1898 Act and the rule of Beacon Theatres and Dairy
162. 359 U.S. 500 (1959). In Beacon Theatres the Court held that when a
jury trial is demanded in a lawsuit comprised of both legal and equitable
claims with overlapping issues, the legal claims normally must be tried to the
jury first to preserve the jury trial right. Id. at 510-11; see generally McCoid,
Procedural Reform and the Right to Jury Trial A Study of Beacon Theatres,
Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1967); Redish, Seventh Amendment
Right to Jury Triak A Study in the Irrationality of Rational Decision Mak-
ing, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 486, 490-502 (1975).
163. 369 U.S. 469 (1962). In Dairy Queen the Court expanded the impact of
its Beacon Theatres holding by declining to accept the plaintiff's characteriza-
tion of the relief sought. Id. at 477-80. Although the complaint requested the
equitable remedy of an accounting, the Court concluded that, given the proce-
dures currently available in the federal courts, the legal remedy of damages
would be adequate, thus giving rise to a right to a jury trial. Id.
164. Katchen, 382 U.S. at 338-39.
165. Id. at 339.
166. Id. To some commentators the Court's discussion of the congressional
desire for prompt trials suggests the existence of congressional power to over-
ride the seventh amendment whenever jury trials would be inconvenient. See
Note, Congressional Provision for Nonjury Trial Under the Seventh Amend-
ment, 83 YALE L.J. 401, 413-16 (1973) (reading Katchen as supporting view that
"[w]hen Congress indicates in legislation which creates a statutory cause of ac-
tion that the suit should be tried without a jury, courts should accede to that
declaration."); infra note 272. In fact, however, the Court was addressing the
specific question whether the bankruptcy court was required to stay its equita-
ble proceedings while the trustee pursued a separate preference suit at law in
a nonbankruptcy court. The Court's conclusion that such delay would be in-
consistent with congressional intent is similar to the conclusion the Court later
reached in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). In that case, the
Court rejected the suggestion that the district court should have stayed the eq-
uitable proceeding brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission to al-
low a parallel private legal action to reach the trial stage first. Id. at 338 n.24.
Although such a procedure would have preserved the defendants' right to jury
trial, the Court found it inconsistent with the congressional desire for "prompt
enforcement actions by the SEC unhindered by parallel private actions." Id.
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Queen, "which is itself an equitable doctrine."' 67 The Court
stressed that Katchen's situation, unlike that before the Court
in the earlier cases, "involved a specific statutory scheme con-
templating the prompt trial of a disputed claim without the in-
tervention of a jury" and that Congress intended the trustee's
objection to be determined summarily.168 Moreover, the Court
noted that both Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen recognized
situations in which an equitable claim might be resolved first,
even though a jury trial of an overlapping legal claim could be
precluded.169
B. CONFLICTING VIEWS OVER KATCHEN'S CURRENT EFFECT
The implications of the Katchen decision, uncertain under
the bankruptcy statute then in effect,170 are even less certain
167. Katchen, 382 U.S. at 339.
168. Id. The Court concluded that "[t]o implement congressional intent,
... it [was] essential to hold that the bankruptcy court may summarily adjudi-
cate the § 57g objection; and... the power to adjudicate the objection carries
with it the power to order surrender of the preference." 382 U.S. at 340.
169. In Beacon Theatres the Court stated that
[i]f there should be cases where the availability of declaratory judg-
ment or joinder in one suit of legal and equitable causes would not in
all respects protect the plaintiff seeking equitable relief from irrepar-
able harm while affording a jury trial in the legal cause, the trial
court will necessarily have to use its discretion in deciding whether
the legal or equitable cause should be tried first.
359 U.S. at 510. The Court also stated, however, that "only under the most im-
perative circumstances, circumstances which in view of the flexible procedures
of the Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate, can the right to a jury trial of
legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims." Id. at
510-11 (footnote omitted).
170. Although Katchen made clear that the bankruptcy court could deter-
mine a trustee's preference counterclaim against a creditor who filed a claim
against the bankruptcy estate, its application to other counterclaims was not
certain. Scholarly commentary debated whether the decision implied that the
bankruptcy court also had summary jurisdiction over permissive counterclaims
not providing a basis for a § 57g objection. Those who interpreted the decision
broadly argued that it was based on a consent theory, despite the Court's ex-
press refusal to consider that issue. See, e.g., Current Decision, 38 U. CoLo. L.
REV. 609, 613 (1966); Recent Decision, 17 W. RES. L. REV. 1198, 1201 (1966).
Under this view, a creditor who filed a claim against the bankruptcy estate
opened itself up to any claims the trustee might have against it. Others, more
faithful to the opinion, believed Katchen was limited to counterclaims that also
provided a basis for objection to the creditor's claim against the estate. See,
e.g., Seidman, Katchen v. Landy-Some Implications, 71 CoM. L.J. 241, 242
(1966); Note, Bankruptcy--Summary Jurisdiction, 27 LA. L. REV. 315, 317-18
(1967); Comment, Katchen v. Landy and Summary Jurisdiction in Bank-
ruptcy, 52 VA. L. REV. 1530, 154041 (1966).
The Supreme Court itself has interpreted Katchen broadly in subsequent
decisions. In Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974), the Court stated that
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under current law. Since the case was decided, Congress has
expanded bankruptcy court jurisdiction to include matters pre-
viously litigated only in nonbankruptcy courts.171 This jurisdic-
tional expansion raises questions about the current
applicability, validity, and meaning of Katchen.
Some authorities interpret Katchen broadly by taking the
position that under current law there is no constitutional right
to jury trial in any bankruptcy matters.172 They accept
Katchen's description of bankruptcy courts as essentially courts
of equity and conclude that the seventh amendment's guaran-
tee of jury trial rights is inapplicable to all matters coming
within bankruptcy jurisdiction, whether exercised by bank-
ruptcy or district judges.173 Although no decisions endorse this
view fully, some courts appear to support this approach.174
Katchen upheld Congress's power to entrust enforcement of statutory rights to
a "specialized court of equity free from the strictures of the Seventh Amend-
ment." Id. at 195. In his dissent in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), Justice White, Katchen's author, described
Katchen as recognizing the authority of the referee to "adjudicate counter-
claims against a creditor who files his claim against the estate." Id. at 99.
Most recently, in Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct.
3245 (1986), the Court stated that "in Katchen ... this Court upheld a bank-
ruptcy referee's power to hear and decide state law counterclaims against a
creditor who filed a claim in bankruptcy when those counterclaims arose out
of the same transaction." Id. at 3258 (emphasis added).
171. See supra notes 1-5, 73 and accompanying text. Although the 1984
Amendments restricted the authority of bankruptcy judges, see infra notes
186-94 and accompanying text, bankruptcy jurisdiction remains as broad as it
was under the 1978 Act. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (Supp. III 1985) (jurisdic-
tional provision under 1984 Amendments) with id. § 1471 (1982) (repealed
1984) (jurisdictional provision under 1978 Act). Under both provisions the dis-
trict court is granted "original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title
11" and "original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising
under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11." Id. § 1334 (Supp.
III 1985); id. § 1471 (1982) (repealed 1984). The 1984 Amendments, however,
deleted the provision that appeared at § 1471(c) that directed the bankruptcy
court to exercise all of the jurisdiction conferred by the provision on the dis-
trict court. See id. § 1471(c) (1982) (repealed 1984).
172. 1 COLLIER, supra note 14, 3.01, at 3-92 to 3-101; King, supra note 14,
at 702-08.
173. 1 COLER, supra note 14, 3.01, at 3-97 (when district court exercises
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334, sitting as bankruptcy court, "the doctrine
of Katchen v. Landy would seem to apply, and, since the proceeding is ipso
facto an equitable proceeding, no jury trial is mandated by any law or by the
United States Constitution"); King, supra note 14, at 706 ("There is no right to
a jury in the bankruptcy court [or] in the district court.") (footnote omitted).
174. For example, the bankruptcy court in Allard v. Benjamin (In re
DeLorean Motor Co.), 49 Bankr. 900 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985), stated that
"generally, there is no right to jury trial under the Bankruptcy Code. 'Cases,
causes, and claims arising under title 11 are summary proceedings and are to
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At the other end of the spectrum are decisions that either
ignore Katchen or consider it irrelevant to analyzing whether
jury trial rights exist in current bankruptcy courts. 1 5 These
courts take the view that bankruptcy courts should determine
jury trial rights according to the same seventh amendment
analysis applied by district courts in nonbankruptcy cases. 176
Courts adopting this view base their jury trial decisions on the
nature of the claim and the relief requested.177 They disregard
whether the matter in question would have been classified as
summary or plenary under the 1898 Act' 78 and whether it is
the type of proceeding in which a bankruptcy judge is now au-
thorized to enter a final judgment. 7 9 Rather, if the case is eq-
be tried by the Court sitting without a jury."' Id. at 913 (quoting McLouth
Steel Corp. v. AJF (In re McLouth Steel Corp.), 38 Bankr. 316, 317 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 1984), tff'd sub nom. McLouth Steel Corp. v. Marblehead Lime Co.
(In re McLouth Steel Corp.), 55 Bankr. 357 (E.D. Mich. 1985)). The court
based its conclusion on Katchen, noting that "[t]here can be 'no right to jury
trial where the U.S. Supreme Court has said none exist[s]."' Id. Accordingly,
the court held there was no right to a jury trial in this action by the trustee to
enforce the debtor's prepetition cause of action for damages. Id.; see also In re
Manning, 71 Bankr. 981, 985 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1987) (holding that "the
debtor's counterclaim is to be tried in the bankruptcy court, which is a court of
equity, [and] ... ordinarily there is no right to a jury trial in a court of eq-
uity"); Nordberg v. Republic Nat'l Bank (In re Chase & Sandborn Corp.), 55
Bankr. 538, 539 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) (stating, without questioning its consti-
tutionality, that § 1411 "restricts the right to jury trial in the bankruptcy court
to the right of an individual in personal injury or wrongful death action
brought under nonbankruptcy law").
175. See Moratzka v. Wencl (In re Wencl), 71 Bankr. 879, 883 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1987); Leird Church Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Union Nat'l Bank (In re
Leird Church Furniture Mfg. Co.), 61 Bankr. 444 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1986) (no
mention of Katchen); Otte v. Monsanto Co. (In re McCrary's Farm Supply), 57
Bankr. 423, 424 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1985); Boss-Linco Lines v. Laidlaw Transp.
(In re Boss-Linco Lines), 55 Bankr. 299 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985) (same);
Mauldin v. Peoples Bank (In re Mauldin), 52 Bankr. 838 (Bankr. N.D. Miss.
1985) (same); Energy Resources Co. v. Rosen (In re Energy Resources Co.), 49
Bankr. 278, 282 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985); Lerblance v. Rodgers (In re Rodgers &
Sons), 48 Bankr. 683 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1985) (same).
176. See cases cited supra note 175; see also S. BERNSTEIN, supra note 14, at
46 ("One could draw the inference [from the wording of § 1411] that the Sev-
enth Amendment applied to all legal issues regarding money damages .... );
Comment, supra note 14, at 546 ("[Because] bankruptcy courts sit as adjuncts
to the district courts .... [they] should, therefore, decide whether a party is
entitled to a jury trial in much the same manner as the district courts,
although guided by the bankruptcy rules.") (footnote omitted).
177. See, e.g., Leird Church Furniture WgIg. Co., 61 Bankr. at 445; Energy
Resources Co., 49 Bankr. at 281.
178. See, eg., Wencl, 71 Bankr. at 883 n.3; Energy Resources Co., 49 Bankr.
at 281.
179. See inf'ra notes 189-92 and accompanying text (discussing procedures
in core proceedings).
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uitable in nature, these courts rule that there is no right to a
jury trial. 80 If legal in nature, however, they grant the jury
trial demand.181 Courts adopting this approach thus apply a
pure seventh amendment analysis similar to that applied by
some courts under section 1480.182
The greatest number of cases take an approach between
the two extremes. To understand these cases, however, it is
first necessary to understand the current procedural structure
of the bankruptcy courts. When it enacted the 1984 Amend-
ments, Congress chose not to give article III status to bank-
ruptcy judges, which would have been the most direct and
certain way to solve the Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co.- 83 problem.L84 Instead, Congress con-
tinued to employ judges appointed for fourteen-year terms, 85
seeking to comply with the uncertain command of the Supreme
Court by limiting the bankruptcy judges' authority over certain
180. See, e.g., Wencl, 71 Bankr. at 885 (no right to jury trial in action to
avoid fraudulent conveyances).
181. See, e.g., Leird Church Furniture Mg. Co., 61 Bankr. at 446 (jury de-
mand conditionally granted as to debtor's counterclaim for damages for tor-
tious interference with business relations).
182. The bankruptcy court in Otte v. Monsanto Co. (In re McCrary's Farm
Supply), 57 Bankr. 423 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1985), for example, in ruling on
whether the defendant to a preference action was entitled to a jury trial,
stated that "[t]he right to a jury trial is properly determined by the nature of
the matter involved, and whether it is a cause of action at law or equity." Id.
at 424. Because "[t]he suit is in the nature of an action at law," the court held
that the defendant was entitled to a jury trial under the seventh amendment.
Id. It did so despite recognizing that under Katchen there probably would
have been no right to a jury trial because the defendant previously filed a
claim against the estate. Id. The court viewed the Katchen holding as applica-
ble only to cases under the 1898 Act. Id. (stating that "if this action had been a
proceeding under the old Bankruptcy Act, Katchen v. Landy would have re-
quired a different result") (citation omitted). The bankruptcy court in Ler-
blance v. Rodgers (In re Rodgers & Sons), 48 Bankr. 683 (Bankr. E.D. Okla.
1985), similarly stated that "[t]he right to a jury trial in bankruptcy depends
upon the nature of the cause of action." Id. at 688. This court rejected the
view that proper analysis of the jury trial issue required consideration of
whether the matter would have come within the bankruptcy court's summary
or plenary jurisdiction under the 1898 Act. Id. It held that under the seventh
amendment "the right to jury trial depends on whether the proceeding is at
law or is in equity." Id. Concluding that the action to avoid fraudulent trans-
fers was equitable in nature, the court denied the jury demand. Id. at 689; see
supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
183. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
184. For a discussion of the events leading up to the enactment of the 1984
Amendments, see Countryman, Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdic-
tion: The Chief Justice, the Judicial Conference, and the Legislative Process,
22 HARv. J. ON LEGis. 1, 2-33 (1985).
185. See 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
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matters.186
Under the 1984 Amendments' jurisdictional provision, all
bankruptcy jurisdiction is vested in district courts.187 Else-
where, however, the 1984 Amendments provide that district
courts can refer "any or all" bankruptcy matters to the bank-
ruptcy judges for their district. 8 8 Once referred, the bank-
ruptcy judge's authority over the matter depends on whether it
is determined to be a "core proceeding."'189 If it is, the bank-
ruptcy judge may hear it and enter a final order, subject to or-
dinary appellate review by the district court.19 Unfortunately,
rather than providing a definition of a "core proceeding," Con-
gress merely set forth a nonexclusive list of matters encom-
passed by the term.191 They include such matters as the
allowance and disallowance of claims, administration of the es-
tate, proceedings to recover preferences and to set aside fraudu-
lent conveyances, and confirmation of plans. Congress
apparently viewed these as traditional matters at the heart of
186. See id. § 157(c) (limiting authority of bankruptcy judges over noncore
proceedings).
187. Id. § 1334; see supra note 171.
188. Id. § 157(a) ("Each district court may provide that any or all cases
under title 11 and any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or
related to a case under title 11 shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for
the district."). All district courts exercise this authority by local rule or order.
King, supra note 14, at 678 (Because "authority to refer cases and proceedings
under section 157(a) has been exercised by local rule or order in all federal
districts... bankruptcy judges continue to handle most, if not all, bankruptcy
cases.").
189. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (Supp. I 1985).
190. Id. § 157(b)(1); id. § 158(a), (c); FED. BANKE. R. 8013 (prescribing
"clearly erroneous" standard of review); see also Production Steel v. Bethle-
hem Steel Corp. (In re Production Steel), 48 Bankr. 841, 844 (M.D. Tenn. 1985)
("The standard for appeal of core matters to the district court is the same as in
other civil matters appealed from the district court to the circuit courts of
appeal.").
191. Section 157(b)(2) provides as follows:
Core proceedings include, but are not limited to-
(A) matters concerning the administration of the estate;
(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or ex-
emptions from property of the estate, and estimation of claims or in-
terests for the purposes of confirming a plan under chapter 11, 12, or
13 of title 11 but not the liquidation or estimation of contingent or un-
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the bankruptcy power.192
If the referred bankruptcy matter is a noncore or related
proceeding, then the bankruptcy judge may not enter a final or-
der unless the parties consent to that procedure. 193 Without
their consent, the bankruptcy judge may only hear the matter
and submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to
the district judge, who is then required to review de novo those
matters to which any party objects. 194
Courts that adopt a middle position on the issue of jury
trial rights base their approach on the statutory distinction be-
tween core and noncore proceedings. Attempting to translate
Katchen into the current terminology, these courts hold that
there is no constitutional right to a jury trial in core proceed-
ings.195 They reach this conclusion by equating core proceed-
liquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death claims against the
estate for purposes of distribution in a case under title 11;
(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims
against the estate;
(D) orders in respect to obtaining credit;
(E) orders to turn over property of the estate;
(F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences;
(G) motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay;
(H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent con-
veyances;
(I) determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts;
(J) objections to discharges;
(K) determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens;
(L) confirmations of plans;
(M) orders approving the use or lease of property, including the
use of cash collateral;
(N) orders approving the sale of property other than property
resulting from claims brought by the estate against persons who have
not filed claims against the estate; and
(0) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of
the estate or the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity se-
curity holder relationship, except personal injury tort or wrongful
death claims.
28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(2) (West Supp. 1987).
192. See infra note 347 (discussing Northern Pipeline's suggestion that
some bankruptcy matters might involve public rights that Congress could as-
sign to non-article III court). For a discussion of the conflicting case law inter-
preting § 157(b), see Countryman, The Bankruptcy Judges: Jurisdiction by
Neglect, 92 CoM. L.J. 1, 6-15 (1987).
193. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1)-(2) (Supp. III 1985).
194. Id. § 157(c)(1).
195. See, e.g., Huffman v. Perkinson (In re Harbour), 840 F.2d 1165, 1178
(4th Cir. 1988), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3755 (U.S. Apr. 25, 1988);
Nordberg v. Granfinanciera, S.A. (In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.), 835 F.2d 1341
(11th Cir. 1988), cert granted, 56 U.S.L.W. 3841 (U.S. June 13, 1988) (No. 87-
1716); Jefferson Nat'l Bank v. I.A. Durbin, Inc. (In re I.A. Durbin, Inc.), 62
Bankr. 139, 144-45 (S.D. Fla. 1986); Morgan v. Lefton (In re Hendon Pools), 57
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ings with the old notion of summary jurisdiction and by reading
Katchen as holding that such proceedings are equitable in na-
ture and thus not entitled to be tried before a jury. 9 6
Although courts adhering to this third view accept Katchen
as controlling, they do not interpret it as broadly as do other
authorities. Rather than embracing the view that there is
never a constitutional right to jury trial in a proceeding before
the bankruptcy court, they restrict their holdings to matters
classified as core proceedings. To the extent they express a
view concerning the right to a jury trial in noncore proceedings,
these courts recognize that such rights exist in accordance with
traditional seventh amendment principles.197 These courts are
Bankr. 801, 803 (E.D. Mich. 1986); McLouth Steel Corp. v. Marblehead Lime
Co. (In re McLouth Steel Corp.), 55 Bankr. 357, 362-63 (E.D. Mich. 1985); Tran-
spro Corp. v. NTW, Inc. (In re NTW, Inc.), 69 Bankr. 656, 663 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1987); Acolyte Elec. Corp. v. City of New York, 69 Bankr. 155, 183 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1986); DuVoisin v. Anderson (In re Southern Indus. Banking Corp.),
66 Bankr. 370, 375 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986); In re Poole, 63 Bankr. 527, 533-34
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1986); Mansker v. Campbell (In re Mansker), 60 Bankr. 803,
806 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986); Billebault v. Schmid (In re Schmid), 54 Bankr. 520,
523 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985); Niedermayer v. Duncan (In re Duncan), 51 Bankr:
71, 72 (Bankr. D. Md. 1985); Thorp Credit v. Lee (In re Lee), 50 Bankr. 683, 684
(Bankr. D. Md. 1985); Cameron v. Anderson (In re American Energy), 50
Bankr. 175, 180-81 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985); Baldwin-United Corp. v. Thompson
(In re Baldwin-United Corp.), 48 Bankr. 49, 56 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985).
196. For example, the bankruptcy court in Baldwin-United Corp. read
Katchen as holding that "matters which fall within the traditional summary
jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court carry no right to a trial by jury." 48
Bankr. at 56. Noting that the Katchen rationale may have been "outmoded"
under the 1978 Act, the court stated that
the 1984 Amendments seem to breathe new life into that doctrine.
Since Congress apparently intended "core" proceedings to include
matters which were within the traditional summary jurisdiction of
the Bankruptcy Courts under the 1898 Act, it follows under Katchen
that a party has no constitutional right to a jury trial in "core" pro-
ceedings ....
Id.; see also L.A. Durbin, Inc., 62 Bankr. at 145 (adopting majority rule that "a
core proceeding is a proceeding created by the bankruptcy code and since
bankruptcy is equitable in nature, all core proceedings are also equitable");
Mans er, 60 Bankr. at 806 ("[S]ince Katchen v. Landy held that matters which
fell within the traditional summary jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Courts car-
ried no right to a jury trial, it follows there is no constitutional right to a jury
trial in 'core' proceedings.") (citation omitted); American Energy, 50 Bankr. at
180 (" '[Clore' proceedings are those which are considered equitable in nature
and for which traditionally no right to a jury trial exists."); Norton & Lieb,
supra note 14, at 164 ("With respect to 'core' proceedings, they would be
mostly statutory or equitable in nature and thus would carry no right to trial
by jury .... ).
197. See, e.g., American Energy, 50 Bankr. at 181 (concluding "that jury tri-
als must remain available to cases 'at law' (related non-core)"); Baldwin-
United Corp., 48 Bankr. at 56 (although designation of action as noncore does
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apparently unwilling to eliminate jury trial rights in matters
previously pursued by plenary proceedings and now classified
as noncore.
198
C. JURISDICTIONAL DICHOTOMY UNDER THE 1898 ACT
To resolve the uncertainty Katchen poses for the current
structure of bankruptcy courts, it is necessary to reconsider the
jurisdictional context in which Katchen was decided. This in-
quiry helps to explain how bankruptcy courts under the 1898
Act were viewed as courts of equity. With that understanding
it is possible to analyze the effects caused by the subsequent ex-
pansion of bankruptcy jurisdiction.
The Katchen Court characterized bankruptcy courts as "es-
sentially courts of equity," even though they were vested by
statute with "'such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will en-
able them to exercise original jurisdiction in proceedings under
• . . title [11].'"199 The Supreme Court had previously ex-
plained, however, that "[t]he words 'at law' were probably in-
serted to meet clause (4) of § 2 [of the 1898 Act], which
empowers such courts to arraign, try and punish certain desig-
nated persons for violations of the act. '200 In other respects,
the Court explained, "courts of bankruptcy are essentially
courts of equity, and their proceedings inherently proceedings
in equity.' '20 In Pepper v. Litton20 2 the Court stated more nar-
rowly that "for many purposes 'courts of bankruptcy are essen-
not "automatically entitle [party] to a jury trial[,] courts ... have traditionally
recognized the right to a jury trial in cases involving a breach of an employ-
ment contract").
198. This analysis, which rests on the distinction between core and noncore
proceedings, is not identical to the summary/plenary analysis some courts uti-
lized under § 1480. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text. For ex-
ample, a preference action against someone who had not filed a claim against
the estate would now be classified as a core proceeding. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(b)(2)(F) (Supp. III 1985). Under the analysis employed by these courts,
such an action would not carry a right to jury trial. Because this action would
have been brought as a plenary proceeding under the 1898 Act, however, a
summary/plenary analysis would recognize a right to jury trial. See, e.g., Beck
v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp. (In re Sunair Int'l), 32 Bankr. 142, 144-46 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1983) (granting jury demand under § 1480 in preference action be-
cause litigants would have been entitled to jury trial in plenary proceeding).
199. 382 U.S. at 327 & n.2 (quoting Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 2, 30
Stat. 544, 545 (repealed 1979)) (emphasis added).
200. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934).
201. Id.
202. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
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tially courts of equity.' ",203 It said that "Ibjy virtue of § 2 a
bankruptcy court is a court of equity at least in the sense that
in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by the
[1898] Act, it applies the principles and rules of equity jurispru-
dence." 20 4 The Court specifically noted that "the bankruptcy
court in passing on allowance of claims sits as a court of eq-
uity."20 5 The Supreme Court's characterization of bankruptcy
courts as courts of equity thus appears to result from a func-
tional analysis. The Court's conclusion was based upon the na-
ture of the tasks performed by the bankruptcy courts and the
principles they applied in resolving disputes.
At the time the Supreme Court decided Katchen, the bank-
ruptcy courts' work was limited to matters falling within their
summary jurisdiction.206 Though never defined precisely, sum-
mary jurisdiction was based on the concept of bankruptcy
courts as administrators of a res-the bankruptcy estate.20 7
Bankruptcy courts possessed jurisdiction over all matters relat-
ing to the administration and distribution of the estate.208 In
addition, in certain circumstances bankruptcy courts resolved
disputes between trustees and others.20 9 To fall within the
bankruptcy court's summary jurisdiction without the defend-
ant's consent, however, the dispute must have involved prop-
erty deemed part of the res that the court was empowered to
administer.2 10
203. Id. at 304 (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934))
(emphasis added).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 307.
206. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., Katchen, 382 U.S. at 329-30. The Court stated that "'[t]he
whole process of proof, allowance, and distribution is, shortly speaking, an ad-
judication of interests claimed in a res,... and thus falls within the principle
... that bankruptcy courts have summary jurisdiction to adjudicate controver-
sies relating to property within their possession."' Id. (quoting Gardner v.
New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 574 (1947)).
208. These matters could include the allowance and disallowance of claims,
the determination of priorities and validity of liens, and the supervision of the
work of the trustee. See generally Countryman, supra note 192, at 1-3 (catego-
rizing bankruptcy court jurisdiction under the 1898 Act); Treister, supra note
20, at 78-81 (describing bankruptcy court jurisdiction).
209. See infra note 210.
210. Thus, a bankruptcy court could exercise its summary jurisdiction to
order a third party to turn over property belonging to the estate if the third
party's claim to it was "merely colorable" rather than "real and substantial."
Harrison v. Chamberlin, 271 U.S. 191, 194 (1926). The Supreme Court also up-
held the bankruptcy court's summary jurisdiction to recover excessive attor-
neys' fees paid by the bankrupt prior to bankruptcy. The Court reasoned that
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It was in the context of administering a res that bank-
ruptcy courts were essentially courts of equity.211 At the same
time, however, other matters essential to the administration of
the bankruptcy case were carried out by nonbankruptcy courts.
Collecting assets from third parties, for example, generally was
pursued by a plenary suit in a state or federal district court.2 2
This aspect of the bankruptcy case, which helped determine the
the fees, to the extent they were excessive, remained part of the bankruptcy
estate. In re Wood & Henderson, 210 U.S. 246, 257-58 (1908).
211. In Prudence Realization Corp. v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89 (1942), for ex-
ample, the Supreme Court stated that
[t]he court of bankruptcy is a court of equity to which the judicial ad-
ministration of the bankrupt's estate is committed, and it is for that
court... to define and apply federal law in determining the extent to
which the inequitable conduct of a claimant in acquiring or asserting
his claim in bankruptcy requires its subordination to other claims
which, in other respects, are of the same class.
Id. at 95 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit, in an early case under the 1898 Act, tied its
discussion of the equitable nature of the bankruptcy courts to their adminis-
tration of bankruptcy estates:
The administration and distribution of the property of bankrupts
is a proceeding in equity, and when authorized by act of Congress it
becomes a branch of equity jurisprudence. Property in the custody of
a court of equity for administration is always held by it in trust for
those to whom it rightfully belongs. The jurisdiction to inquire and
determine who the lawful owners of it are, and to that end to call
before it all claimants by a reasonable notice or order to present their
claims to the court within a reasonable time, or to be barred of any
right or interest in the property in its custody, or in its proceeds, is a
power inherent in every court of equity, incidental and indispensable
to the authority to administer the property in its possession and to
distribute its proceeds.
In re Rochford, 124 F. 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1903) (citations omitted); see also
Bachrach v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (In re Commonwealth Light
& Power Co.), 141 F.2d 734, 736 (7th Cir.) (stating that bankruptcy court, as
court of equity, "is empowered to allow or disallow claims and to determine
controversies in relation thereto, and has full power to inquire into the valid-
ity of any claim asserted against the estate and to sift the circumstances sur-
rounding any claim, to see that injustice or unfairness is not done in the
administration of the bankrupt estate"), cert dismissed, 322 U.S. 766 (1944);
Jackson, Translating Assets and Liabilities to the Bankruptcy Forum, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 73, 86 n.35 (1985) (stating that "the concept of bankruptcy as an
equitable device with proceedings against a trust res makes perhaps most ana-
lytical sense" in context of liquidation of claims against the estate).
212. See, e.g., Hollywood Nat'l Bank v. Bumb, 409 F.2d 23, 24 (9th Cir. 1969)
("If the property is not in the court's possession and a third person asserts a
bona fide claim adverse to the receiver or trustee in bankruptcy, he has the
right to have the merits of his claim adjudicated in a plenary action, with the
rights and remedies incident thereto."); V. COUNTRYMAN, CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON DEBTOR AND CREDITOR 326 (2d ed. 1974) ("[Where the summary juris-
diction does not exist because the property is in possession of a bona fide
adverse claimant who seasonably objects to the summary proceeding, the
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size of the res to be distributed, was not necessarily equitable in
nature. Instead, a plenary action was governed either by legal
or equitable principles depending upon the nature of the claim
asserted and the relief sought.213
For example, when a trustee sued to enforce a breach of
contract claim held by the bankrupt prior to bankruptcy, the
plenary action was of a legal nature and thus triable to a
jury.214 Likewise, in Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co.,21 5 the
Supreme Court held that the defendants to a preference action
brought by a bankruptcy trustee were entitled to have the ac-
tion tried at law by a jury. The Court concluded that the suit
could not be tried in equity because there was an adequate rem-
edy at law.216 In so ruling, the Court rejected the view of some
lower courts that had sustained equity jurisdiction over prefer-
ence suits.217 The lower courts reasoned that because "proceed-
ings in bankruptcy are in their nature proceedings in equity,
preferences, as creations of the Bankruptcy Act, must likewise
be cognizable in equity."218 The Supreme Court, however,
bankruptcy court as such will generally have no jurisdiction and a plenary pro-
ceeding must be brought .. ").
213. See J. MooRE & W. PHILLIPS, supra note 133, at 6-2. The authors de-
scribe plenary actions as "'litigation involving the trustee and third parties
brought in the form of an ordinary civil action. If the action is brought in the
federal court, the right of jury trial, when timely demanded, is determined ac-
cording to the nature of the issues, just as in any other civil action."' Id.
(quoting 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.30 (2d ed. 1948)); see supra note 25
and accompanying text.
214. See, e.g., Tamasha Town & Country Club v. McAlester Constr. Fin.
Corp., 252 F. Supp. 80, 85 (S.D. Cal. 1966) ("Plenary proceedings involve all of
the normal attributes of court trial, including formal pleadings, cross-examina-
tion of witnesses and the right to jury trial.").
215. 287 U.S. 92 (1932).
216. The Court noted that
In England, long prior to the enactment of our first Judiciary Act,
common law actions of trover and money had and received were re-
sorted to for the recovery of preferential payments by bankrupts.
Suits to recover preferences constitute no part of the proceedings in
bankruptcy but concern controversies arising out of it. They may be
brought in the state courts as well as in the bankruptcy courts. The
question whether remedy must be by action at law or may be pursued
in equity notwithstanding objection by defendant depends upon the
facts stated in the bill. And, in absence of a clear showing that a court
of law lacks capacity to give the relief which the allegations show
plaintiff entitled to have, a suit in equity cannot be maintained.
Id. at 94-95 (footnote and citations omitted).
217. See, e.g., Off v. Hakes, 142 F. 364, 366 (7th Cir. 1905); Reed v. Guaranty
Sec. Corp., 291 F. 580, 581 (D. Mass. 1923), aff'd in part, 299 F. 265 (1st Cir.
1924).
218. Note, Equity Jurisdiction of Suit by Trustee in Bankruptcy to Recover
Preference, 42 YALE L.J. 450, 450-51 (1933) (footnote omitted).
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viewed this preference action as a controversy arising out of the
bankruptcy, rather than a proceeding in bankruptcy.219 It had
recognized a similar distinction in Bardes v. Hawarden Bank,220
concluding that the 1898 Act vested courts of bankruptcy with
jurisdiction over bankruptcy proceedings which were "gener-
ally... in the nature of proceedings in equity. '221 The 1898 Act
did not, however, confer jurisdiction over "'controversies at law
and in equity.' "222 The Court stated that the latter were "con-
troversies, not strictly or properly part of the proceedings in
bankruptcy, but independent suits brought by the trustee in
bankruptcy to assert a title to money or property as assets of
the bankrupt against strangers to those proceedings."22 3
Thus, under the bifurcated jurisdictional scheme of the
1898 Act, some bankruptcy matters, particularly those relating
to the administration and distribution of the bankruptcy estate,
were resolved in the bankruptcy court acting as a court of eq-
uity. Other bankruptcy matters, usually those involving efforts
by the trustee to bring assets into the bankruptcy estate, were
resolved in nonbankruptcy courts, where litigants might be
constitutionally entitled to a jury trial. The 1978 Act, however,
expanded bankruptcy jurisdiction to encompass all of these
matters.224 The effect of this jurisdictional expansion on pre-
existing.jury trial rights depends upon whether the seventh
amendment permits Congress to eliminate jury trial rights by
means of its forum assignment.
D. RESTRICTIONS ON CONGRESSIONAL ELIMINATION OF JURY
TRIAL RIGHTS
Some courts have concluded that Katchen permits Con-
gress to convert legal claims arising out of bankruptcy into eq-
uitable ones, thereby "displacing any Seventh Amendment
right of trial by jury."225 Based on this rationale, the bank-
219. Schoenthal, 287 U.S. at 95.
220. 178 U.S. 524 (1900).
221. Id. at 535.
222. Id. at 536 (quoting Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 2, 30 Stat.
544, 545 (repealed 1979)). The Court concluded that the 1898 Act vested the
circuit, but not the district, courts with jurisdiction over controversies at law
and in equity. Id. Jurisdiction was granted, however, only to the extent the
suit could have been brought there in the absence of bankruptcy. Id.
223. Id. at 538. The Court therefore affirmed the district court's dismissal
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of this fraudulent conveyance action
brought by a trustee in bankruptcy. Id. at 539.
224. See supra notes 1-5, 73 and accompanying text.
225. DuVoisin v. Anderson (In re Southern Ind. Banking Corp.), 66 Bankr.
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ruptcy court in DuVoisin v. Anderson (In re Southern Indus-
trial Banking Corp.) held that the defendants to hundreds of
preference actions were not entitled to jury trials.226 The court
recognized that preference actions previously had been held to
be actions at law to which the seventh amendment applied. It
concluded, however, that the expansion of bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion to include the adjudication of such matters transformed
such actions into "proceedings in bankruptcy" intended to be
tried without a jury.227 Relying on Katchen, the court found
this transformation to be constitutionally permissible.228
The Katchen Court appeared to endorse the view that Con-
gress could transform actions at law into equitable proceedings,
and thereby eliminate jury trial rights, merely by assigning ad-
judication of the actions to the equitable bankruptcy court.229
Indeed, Katchen frequently is cited as upholding "the power of
370, 375 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.), appeal dismissed, 70 Bankr. 196 (E.D. Tenn.
1986).
226. Id. The debtor corporation was a former industrial loan and thrift
company. The trustee in bankruptcy brought hundreds of preference actions
against former investors of the debtor, and more than 400 of the preference
defendants demanded jury trials. See id. at 371.
227. Id. at 374; see also Huffman v. Perkinson (In re Harbour), 840 F.2d
1165 (4th Cir. 1988), petition for cert filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3755 (U.S. Apr. 25,
1988). In Harbour the court stated that
Now, Congress also has determined that actions such as the trustee's
[preference and fraudulent conveyance actions] in this case are core
bankruptcy proceedings requiring summary disposition by a bank-
ruptcy judge. As such, they assume the historical equitable posture of
all such bankruptcy proceedings, and the litigants involved in these
actions have no seventh amendment right to a trial by jury.
Id. at 1178 (footnote omitted); Nordberg v. Granfinanciera, S.A. (In re Chase &
Sanborn Corp.), 835 F.2d 1341 (11th Cir. 1988) ("If... Congress may convert a
creditor's legal right into an equitable claim and displace any seventh amend-
ment right to trial by jury, Congress may likewise treat other core proceedings
in bankruptcy such as actions to avoid fraudulent transfers or preferences."),
cert granted, 56 U.S.L.W. 3841 (U.S. June 13, 1988) (No. 87-1716).
228. 66 Bankr. at 375. Collier on Bankruptcy makes a similar argument.
Relying on Katchen, it suggests that there is no right to a jury trial in core
proceedings because they are inherently proceedings in equity. 1 COLIER,
supra note 14, 3.01, at 3-96 to 3-97. The treatise also interprets Katchen as
eliminating jury trials in noncore proceedings, even when tried by the district
judge, because
[i]f the case is tried by a district court, it is not sitting qua district
court, but as the court to which all bankruptcy jurisdiction has been
granted by section 1334(a) and (b). In such capacity, the doctrine of
Katchen v. Landy would seem to apply, and, since the proceeding is
ipso facto an equitable proceeding, no jury trial is mandated by any
law or by the United States Constitution.
Id. 1 3.01, at 3-97; see King, supra note 14, at 703-06.
229. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
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Congress to take some causes of action outside the scope of the
Seventh Amendment by providing for their enforcement... in
a specialized court. '230 To determine the limits on this congres-
sional circumvention of the seventh amendment, the context of
the Court's statements in Katchen must be carefully
considered.
When the Katchen Court spoke of converting legal claims
into equitable ones, it was referring specifically to claims be-
longing to a creditor of the bankrupt.231 In Barton v. Bar-
bour232, the Court discussed the same transformation in a
similar context.233 That context was one in which the event of
bankruptcy had transformed the nature of the claim. When a
defendant or potential defendant to an action at law files for
bankruptcy, the nature of the plaintiff's claim is automatically
changed by these circumstances. The plaintiff no longer is as-
serting a claim against a solvent defendant, which might have
enabled the plaintiff to obtain a judgment against the defen-
dant's nonexempt assets. Instead, the intervening bankruptcy
means that the plaintiff becomes one of many creditors seeking
to share a limited fund.234 The plaintiff's recovery, if any, will
be governed by equitable principles applied by the bankruptcy
court in administering the res within its exclusive control.2ss
230. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 45, at 498; see also
F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 45, at 451 ("[Ihe Court has held in
Katchen v. Landy that Congress could exclude jury trial in special procedures
in the courts where necessitated by practical considerations of the kind associ-
ated with equity.") (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
231. Thus the Court said that the 1898 Act "converts the creditor's legal
claim into an equitable claim to a pro rata share of the res." 382 U.S. at 336.
232. 104 U.S. 126 (1881).
233. The Barton Court explained that
in cases of bankruptcy, many incidental questions arise in the course
of administering the bankrupt estate, which would ordinarily be pure
cases at law, and in respect of their facts triable by jury, but, as be-
longing to the bankruptcy proceedings, they become cases over which
the bankruptcy court, which acts as a court of equity, exercises exclu-
sive control. Thus a claim of debt or damages against the bankrupt is
investigated by chancery methods.
Id. at 134 (emphasis added); see also Robinson v. Hinkley (In re Hinkley), 58
Bankr. 339, 343 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986) (holding that "a bankruptcy court is a
court of equity when passing on claims").
234. See Transpro Corp. v. NTW Inc. (In re NTW Inc.), 69 Bankr. 656, 659
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1987) (creditor "does not seek entry of a money judgment
against the debtor, but the equitable allowance of its claim against the bank-
ruptcy estate").
235. See id. ("[Tihe entitlement of [the creditor] to a proportionate share of
[the debtor's] estate in bankruptcy, is by its nature equitable despite the fact
that Transpro's claim to entitlement may be grounded in a claim at law.");
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The transformation of the plaintiff's legal claim for a money
judgment into an equitable claim to a portion of the res is thus
brought about, not by a mere change in forums, but by a change
in factual circumstances.
The expansion of bankruptcy jurisdiction to include mat-
ters previously pursued only by plenary suit, however, works
no such factual transformation.236 As was true under the 1898
Act, a trustee under the present Act is permitted to sue third
parties to recover assets for the estate. As discussed earlier, a
trustee formerly could proceed by an action at law, in which
case the seventh amendment provided a right to a jury trial.237
The same result should still obtain despite the expansion of
bankruptcy jurisdiction, because the only change that has oc-
curred is that Congress has established an additional, nonexclu-
sive forum for the adjudication of these matters.23s Neither the
nature of the claim nor the relief sought is in any way altered
by the bankruptcy filing239 or by the bankruptcy courts' juris-
dictional expansion. 240
Hayutin v. Grynberg, 52 Bankr. 657, 661 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985). The court in
Hayutin noted that the suit involved "claims to property over which the bank-
ruptcy court has jurisdiction.... Were it not for bankruptcy, these issues may
be triable in state court to a jury. But 'when the same issue arises as part of
allowance and disallowance of claims, it is triable in equity."' Id. (quoting
Katchen, 382 U.S. at 336). Equitable principles will govern not only the claim
itself but also any defenses that may be asserted against it. This is because, as
the Katchen Court stated, a defense to a claim is "part and parcel" of the equi-
table claims adjudication process. 382 U.S. at 330.
236. Cf. 1616 Reminc Ltd. Partnership v. Atchison & Keller Co. (In re 1616
Reminc Ltd. Partnership), 704 F.2d 1313, 1317 (4th Cir. 1983) (contrasting cred-
itor's "'equitable claim to a pro rata share of the res'" in Katchen with the
present debtor in possession's common law breach of contract claim) (quoting
Katchen, 382 U.S. at 336).
237. See supra notes 214-23 and accompanying text.
238. Under § 1334(b) district courts are granted "original but not exclusive
jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related
to cases under title 11." 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (Supp. 1I 1985). A trustee may
therefore choose to sue a third party in a state court rather than in the bank-
ruptcy court to enforce a cause of action that became property of the estate or
to recover a preference or fraudulent conveyance.
239. The effects of bankruptcy with regard to the debtor's actions are the
substitution of the trustee for the debtor as plaintiff and the inclusion in the
estate of the resulting recovery. See 11 U.S.C. § 323 (1982) (trustee is represen-
tative of estate and has authority to sue); id. § 541(a)(1) (estate includes "all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement
of the case"). The principles governing resolution of the suit are the same as if
the debtor sued outside bankruptcy.
240. See In re Wood & Henderson, 210 U.S. 246, 262 (1908) (Brewer, J., dis-
senting). Justice Brewer noted that "the recovery of an amount due or of
property belonging to an individual or an estate is ordinarily by a common law
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Support for this analysis can be found in Ross v. Bern-
hard,241 in which the Supreme Court held that the seventh
amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial in a shareholder
derivative suit.242 The Court noted that the question of the
shareholder's standing to sue on behalf of the corporation
presented an equitable issue. The suit on the corporation's un-
derlying claim, however, might be legal in nature.24 3 Citing its
decision in Fleitmann v. Welsbach Street Lighting Co.,2 " the
Court emphasized that "legal claims are not magically con-
verted into equitable issues by their presentation to a court of
equity in a derivative suit. ' '24 5
In Feitmann, the Court held that a shareholder could not
maintain a treble damages action against a corporation under
the Sherman Act.246 Because the shareholder was required to
bring its derivative suit in a court of equity, permitting the
treble damages action would have deprived the defendant of its
right to a jury trial. The Court concluded that the statute
should not be interpreted to permit the denial of jury trial
rights.247
These cases can be construed as establishing that a legal
claim is not magically transformed into an equitable one
merely because it is asserted in what traditionally has been
viewed as a court of equity.2 8 Unless the claim has been factu-
ally transformed, such as in Katchen and Barton, the right to a
jury trial remains. If, as in Fleitmann, a jury trial is unavail-
able in the equity court, then the court cannot hear the legal
claim because doing so would deprive the parties of their jury
trial rights.249 If, however, as in Ross, the claim is presented in
action. That the claimant is an estate and in the hands of a trustee or receiver
does not change the nature of the proceeding." Id.
241. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
242. See id. at 532-33.
243. Id. at 538. The Court stated "that the derivative suit has dual aspects:
first, the stockholder's right to sue on behalf of the corporation, historically an
equitable matter; second, the claim of the corporation against directors or
third parties on which, if the corporation had sued and the claim presented
legal issues, the company could demand a jury trial." Id.
244. 240 U.S. 27 (1916).
245. Ross, 396 U.S. at 538.
246. 240 U.S. at 29.
247. Id. (agreeing "with the courts below that when a penalty of triple
damages is sought to be inflicted, the statute should not be read as attempting
to authorize liability to be enforced otherwise than through the verdict of a
jury in a court of common law").
248. See supra notes 225-28 and accompanying text.
249. See Fleitmann, 240 U.S. at 29.
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a merged court of law and equity, then the court can hear the
claim and grant the jury trial demand.250 Under this analysis,
actions by a bankruptcy trustee once pursued by plenary ac-
tions at law in state or district courts retain their legal nature
even though they now may be maintained in the bankruptcy
court. Therefore, the seventh amendment applies, entitling the
parties to a jury trial.2 1
It might be argued that the foregoing conclusion cannot be
reconciled with the Supreme Court's decision in Atlas Roofing
Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission. 2
The Atlas Roofing Court rejected a seventh amendment chal-
lenge to a federal statute authorizing the government to sue for
civil penalties in an administrative proceeding.2 3 The Court
250. See 396 U.S. at 540 ("[lt is no longer tenable for a district court, ad-
ministering both law and equity in the same action, to deny legal remedies to a
corporation, merely because the corporation's spokesmen are its shareholders
rather than its directors.").
251. Several district and bankruptcy courts have reached this conclusion.
See Doyle v. Mellon Bank (E.) Nat'l Ass'n (In re Globe Parcel Serv.), 75
Bankr. 381, 383 (E.D. Pa. 1987) ('The mere fact that a plaintiff raises his legal,
claims before a court of equity in the context of an equitable proceeding does
not somehow convert claims that are otherwise legal-triable before a court of
law-into equitable ones."); M & E Contractors v. Kugler-Morris Gen. Con-
tractors, 67 Bankr. 260, 266-67 (N.D. Tex. 1986) ("Congress cannot transform a
legal proceeding into an equitable proceeding and thus abrogate the terms of a
constitutional provision."), aff V Wolfe v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n (In re
Wolfe), 68 Bankr. 80, 85-86 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986) ("[L]imited legal actions
which the Bankruptcy Court finds are core proceedings and require a jury
trial under the Seventh Amendment cannot be released from that require-
ment by claiming that their adjudication by the Bankruptcy Court transforms
such legal actions into an equitable proceeding."); Zimmerman v. Cavanagh
(In re Kenval Mktg. Corp.), 65 Bankr. 548, 553 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (after classify-
ing a matter as a core proceeding, "the court is still required to determine
whether the action is one at law or lies in equity in deciding the right to a jury
trial"); Edelman v. Michigan Blueberry Growers Ass'n (In re Silver Mills Fro-
zen Foods), 80 Bankr. 848, 854 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987) ("[I]f mere classifica-
tion of a matter as a core proceeding [could] abolish a litigant's right to a jury
trial under the Seventh Amendment[,] Congress could nullify the Seventh
Amendment simply by reclassifying every action out from under the Amend-
ment's protection.") (footnote & citation omitted); Eisenberg v. Guardian
Group, Inc. (In re Adams, Browning & Bates, Ltd.), 70 Bankr. 490, 497 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1987) ("This Court is unable to accept the view that Congress... has
the right to strip Seventh Amendment protection from traditional actions-at-
law simply by vesting jurisdiction to decide [them] in the bankruptcy court.").
252. 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
253. See id. at 455-61. The statute at issue in Atlas Roofing was the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act of 1970, which authorized the Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission to impose civil penalties on employers
found to maintain unsafe working conditions. The penalties were imposed fol-
lowing an evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge. Id. at 445-
1988] 1019
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
explicitly recognized that Congress's choice of a forum for par-
ticular litigation could eliminate jury trial rights that might
have existed had another forum been chosen. 4 The decision
may suggest therefore that Congress, by assigning the litigation
of legal actions to the bankruptcy court, can eliminate previ-
ously existing jury trial rights.255
Although Atlas Roofing does give Congress some latitude
to escape the seventh amendment's requirements, the limits
the Court placed on its holding render it inapplicable to the
present bankruptcy situation. Throughout the opinion, for in-
stance, the Court stressed that the decision was applicable only
to congressionally created public rights.2- 6 Although the con-
46. The Court rejected the employer's argument that, because it would have
been entitled to a jury trial had the government been authorized to sue for
civil penalties in federal court, its seventh amendment rights were violated by
this administrative procedure. Id. at 450.
The Atlas Roofing Court declined to decide whether the seventh amend-
ment guarantees a right to jury trial in government actions in federal court to
collect civil penalties. Id. at 449 n.6. The Court subsequently held, however,
that under the seventh amendment a defendant in an action for civil penalties
under the Clean Water Act is entitled to a jury trial on the question of liabil-
ity, but not on the question of the amount of penalty to be awarded. See Tull
v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 1831, 1836, 1840 (1987).
254. 430 U.S. at 460-61. The Court stated that "history and our cases sup-
port the proposition that the right to a jury trial turns not solely on the nature
of the issue to be resolved but also on the forum in which it is to be resolved."
Id.
255. The Court stated its holding in Atlas Roofing as follows:
At least in cases in which 'public rights' are being litigated-e.g., cases
in which the Government sues in its sovereign capacity to enforce
public rights created by statutes within the power of Congress to en-
act-the Seventh Amendment does not prohibit Congress from as-
signing the factfinding function and initial adjudication to an
administrative forum with which the jury would be incompatible.
430 U.S. at 450.
For a detailed critique of the Atlas Roofing decision, see Kirst, Adminis-
trative Penalties and the Civil Jury: The Supreme Court's Assault on the Sev-
enth Amendment, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1281 (1978) (arguing that Atlas
Roofing "seriously weakened the protection" afforded by the seventh
amendment).
256. See 430 U.S. at 450. The Court noted that "the cases discussed ...
stand clearly for the proposition that when Congress creates new statutory
'public rights,' it may assign their adjudication to an administrative agency
with which a jury trial would be incompatible, without violating the Seventh
Amendment's injunction." Id. at 455 (emphasis added); see also Kirst, supra
note 255, at 1287 ("The Court in Atlas ... stated a new rule to explain why the
right to a jury trial does not apply to administrative proceedings . . .);
Luneburg & Nordenberg, supra note 76, at 960-61 ("The Atlas holding is lim-
ited to the area of public rights where the adjudication takes place in a tribu-
nal other than a federal court of law."). Although in Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986), the Supreme Court permitted
1020 [Vol. 72:967
JURY TRIALS IN BANKRUPTCY
cept of public rights remains ill defined,257 it is not broad
enough under any viable definition to encompass most of the
estate-enhancing actions pursued by bankruptcy trustees. 258
The bulk of such actions are between private individuals or en-
tities and are based on state common law, such as tort and con-
tract actions held by the debtor prior to bankruptcy. These
types of common law actions were pursued by the debtor in
possession in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co.,2 9 and there a majority of the Court held that
they did not fall within the public rights exception to article
111.260 Consequently, it appears that most of the actions Con-
gress added to the bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction, especially
the adjudication of a state common law counterclaim by an administrative
agency, no seventh amendment issue was raised in that case. See id. at 3249.
The Court's opinion gives no indication that either party demanded a jury
trial, and furthermore, both parties voluntarily submitted to the agency adju-
dication rather than pursuing their claims in the courts. Id. at 3251. Thus, any
seventh amendment rights that might otherwise have existed were surely
waived.
257. The Supreme Court has continued to struggle with the concept in
cases following Atlas Roofing. Compare Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Mar-
athon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 (1982) (plurality opinion) (holding that
"[tihe distinction between public rights and private rights has not been defini-
tively explained in our precedents" and that "a matter of public rights must at
a minimum arise 'between the government and others' ") (quoting Ex Parte
Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)) (footnote omitted) with Thomas v.
Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 586-89 (1985) (rejecting
view that government must be party for action to involve public right and con-
cluding that "the public rights doctrine reflects simply a pragmatic under-
standing that when Congress selects a quasi-judicial method of resolving
matters that 'could be conclusively determined by the Executive and Legisla-
tive Branches,' the danger of encroaching on the judicial powers is reduced")
(quoting Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 68).
258. Some commentators, discussing the implications of Northern Pipeline,
question whether any bankruptcy matters are properly considered to involve
public rights. See Baird, Bankruptcy Procedure and State-Created Rights: The
Lessons of Gibbons and Marathon, 1982 SuP. CT. REV. 25, 44 (questioning sug-
gestion that summary proceedings involve public rights because they involve
restructuring of debtor-creditor relations); Currie, Bankruptcy Judges and the
Independent Judiciary, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 441, 452 (1983) ("Bankruptcy
cases are not controversies 'between the government and others' but rather in-
volve essentially private litigation between private parties."); infra note 347.
259. See 458 U.S. 50, 56 (plurality opinion) ("Northern [the debtor in pos-
session] ... filed in [the bankruptcy] court a suit against appellee Marathon[,
in which it] sought damages for alleged breaches of contract and warranty, as
well as for alleged misrepresentation, coercion, and duress.").
260. Id. at 71-72 (plurality opinion) ("Appellant Northern's right to recover
contract damages to augment its estate is 'one of private right, that is, of the
liability of one individual to another under the law as defined.' ") (quoting
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)); id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
('"To whatever extent different powers granted under that Act might be sus-
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those now designated as noncore,261 fall within the category of
cases identified as "not at all implicated" by the Supreme
Court's decision in Atlas Roofing.262
Among the actions added to the bankruptcy courts' juris-
diction, however, are a few that are congressionally created.
Preference and fraudulent conveyance actions, once pursued by
plenary actions and now classified as core proceedings, are cre-
ated by federal statute.2 63 Despite their federal statutory ori-
gin, however, they do not fit within Atlas Roofing's description
of public rights cases. The Court identified such cases as ones
"where the Government is involved in its sovereign capacity
under an otherwise valid statute creating enforceable public
rights."264 Even if that description was meant to be merely il-
tained under the 'public rights' doctrine, I am satisfied that the adjudication of
Northern's lawsuit cannot be so sustained.") (citation omitted).
261. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
262. See 430 U.S. at 458 ("Wholly private tort, contract, and property cases,
as well as a vast range of other cases, are not at all implicated."). Even com-
mentators who argue that the seventh amendment permits Congress to elimi-
nate jury trial rights in some circumstances recognize that the right should
remain inviolate in "those actions unmistakably cognizable in common law
courts in 1791 in England." Note, supra note 166, at 418; accord F. JAMEs & G.
HAZARD, supra note 45, at 417 (arguing that "the legislature has some latitude
to change the scope of the jury-trial right if doing so .. . does not withdraw
jury trial in an area where historically it was firmly established"); Luneburg &
Nordenberg, supra note 76, at 977 (stating that "[i]f a cause of action existed in
1791 and was then jury triable, Congress could not destroy the right merely by
consigning its adjudication to a newly created court").
263. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (preferences); id. § 548
(fraudulent transfers and obligations); id. § 544(b) (1982) (incorporating into
bankruptcy law state fraudulent conveyance law). Although the seventh
amendment refers to the preservation of jury trial rights "[i]n Suits at com-
mon law," see supra note 132 and accompanying text, the Supreme Court has
rejected the argument that the amendment is therefore inapplicable to statu-
tory causes of action. See Tull v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 1831, 1835 (1987)
("This analysis applies not only to common law forms of action, but also to
causes of action created by congressional enactment."); Curtis v. Loether, 415
U.S. 189, 194 (1974) (9-0 decision) ("The Seventh Amendment does apply to ac-
tions enforcing statutory rights, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the
statute creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages
in the ordinary courts of law.").
264. 430 U.S. at 458. Preference and fraudulent conveyance actions are also
unlike actions against the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
The Supreme Court suggested in dicta that such claims fall outside the guar-
antee of the seventh amendment due to "the power of the sovereign to attach
conditions to its consent to be sued." United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584,
587 (1941); see Kirst, Jury Trial and the Federal Tort Claims Act Time to Rec-
ognize the Seventh Amendment Right, 58 TEx. L. REV. 549 (1980) (arguing that
seventh amendment guarantees right to jury trial in Federal Tort Claims Act
cases).
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lustrative and not definitional, 265 actions by a bankruptcy
trustee to recover property for the bankruptcy estate can
hardly be characterized as involving anything other than pri-
vate rights.266 Moreover, preference and fraudulent convey-
ance actions, traditionally authorized by bankruptcy law, are
unlike the newly created cause of action in Atlas Roofing.267 In
the 1978 Act, Congress simply authorized bankruptcy judges to
preside over the adjudication of previously existing causes of
action.268 The elimination of jury trial rights in such actions,
265. Professors Luneburg and Nordenberg argue that "[a] close reading of
Atlas indicates the opinion considers a suit in which the government enforces
a statute as merely an example of those public right actions within the scope
of the decision." Luneburg & Nordenberg, supra note 76, at 963. Accordingly,
they suggest that "Atlas applies to causes of action that result in monetary re-
coveries inuring to the immediate benefit of private individuals, even if the
private beneficiaries of those recoveries are the sole prosecutors of the actions
against other private individuals, so long as there is a substantial public benefit
to be derived from litigating such actions." Id. at 966; cf. Thomas v. Union
Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 585-86 (1985) (rejecting bright
line test requiring government as party in order to come within public rights
exception to article H).
266. Any recovery obtained accrues to the benefit of the bankruptcy estate
and thus ultimately to the unsecured creditors, rather than to the public at
large. Preference actions, for example, are intended to assist in "secur[ing]
fairness in the distribution of an insolvent debtor's assets among its creditors."
Broome, Payments on Long-Term Debt as Voidable Preferences: The Impact
of the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments, 1987 DUKE L.J. 78, 78. Fraudulent con-
veyance actions seek to achieve the same goal. Assets that the debtor previ-
ously diverted from the estate are brought back into the estate for distribution
to the general creditors. Such recoveries are permitted under bankruptcy law
even without a showing of fraudulent intent on the part of the debtor where
the property was exchanged for less than "reasonably equivalent value" at a
time when the debtor was insolvent. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp.
I 1985). Thus the goal is primarily one of augmenting distribution to credi-
tors rather than punishment of defrauding debtors. See, e.g., B. WEINTRAUB &
A. RESNICK, supra note 14, at 7-35 ("[The] Code recognizes that creditors'
rights are jeopardized whenever a debtor whose assets are not sufficient to pay
liabilities disposes of property for less than reasonably equivalent value, re-
gardless of the debtor's motive.").
267. See supra note 253.
268. Under the 1898 Act, preference and fraudulent conveyance actions
could be brought in either state courts or federal district courts. The latter
were granted jurisdiction over such actions in their capacity as courts of bank-
ruptcy. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 23, 30 Stat. 544, 552 (as amended) (re-
pealed 1979). These plenary actions were placed on the civil dockets, however,
rather than the bankruptcy dockets of district courts and were heard by the
district judges themselves, rather than bankruptcy referees. See supra note 24.
The 1978 Act also vested nonexclusive jurisdiction over preference and fraudu-
lent conveyance actions in the district courts. It directed bankruptcy judges to
hear and decide such matters, however. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b)-(c) (1982) (re-
pealed 1984). Bankruptcy judges continue to be authorized to conduct such
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therefore, is not justified by Atlas Roofing's rationale that
"Congress is not required by the Seventh Amendment to choke
the already crowded federal courts with new types of
litigation."269
The nature of the forums involved also distinguishes Atlas
Roofing from the bankruptcy situation. In Atlas Roofing the
Court was concerned with "an administrative forum with
which the jury would be incompatible. '270 A similar conclusion
of incompatibility cannot be reached about the federal bank-
ruptcy courts, however. As the post-1978 history of bankruptcy
law indicates,271 jury trials, even if not welcome in the bank-
ruptcy courts, are not incompatible with these courts. 272 Un-
proceedings under the 1984 Amendments, which classified these actions as
core proceedings. 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b), 1334 (Supp. 1I 1985).
269. 430 U.S. at 455 (emphasis added); see also id. at 461 ('The Seventh
Amendment is no bar to the creation of new rights or to their enforcement
outside the regular courts of law.") (emphasis added); Luneburg &
Nordenberg, supra note 76, at 971 (noting that Atlas Roofing could be inter-
preted to mean that "where a particular type of new litigation already has
been statutorily created and committed to the original jurisdiction of the regu-
larly established federal district courts, Congress cannot transfer the adjudica-
tion of that cause of action to a different forum and thereby avoid the need for
a jury trial").
270. 430 U.S. at 450.
271. See supra notes 42-60, 175-98 and accompanying text.
272. Some courts conclude that jury trials are incompatible with bank-
ruptcy proceedings because of the need for expeditious resolution of such mat-
ters. See, e.g., DuVoisin v. Anderson (In re Southern Indus. Banking Corp.), 66
Bankr. 370, 375 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986); Pennels v. Barnes (In re Best Pack
Seafood), 45 Bankr. 194, 195 (Bankr. D. Me. 1984). Relying on Katchen's dis-
cussion of the congressional desire for "the prompt trial of a disputed claim
without the intervention of a jury," see supra text accompanying note 168,
these courts conclude that "Congress may accommodate the right to trial by
jury to the need for expeditious proceedings." Pennels, 45 Bankr. at 195; ac-
cord DuVoisin, 66 Bankr. at 375. This Article does not interpret Katchen as
authorizing Congress to eliminate seventh amendment rights just because it
wants cases decided quickly. Instead, the Article contends that Katchen
merely recognized that the event of bankruptcy can transform legal claims
into equitable ones. See supra notes 231-35 and accompanying text. The
Court's discussion of the desire for expeditious decisions did not concern
whether Congress could deny jury trial rights in legal actions. Rather, it in-
volved whether a court was required to delay equitable proceedings so that an-
other court could first try a related legal claim. In the context of that timing
question, the Court considered Congress's desire for expedited action; it did
not look to congressional intent to determine whether the seventh amendment
should be overridden. Cf. Redish, supra note 162, at 522 (questioning rele-
vance of Congress's desire for prompt trials); see also Pernell v. Southall Re-
alty, 416 U.S. 363, 384 (1974) (rejecting "the notion that there is some
necessary inconsistency between the desire for speedy justice and the right to
jury trial").
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like administrative agencies, bankruptcy courts possess the
procedural mechanisms to summon and impanel jurors,2 73 and
jury trials have in fact been conducted there.2 7 4
Neither Katchen nor Atlas Roofing supports the view that
the seventh amendment permits Congress to eliminate jury
trial rights by expanding the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
courts. Instead, matters previously pursued by actions at law in
nonbankruptcy courts retain their legal nature when pursued
in the bankruptcy courts, and the seventh amendment guaran-
tees litigants jury trial rights in these actions.
E. BANKRUPTCY COURTS AS COURTS OF LAW AND EQUITY
Concluding that a right to a jury trial is automatically pre-
cluded just because the matter comes within the bankruptcy
courts' jurisdiction was perhaps correct under the 1898 Act. At
that time the bankruptcy courts' summary jurisdiction centered
on the equitable administration of a res.2 75 Now that bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction has been expanded to include matters of a
legal nature, however, bankruptcy courts are properly viewed
as merged courts of law and equity, like federal district
courts.2 7 6 Accordingly, the seventh amendment requires exam-
ination of the nature of claims asserted and relief sought to de-
termine the existence of jury trial rights.277
The foregoing approach does not categorically reject jury
trials in all matters now classified as core proceedings.278 De-
spite the substantial overlap between core proceedings and
summary jurisdiction, the two categories are not identical. As
discussed above,279 some matters now expressly classified by
Congress as core, such as preference and fraudulent conveyance
actions, previously were pursued only by plenary actions in
which jury trials were sometimes available.280 This Article con-
273. As a unit of the district court, the bankruptcy court could be author-
ized to utilize existing jury trial procedures. See 28 U.S.C. § 1866 (1982) (selec-
tion and summoning of jury panels).
274. See supra note 82 and accompanying text; infra note 308 and accompa-
nying text.
275. See supra notes 206-11 and accompanying text.
276. See supra note 75.
277. See supra note 132.
278. But see supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
279. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
280. See G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES 183-84
(1940). Professor Glenn argued-
It follows that whether the trustee's [fraudulent conveyance] suit
should be at law or in equity is to be judged by the same standards
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tends that plenary actions at law retain their legal nature even
though they now may be pursued in the bankruptcy courts and
that Congress lacks authority to override the seventh amend-
ment's command with regard to them. This approach thus rec-
ognizes the continuation of jury trial rights in such core
proceedings in the bankruptcy courts.
This approach does not suggest, however, that jury trial
rights be determined in the bankruptcy courts just as they
would be in the district courts. 28 1 Although the general method
of analysis employed by bankruptcy and district courts should
be the same, Katchen continues to require that bankruptcy's
factual transformation of legal causes of action into equitable
claims to a share of the estate be considered.282 That is, to de-
termine whether the seventh amendment guarantees a right to
a jury trial in a particular action, the bankruptcy context in
which the claim is asserted must be taken into account. It is
not sufficient to look only to whether compensatory damages
are sought. If damages are sought from the bankruptcy estate
or in connection with an objection to a claim against the estate,
Katchen teaches that the claim has been transformed by bank-
ruptcy into an equitable claim triable without a jury.
What this approach requires, then, is that jury trial rights
be preserved for actions that retain their legal nature despite
their assertion in the bankruptcy courts. Matters viewed as eq-
uitable because of the nature of the relief sought will not be tri-
able by jury;283 nor will matters involving the equitable
that are applied to any other owner of property which is wrongfully
withheld. If the subject matter is a chattel, and is still in the grantee's
possession, an action in trover or replevin would be the trustee's rem-
edy; and if the fraudulent transfer was of cash, the trustee's action
would be for money had and received. Such actions at law are as
available to the trustee to-day as they were in the English courts of
long ago. If, on the other hand, the subject matter is land or an intan-
gible, or the trustee needs equitable aid for an accounting or the like,
he may invoke the equitable process, and that also is beyond dispute.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Not all courts agree with Professor Glenn's analysis,
however. Some view fraudulent conveyance actions as inherently equitable,
regardless of the relief sought. See, e.g., Moratzka v. Wend (In re Wencl), 71
Bankr. 879, 883-85 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987). But see Hassett v. Weissman (In re
O.P.M. Leasing Servs.), 48 Bankr. 824, 826-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (adopting Prof.
Glenn's analysis).
281. But see supra notes 175-82 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 231-35 and accompanying text.
283. For example, an action by a trustee seeking an injunction or specific
performance would have been equitable when pursued by a plenary suit under
the 1898 Act, and it remains equitable when brought in the bankruptcy court
under current law.
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administration of the bankruptcy estate.284 Matters previously
pursued by actions at law in nonbankruptcy courts, however,
will retain their jury trial entitlements.285
This approach results in a system of jury trial rights simi-
lar to that which Congress attempted to create under the 1978
Act. In section 1480 of the 1978 Act, Congress preserved jury
trial rights that existed prior to the expansion of the bank-
ruptcy courts' jurisdiction.2s6 Although replaced in 1984 by a
much narrower provision, the approach proposed by this Arti-
cle is based on the view that the seventh amendment continues
to require that jury trial rights be recognized.2 7 Thus, notwith-
standing Congress's failure to provide for the right to jury trial
in bankruptcy except in a narrow category of cases, jury trials
continue to be available in both core and noncore bankruptcy
proceedings pursuant to the seventh amendment.
IV. AUTHORITY OF BANKRUPTCY JUDGES TO
CONDUCT JURY TRIALS
A. CONFLICTING VIEws
If the seventh amendment guarantees litigants the right to
a jury in certain bankruptcy matters, it must be determined
who may conduct the jury trial. The logical choice is a bank-
ruptcy judge.2s8 In the 1984 Amendments, however, Congress
failed to state expressly whether bankruptcy judges are author-
ized to conduct jury trials.289 As a result courts have deter-
284. Thus, claims against the estate and objections to creditors' claims are
equitable in nature and are not entitled to be tried by a jury.
285. This category of claims, to which the seventh amendment applies, in-
cludes fraudulent conveyance and preference actions seeking legal relief,
which are core proceedings, and all noncore proceedings in which legal relief
is sought.
286. See supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
287. The seventh amendment preserves jury trial rights only in actions of a
legal nature. Unlike 28 U.S.C. § 1480 (1982), it does not preserve any preexist-
ing jury trial rights granted by statute to actions of an equitable nature.
288. Though bankruptcy jurisdiction is vested in the district courts, most
bankruptcy matters are heard by a bankruptcy judge. See supra note 188. In-
deed, the consolidation of bankruptcy litigation in the bankruptcy court was
one of the goals underlying Congress's enactment of the 1978 Act. See supra
notes 1-5 and accompanying text. Thus, if a bankruptcy matter is to be tried to
a jury, it would appear to be preferable to allow the bankruptcy judge to con-
duct the trial, rather than to require this litigation to be split off from all re-
lated bankruptcy matters and added to the district court's jury trial backlog.
289. In evaluating the various positions taken by the courts, discussed infra
notes 290-308 and accompanying text, the lack of any express statutory author-
ization for bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials should not be dispositive.
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mined the appropriate procedure for themselves. Once again a
variety of views have emerged.
One line of authority holds that bankruptcy judges possess
no authority to conduct jury trials and that a district judge
therefore must try any bankruptcy matter in which a jury trial
District judges have no such statutory authorization. Chapter 121 of title 28,
United States Code, which governs jury trials in the federal courts, contains no
express authorization for district judges to conduct jury trials. Nor is such au-
thorization included in chapter 5 of title 28, which governs the district courts.
Nevertheless, authority to preside over jury trials is dearly implicit in the
grant of jurisdiction to them over matters at law. The same conclusion could
be reached concerning bankruptcy judges.
Congress apparently repealed the statutory provision that would have
made jury trial procedures expressly applicable to bankruptcy courts. Section
243 of the 1978 Act amended 28 U.S.C. § 1869(f) to include bankruptcy courts
within the definition of the courts to which the jury trial provisions of the ju-
dicial code apply. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2671 (1978). Section 402(b)
of the 1978 Act provided that § 243 would take effect on April 1, 1984, later
extended to June 28, 1984. Id. at 2682. The 1984 Amendments contained con-
flicting provisions concerning its effect on § 402(b). Section 113 declared that
§ 402(b) "'shall not be effective,'" Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 343 (1984),
whereas § 121(a) provided that § 402(b) would go into effect on the effective
date of the 1984 Amendments. Id. at 345. These are the same conflicting pro-
visions that govern the effect of the 1984 Amendments on the 1978 Act's jury
trial provision, which most have interpreted as causing the provision's repeal.
See supra note 96.
In the analogous case of magistrates, however, Congress enacted a statu-
tory provision expressly stating the circumstances under which they may con-
duct jury trials. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1982) (providing that "[u]pon the
consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate... may conduct
any or all proceedings in a jury ... civil matter and order the entry of judg-
ment in the case, when specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the
district court or courts he serves").
Although these actions by Congress might suggest that it did not intend
bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials, there are indications to the contrary.
When Congress enacted the 1984 Amendments, it declined to enact the emer-
gency rule's express prohibition against the conduct of jury trials by bank-
ruptcy judges, even though in other respects it generally adopted the
Emergency Rule's approach to the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Dailey v. First Peoples Bank, 76 Bankr. 963, 967 (D.N.J. 1987) ("Had Con-
gress intended to abrogate the bankruptcy court's authority to empanel juries,
it would have enacted the Emergency Rule to accomplish that."); Walsh v.
Long Beach Honda (In re Gaildeen Indus.), 59 Bankr. 402, 406 (N.D. Cal. 1986)
("Had Congress intended to prohibit bankruptcy judges from conducting jury
trials it need only have enacted the proscription contained in the Emergency
Rule.").
It thus seems more likely that Congress failed to enact a provision clearly
stating the bankruptcy judges' authority to conduct jury trials because of its
uncertainty about applicable constitutional requirements. If that is the case,
then clarification of the constitutional issues might lead to a clarification of
the congressional intent regarding the conduct of jury trials by bankruptcy
judges. See infra notes 309-397 and accompanying text.
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is properly demanded.290 Some courts reaching this conclusion
interpret Northern Pipeline as indicating that article III is vio-
lated if non-article III bankruptcy judges conduct jury trials. 291
Other courts in this group avoid the constitutional question and
conclude that bankruptcy judges should not conduct jury trials
in the absence of express statutory authorization.292 Finally,
some courts follow local bankruptcy rules requiring all bank-
ruptcy jury trials to be conducted by a district judge.293
A majority of courts disagree with the view that bank-
ruptcy judges lack authority to conduct jury trials, but for prac-
tical reasons they conclude that they should not do so in
noncore proceedings without the parties' consent.294 These
290. See Jefferson Nat'1 Bank v. I.A. Durbin, Inc. (In re l.A. Durbin, Inc.),
62 Bankr. 139, 146 (S.D. Fla. 1986); Terry v. Proehl (In re Proehl), 36 Bankr.
86, 86-88 (W.D. Va. 1984); Hoffman v. Brown (In re Brown), 56 Bankr. 487, 488-
91 (Bankx. D. Md. 1985); Cameron v. Anderson (In re American Energy), 50
Bankr. 175, 180-81 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985); Bokum Resources Corp. v. Long Is-
land Lighting Co. (In re Bokum Resources Corp.), 49 Bankr. 854, 868-69
(Bankr. D.N.M. 1985); Atlas Automation v. Jensen, Inc. (In re Atlas Automa-
tion), 42 Bankr. 246, 247-48 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984). Some commentators
agree that bankruptcy judges lack authority to conduct jury trials. See, e.g.,
King, supra note 14, at 704 (arguing that "there is no authorization in Title 11
or Title 28 for bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials"); Sabino, supra note
14, at 345 (stating that "bankruptcy courts, for reason of the present limita-
tions of their powers, cannot conduct jury trials").
291. Proehl, 36 Bankr. at 87 ("Implicit in the Northern Pipeline decision is
the conclusion that it would be an unconstitutional delegation to permit a
bankruptcy judge to preside over a jury trial."); American Energy, 50 Bankr.
at 181 ("The Supreme Court in its Marathon decision was quite clear in its
holding that the grant of Article m powers to bankruptcy judges was an un-
constitutional delegation to an adjunct court."). For discussions of the North-
ern Pipeline language on which these courts rely, see supra notes 85-86 and
accompanying text and in-fra notes 334-35 and accompanying text.
292. LA. Durbin, Inc., 62 Bankr. at 146 (finding no authority under § 1411
and concluding that "[n]owhere else in the code is the bankruptcy court em-
powered to conduct a jury trial"); Brown, 56 Bankr. at 490 ("[B]ased upon
Northern Pipeline and prior case law which denied the right to trial by jury in
the bankruptcy court, and in light of the absence of express statutory authori-
zation therefor in [1984 Amendments], this Court concludes that it is power-
less to conduct jury trials.").
293. Bokum Resources Corp., 49 Bankr. at 869 (relying on local rule stating
that "'[a] district judge shall conduct jury trials in all bankruptcy cases and
proceedings in which a party has a right to trial by jury and a jury is timely
demanded' ") (quoting Miscellaneous No. 1426, Amendment to Local Rule 31,
1(c)); Atlas Automation, 42 Bankr. at 247 (relying on local administrative or-
der that requires bankruptcy judge to administer jury trial case until it is
ready for a final pretrial conference, at which point it is transferred to the dis-
trict court for trial).
294. See Macon Prestressed Concrete Co. v. Duke, 46 Bankr. 727, 730-31
(M.D. Ga 1985); Mohawk Indus. v. Robinson Indus., 46 Bankr. 464, 466 (D.
Mass. 1985); Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (In re Guenther), 65
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courts infer such authority from a variety of sources: section
1411;295 Bankruptcy Rule 9015, which prior to its abrogation-96
prescribed the procedure for jury trials; 297 or 28 U.S.C. § 157(a),
which authorizes district courts to refer bankruptcy matters to
bankruptcy judges.298 Other courts conclude that bankruptcy
judges possess the authority because of the absence of any ex-
press statutory prohibition.299 Several of these courts expressly
Bankr. 650, 652 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986); R.I. Lithograph Corp. v. Aetna Casu-
alty & Sur. Co. (In re R.I. Lithograph Corp.), 60 Bankr. 199, 205 (Bankr. D.R.I.
1986); Reda, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank (In re Reda, Inc.), 60 Bankr. 178,
182 (Bankr. N.D. IM. 1986); Blackman v. Seton (In re Blackman), 55 Bankr.
437, 441-42 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1985); Arnold Print Works v. Apkin (In re Arnold
Print Works), 54 Bankr. 562, 569-70 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985), aff'd in part rev'd
in part, 61 Bankr. 520 (D. Mass. 1986), vacated, 815 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1987) (af-
firming bankruptcy court on other grounds); Palmisano v. Briggs (In re North-
ern Design), 53 Bankr. 25, 27 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1985); Barry v. Pierce (In re
Atlantic Energy), 52 Bankr. 17, 17 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985); L.A. Clarke & Son
v. Bullock Constr. (In re L.A. Clarke & Son), 51 Bankr. 31, 32 (Bankr. D.D.C.
1985); Morse Elec. Co. v. Logicon, Inc. (In re Morse Elec. Co.), 47 Bankr. 234,
238 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985); Smith-Douglass, Inc. v. Smith (In re Smith-
Douglass, Inc.), 43 Bankr. 616, 618 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984).
295. Blackman, 55 Bankr. at 440 ("[Ihe new statute specifically adverts to
the right to trial by jury without in any way indicating that the bankruptcy
court unit of the district court is prohibited from conducting jury trials."); L.A.
Clarke & Son, 51 Bankr. at 32 (same).
296. The amendments to the Bankruptcy Rules, effective August 1, 1987,
eliminated Rule 9015. The Committee Note explained:
Former section 1480 of title 28 preserved a right to trial by jury in
any case or proceeding under title 11 in which jury trial was provided
by statute. Rule 9015 provided the procedure for jury trials in bank-
ruptcy courts. Section 1480 was repealed. Section 1411 added by the
1984 amendments affords a jury trial only for personal injury or
wrongful death claims, which 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) requires be tried in
the district court. Nevertheless, Rule 9015 has been cited as confer-
ring a right to jury trial in other matters before bankruptcy judges.
In light of the clear mandate of 28 U.S.C. § 2075 that the "rules shall
not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right," Rule 9015 is ab-
rogated. In the event the courts of appeals or the Supreme Court de-
fine a right to jury trial in any bankruptcy mattes, a local rule in
substantially the form of Rule 9015 can be adopted pending amend-
ment of these rules.
Committee Note to Abrogation of Bankr. R. 9015, reprinted in BANKRUPTCY
SERVICE § 62:175 (1987).
297. Blackman, 55 Bankr. at 440 ("The Bankruptcy Rules expressly vest
power to conduct jury trials in the bankruptcy court."); Atlantic Energy, 52
Bankr. at 17 ("Under existing bankruptcy law and B.R. 9015, this court is au-
thorized and empowered to conduct jury trials."); L.A. Clarke & Son, 51 Bankr.
at 32 n.1 (holding that "Bankruptcy Rules promulgated by the Supreme Court
specifically contemplate jury trials in bankruptcy courts").
298. Macon Prestressed Concrete Co., 46 Bankr. at 730 (concluding "that the
authority granted to it by 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(a) ... vests the bankruptcy court
with the same authority to conduct a jury trial as exists in this court").
299. McCormick v. American Investors Management (In re McCormick),
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hold that such authorization does not violate article 111.300
Despite finding sufficient authority, courts in this latter
group conclude that the current procedural structure of the
bankruptcy courts301 makes it impractical for bankruptcy
judges to conduct jury trials in most noncore proceedings. The
1984 Amendments state explicitly that a bankruptcy judge can-
not enter a final judgment in a noncore proceeding30 2 unless
the parties consent.30 3 Because of that limitation, these courts
hold that any jury trials of noncore matters in which the par-
ties do not consent must occur before a district judge.304
67 Bankr. 838, 842 (D. Nev. 1986) ("[It is significant that the prohibition of
jury trials was 'one of the few provisions of the Emergency Rule which Con-
gress did not see fit to enact.' ") (quoting Baldwin-United Corp. v. Thompson
(In re Baldwin-United Corp.), 48 Bankr. 49, 56 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985)); Ar-
nold Print Works v. Apkin (In re Arnold Print Works), 54 Bankr. 562, 569
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1985) ("[T]here is authority that a bankruptcy judge has the
implied power to conduct jury trials in all instances when such right exists,
except the expressly excluded limited class of personal injury or wrongful
death claims."), qff'd in par4 rev'd in part, 61 Bankr. 520 (D. Mass. 1986), va-
cated, 815 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1987) (affirming bankruptcy court on other
grounds); Morse Elec. Co. v. Logicon, Inc. (In re Morse Elec. Co.), 47 Bankr.
234, 238 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985) (relying on authority stating that bankruptcy
judge is authorized to conduct jury trials except in the cases expressly ex-
cluded by statute); Smith-Douglass, Inc. v. Smith (In re Smith-Douglass, Inc.),
43 Bankr. 616, 618 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984) (finding "no direct prohibition
under the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984
against jury trials being conducted by the bankruptcy court").
300. See, e.g., Blackman, 55 Bankr. at 440-41 (citing with approval authority
holding that "the bankruptcy court's power to conduct a jury trial ... is
neither contrary to the Supreme Court's Northern Pipeline ... decision...
nor contrary to the provisions of Article III of the Constitution") (footnote
omitted); LA. Clarke & Son, 51 Bankr. at 32 n.1 ("nothing in the Constitution
forbids an Article I federal court from conducting a jury trial"); cf. McCor-
mick, 67 Bankr. at 843 (holding that "the bankruptcy court is both authorized
and constitutionally permitted to conduct jury trials in core proceedings and,
with consent of the parties, in non-core proceedings").
301. See supra notes 187-94 and accompanying text.
302. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
303. Id. § 157(c)(2). If the parties consent to the bankruptcy court's entry
of final judgment, these courts recognize the bankruptcy judge's authority to
conduct the jury trial of a noncore proceeding. See, e.g., Mauldin v. Peoples
Bank (In re Mauldin), 52 Bankr. 838, 842 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1985) ("In a re-
lated or non-core proceeding, no jury trial is available unless all parties con-
sent to the bankruptcy judge presiding over the case and entering the final
order or judgment resulting from the jury verdict."); Lerblance v. Rodgers (In
re Rodgers & Sons), 48 Bankr. 683, 688 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1985) ("[Tihis Court
is empowered to conduct a jury trial in core proceedings and non-core proceed-
ings in which all parties so consent.").
304. As one bankruptcy court explained:
Because the debtor's adversary complaint is a noncore proceeding, the
bankruptcy court is unable to enter a final judgment without the con-
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A third line of authority, not necessarily inconsistent with
the second, holds that bankruptcy judges possess authority to
conduct jury trials in core proceedings.305 Courts taking this
position find authority from the same sources relied upon by
sent of the parties. Such consent is lacking in this case. Therefore,
any jury verdict rendered in this Court and any order entered by this
Court in accordance with that verdict would be subject to de novo re-
view upon appeal to the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1).
This review would include the holding of a new jury trial if timely re-
quested.
It would be impractical and make no sense in terms of judicial
economy for the bankruptcy court to hold a jury trial in a noncore
proceeding where the parties have not given their consent to the
bankruptcy court's exercise of jurisdiction. The likelihood of a second
jury trial in the district court is great. The waste of time and re-
sources in having the bankruptcy court conduct its own jury trial in
such circumstances is obvious....
Reda, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank (In re Reda, Inc.) 60 Bankr. 178, 182
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986) (citations omitted); see also Dailey v. First Peoples
Bank, 76 Bankr. 963, 968 (D.N.J. 1987) ("It therefore appears that Congress
contemplated no role for a jury in 'otherwise related' [ie. noncore] proceed-
ings; would a jury's findings be mere proposals?"); Palmisano v. Briggs (In re
Northern Design), 53 Bankr. 25, 27 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1985) ("It would be an exer-
cise in futility for the Bankruptcy Court to conduct a hearing solely for the
purpose of submitting proposed findings and conclusions of law to the District
Court only to have this hearing followed by a jury trial on the same issues.");
Morse Elec. Co. v. Logicon, Inc. (In re Morse Elec. Co.), 47 Bankr. 234, 238
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985) ("because this adversary proceeding is a related pro-
ceeding, the Bankruptcy Court cannot enter final judgment in the matter"
and, therefore, a jury trial would not be effective); Smith-Douglass, Inc. v.
Smith (In re Smith-Douglass, Inc.), 43 Bankr. 616, 618 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984)
("[Tihe inability of bankruptcy judges to enter final judgments, absent consent
of the parties, in noncore proceedings makes jury trials in such proceedings
impractical."); Norton & Lieb, supra note 14, at 163-64 ("[I]n a 'related to' pro-
ceeding it would be impracticable to conduct a jury trial before the bankruptcy
judge [because] a jury's verdict could at most be advisory and included in the
bankruptcy judge's draft of findings of fact submitted for de novo review in
the district court.").
305. See Zimmerman v. Cavanagh (In re Kenval Marketing Corp.), 65
Bankr. 548, 553 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Walsh v. Long Beach Honda (In re Gaildeen
Indus.), 59 Bankr. 402, 406-07 (N.D. Cal. 1986); Hassett v. Weissman (In re
O.P.M. Leasing Servs.), 48 Bankr. 824, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Official Creditors'
Comm. of Honeycomb v. Fidelity Bank (In re Honeycomb), 72 Bankr. 371, 374-
78 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); Wolfe v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Wolfe),
68 Bankr. 80, 89 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.), aff'd sub nom. M & E Contractors v. Ku-
gler-Morris Gen. Contractors, 67 Bankr. 260 (N.D. Tex. 1986); Otte v. Mon-
santo Co. (In re McCrary's Farm Supply), 57 Bankr. 423, 424-25 (Bankr. E.D.
Ark. 1985); Boss-Linco Lines v. Laidlaw Transp. (In re Boss-Linco Lines), 55
Bankr. 299, 308 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985); cf. M & E Contractors v. Kugler-Mor-
ris Gen. Contractors, 67 Bankr. 260, 267 (N.D. Tex. 1986) (finding authority for
bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials in core proceedings, but concluding it
would violate article III for bankruptcy judge to hear noncore proceedings
based on state law without parties' consent).
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the previous group,306 but do so in cases not requiring them to
consider whether bankruptcy judges should preside over jury
trials in noncore proceedings. Thus it is not known whether
they believe it permissible for bankruptcy judges to conduct
jury trials in all proceedings,307 or whether they think it appro-
priate only in those proceedings in which bankruptcy judges
may enter final judgments.308
306. See supra notes 295-99 and accompanying text.
307. A few courts have stated without limitation that bankruptcy courts
are authorized to conduct jury trials. They reach this conclusion without dis-
cussing the possible difficulties of conducting jury trials in noncore proceed-
ings. See, e.g., McCormick v. American Investors Management (In re
McCormick), 61 Bankr. 595, 596 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1986); Baldwin United Corp.
v. Thompson (In re Baldwin-United Corp.), 48 Bankr. 49, 56 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1985); see also Comment, supra note 14, at 554-55 (concluding that bankruptcy
judges have authority to conduct jury trials in core and noncore proceedings);
cf. Price-Watson Co. v. Amex Steel Corp. (In re Price-Watson Co.), 66 Bankr.
144, 152-60 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986) (holding that bankruptcy judges may con-
duct jury trials in noncore proceedings because de novo review does not re-
quire a second jury trial in district court).
308. The result of the various viewpoints on the right to a jury trial in
bankruptcy and the authority of bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials is
that some courts are permitting jury trials to be conducted in the bankruptcy
court despite Northern Pipeline and the 1984 Amendments. If a court adopts a
pure seventh amendment analysis of when a right to a jury trial exists, see
supra note 175-82 and accompanying text, and if it concludes that the bank-
ruptcy judge has authority to conduct jury trials, at least in core proceedings,
then in certain cases it will permit a jury trial to take place in the bankruptcy
court. See Wolfe, 68 Bankr. at 89; McCormick, 61 Bankr. at 596; McCrary's
Farm Supply, 57 Bankr. at 424-25; Boss-Linco Lines, 55 Bankr. at 308; Barry v.
Pierce (In re Atlantic Energy), 52 Bankr. 17, 17 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985); cf.
Zimmerman v. Cavanagh (In re Kenval Marketing Corp.), 65 Bankr. 548, 555-
56 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (but for space and staff limitations, district court would have
ordered jury trial to be conducted in bankruptcy court). If, however, a court
adopts the majority viewpoint on both issues-that is, it concludes that there is
no right to a jury trial in core proceedings and that the bankruptcy court
should not conduct jury trials of noncore proceedings-then it will not permit
a jury trial to take place in the bankruptcy court unless the parties in a
noncore proceeding consent to the entry of judgment by the bankruptcy judge.
In any other noncore proceedings in which a court concludes that a jury trial
right exists, it will either abstain or recommend withdrawal of the reference
so that the trial can take place before a jury in either state court or federal
district court. See, e.g., R.I. Lithograph Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. (In
re R.I. Lithograph Corp.), 60 Bankr. 199, 205-06 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1986); Bokum
Resources'Corp. v. Long Island Lighting Co. (In re Bokum Resources Corp.),
49 Bankr. 854, 869 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1985); Smith-Douglass, Inc. v. Smith (In re
Smith-Douglass, Inc.), 43 Bankr. 616, 618 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984). Finally,
there are a few courts that have failed to recognize that two distinct issues are
involved. Because they combine the question of jury trial rights with the ques-
tion of the bankruptcy judges' authority, they end up denying the jury demand
due to practical considerations or lack of authority, even though they previ-
ously concluded that a right to a jury trial was conferred by statute or the sev-
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The following sections of the Article accordingly examine
whether a jury trial before a bankruptcy judge is both constitu-
tionally sufficient and constitutionally permissible. Because the
jury trial rights under discussion are mandated by the seventh
amendment, it must be determined whether a trial before a
non-article III bankruptcy judge satisfies the seventh amend-
ment's requirements for a trial by jury. Secondly, even if the
seventh amendment would be satisfied by such a trial, the re-
quirements of article III of the Constitution must be explored
to determine whether it is permissible for bankruptcy judges to
exercise this judicial power.
B. THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT'S REQUIREMENTS
An issue raised briefly during the hearings leading up to
the 1978 Act, but addressed infrequently by the courts, is
whether a trial before a non-article III judge constitutes a
"trial by jury" within the meaning of the seventh amend-
ment.30 9 If it does not, then any bankruptcy jury trials required
by the seventh amendment will have to be conducted by the
district judge. Most decisions considering the meaning of "trial
by jury" have focused on the composition of the jury.310 The
seventh amendment's requirements with respect to the presid-
ing judge, on the other hand, have rarely been considered.
enth amendment. See, e.g., Arnold Print Works v. Apkin (In re Arnold Print
Works), 54 Bankr. 562, 569-70 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985), aff'd in par4 rev'd in
part, 61 Bankr. 520 (D. Mass. 1986), vacated, 815 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1987) (af-
firming bankruptcy court on other grounds); Morse Elec. Co. v. Logicon, Inc.
(In re Morse Elec. Co.), 47 Bankr. 234, 238 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985).
309. In response to constitutional concerns raised concerning the creation
of non-article III bankruptcy courts, the House Judiciary Committee in 1976
solicited the views of various constitutional and federal jurisdiction scholars.
Among those who responded was Professor David Shapiro. In the course of
stating his view that a non-article III court could adjudicate bankruptcy mat-
ters, he stated briefly that "the guarantee of the Seventh Amendment does
not, I believe, require that a jury trial, if one is to be had, take place in an Ar-
ticle III court presided over by an Article III judge." Bankruptcy Act Revi-
sion: Hearings on H.R. 31 and 32 Before the Subcomrm on Civil &
Constitutional Rights of the House Comrm on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2702 (1976). Although he was aware of no authority on the point, he ex-
plained that "the essence of the Seventh Amendment is the preservation of
the right to a jury, not an Article III judge." Id. (emphasis in original); see also
Bankruptcy Court Revision: Hearings on H.R. 8200 Before the Subcomm. on
Civil & Constitutional Rights of the House Comr, on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 255 (1977) (testimony of Prof. Countryman referring to Prof.
Shapiro's statement).
310. See, e.g., Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973) (six-person jury
permissible under seventh amendment).
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The most extensive judicial consideration of the issue oc-
curred in a nineteenth century Supreme Court decision, Capital
Traction Co. v. Hof 3 1 ' The Court upheld a statute giving Dis-
trict of Columbia justices of the peace jurisdiction over civil
jury trials and permitting appeal from the judgment of the jus-
tice of the peace with the right to a new trial by jury.3 12
Although it was argued that permitting a second jury trial on
appeal violated the seventh amendment's proscription against
reexamination of facts found by a jury, 13 the Court held that
the trial before the justice of the peace did not constitute a trial
by jury within the meaning of the seventh amendment.3 14 The
Court emphasized that District of Columbia justices of the
peace performed only the ministerial tasks of impaneling the
jury and entering judgment on the jury's verdict. They did not
possess the power to instruct jurors on the law, to advise them
on the facts, or to set aside verdicts in appropriate cases.315 The
Court thus concluded that a jury trial in such a forum did not
satisfy the seventh amendment's trial by jury requirements.3 16
Hofs description of the characteristics required of a judge
311. 174 U.S. 1 (1899).
312. Id. at 45-46.
313. For a discussion of the seventh amendment's reexamination clause,
see infra notes 370-71 and accompanying text.
314. 174 U.S. at 45.
315. The Court explained that
"[t]rial by jury," in. the primary and usual sense of the term at the
common law and in the American constitutions, is not merely a trial
by a jury of twelve men before an officer vested with authority to
cause them to be summoned and empanelled, to administer oaths to
them and to the constable in charge, and to enter judgment and issue
execution on their verdict; but it is a trial by a jury of twelve men, in
the presence and under the superintendence of a judge empowered to
instruct them on the law and to advise them on the facts, and (except
on acquittal of a criminal charge) to set aside their verdict if in his
opinion it is against the law or the evidence....
Id. at 13-14 (emphasis added).
316. A trial before the justice of the peace did not constitute a trial by jury
within the meaning of the seventh amendment, explained the Court, because
[a] justice of the peace, having no other powers than those conferred
by Congress on such an officer in the District of Columbia, was not,
properly speaking, a judge, or his tribunal a court; least of all, a court
of record. The proceedings before him were not according to the
course of the common law; his authority was created and defined by,
and rested upon, the acts of Congress only. The act of 1823, in permit-
ting cases before him to be tried by jury, did not require him to super-
intend the course of the trial or to instruct the jury in matter of law;
nor did it authorize him, upon the return of their verdict, to arrest
judgment upon it, or to set it aside, for any cause whatever; but made
it his duty to enter judgment upon it forthwith, as a thing of course.
A body of men, so free from judicial control, was not a common law
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conducting a seventh amendment jury trial remains valid.317 In
the more recent case of Pernell v. Southall Realty,318 the Court
expanded briefly on this description. It explained -that jury tri-
als before English common law justices of the peace were jury
trials in "the full constitutional sense" because "[t]hey were
judges of record and their courts, courts of record" and the
"procedures they followed differed in no essential manner from
that of the higher court[s]." 319
The Supreme Court's description of the vital characteristics
of a trial by jury emphasize the court's procedures and the ex-
ercise of legal discretion by the judge. They contain no sugges-
tion that the seventh amendment requires the presiding judge
to be appointed pursuant to article III of the Constitution. In-
stead, the characteristics necessary to satisfy constitutional re-
quirements are ones potentially possessed by many types of
federal judges, including those serving pursuant to authority
other than article 111.320
The District of Columbia courts illustrate most persua-
sively that the seventh amendment does not require that only
article III judges preside over jury trials. Each day jury trials
required by the seventh amendment 321 are conducted in these
non-article III courts before judges appointed for fifteen-year
jury; nor was a trial by them a trial by jury, within the meaning of the
Seventh Amendment to the Constitution....
Id. at 38-39.
317. The Court has since eliminated, however, the requirement that there
be twelve jurors. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 160 (1973) (permitting
six-person civil juries). In addition, Federal law now prohibits the exclusion of
women from jury service in federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1982) ("No
citizen shall be excluded from service as a grand or petit juror in the district
courts of the United States ... on account of... sex . .
318. 416 U.S. 363 (1974).
319. Id. at 381. The Court therefore concluded that a jury trial before an
English justice of the peace constituted a trial by jury as that concept came to
be established in the seventh amendment. Id. at 380. It accordingly found that
the plaintiff's suggested analogy between the District of Columbia statute,
under which the plaintiff was proceeding, and the English forcible entry and
detainer statute, which granted a jury trial before a justice of the peace, sup-
ported the conclusion that the seventh amendment guaranteed a right to jury
trial in the action before it. Id. at 380-81.
320. Cf. The Justices v. Murray, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 274, 282 (1869) (facts
found by jury in non-article III state court entitled to protection against re-
examination under second clause of seventh amendment).
321. In Hof the Court stated: "It is beyond doubt, at the present day, that
the provisions of the Constitution of the United States securing the right of
trial by jury, whether in civil or in criminal cases, are applicable to the District
of Columbia." 174 U.S. at 5; accord Pernell, 416 U.S. at 370.
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terms.322 The Supreme Court has sanctioned this practice with-
out questioning its constitutionality.323 In Pernell it held that a
party to an action under the District of Columbia Code to re-
cover real property was entitled to a jury trial under the sev-
enth amendment and remanded the case for trial in that city's
superior court.324 Although the Court did not discuss explicitly
whether a trial in this non-article III court satisfied the sev-
enth amendment, that conclusion was an essential underpin-
ning of the Court's holding.325
If the seventh amendment is satisfied by jury trials con-
ducted by District of Columbia judges, the same conclusion
should follow with respect to bankruptcy judges. Bankruptcy
judges, like the Pernel superior court judges and unlike the
Hof justices of the peace, are judges presiding over courts of
record.326 They possess the legal training and ability to instruct
jurors on the law,327 advise them concerning the facts, and set
322. Under the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Proce-
dure Act of 1970, the current District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the
Superior Court of the District of Columbia were established "pursuant to ar-
ticle I of the Constitution." Pub. L. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473, 475 (codified at D.C.
CODE ANN. § 11-101(2) (1981)). The judges serving on these courts are ap-
pointed by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate for a term
of fifteen years. Id. at 491 (codified at D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-1501 to -1502
(1981)).
323. See Pernell, 416 U.S. at 367.
324. Id. at 385.
325. The Supreme Court held in Hof, discussed supra notes 311-17 and ac-
companying text, that a trial in the former District of Columbia Supreme
Court constituted a trial by jury within the meaning of the seventh amend-
ment. 174 U.S. at 45. That court, however, unlike the present District of Co-
lumbia courts, was established pursuant to article HI of the Constitution. See
O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 551 (1933) ("ITihe Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia are constitutional courts
of the United States, ordained and established under Art. H of the Constitu-
tion .... "). Thus Hof does not hold directly that the seventh amendment is
satisfied by jury trials in non-article HI courts.
326. Under § 151 bankruptcy judges are designated as "judicial officers] of
the district court." 28 U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. MI 1985). They are authorized to
"exercise the authority conferred under this chapter with respect to any ac-
tion, suit, or proceeding and [to] preside alone and hold a regular or special
session of the court, except as otherwise provided by law or by rule or order of
the district court." Id.
327. Section 120 of the 1984 Amendments, as amended in 1986, prescribes
the qualifications for persons selected as bankruptcy judges. They include the
requirement that candidates be "members in good standing of at least one
State bar, the District of Columbia bar, or the bar of the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, and members in good standing of every other bar of which they
are members," and that they "possess and have demonstrated outstanding
legal ability and competence, as evidenced by substantial legal experience,
ability to deal with complex legal problems, aptitude for legal scholarship and
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aside inappropriate verdicts.3 28 The seventh amendment thus
appears to pose no constitutional obstacle to jury trials con-
ducted by bankruptcy judges.
C. ARTICLE III's REQUIREMENTS
Even though a jury trial before a bankruptcy judge may
satisfy the seventh amendment's requirements, some courts
conclude that article III of the Constitution 329 prohibits bank-
ruptcy judges from exercising such authority.330 These courts
believe that presiding at jury trials is a judicial power reserved
exclusively for judges possessing the protections mandated by
article III. These protections include the judges' ability to
"hold their Offices during good Behaviour" and the assurance
that their salaries "shall not be diminished during their Contin-
uance in Office."'s 31 Bankruptcy judges lack such protections.332
The conclusion reached by these courts is not compelled by
Northern Pipeline.33 3 Its plurality opinion referred to jury tri-
als conducted by bankruptcy judges only to illustrate the bank-
writing, and familiarity with courts and court processes." Pub. L. 98-353, 98
Stat, 333, 345 (1984), as amended by Pub. L. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3097, 3098 (1986),
reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. § 152 note (West Supp. 1987).
328. Prior to its abrogation, see supra note 296, Bankruptcy Rule 9015(f)
provided that Rules 47-51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were appli-
cable in the bankruptcy court when a jury trial was conducted. Fed. Bankr. R.
9015(f), 11 U.S.C. app. at 140 (Supp. IV. 1986). Rule 50 governs the granting of
directed verdicts and judgments notwithstanding the verdict. See FED. R. Civ.
P. 50. Rule 51 governs jury instructions. See FED. R. CiV. P. 51. As the Com-
mittee Note stated, should the right to jury trial in bankruptcy be clearly es-
tablished, Rule 9015 could be repromulgated and this procedure once more
made applicable to the bankruptcy courts. Comm. Note to Abrogation of
Bankr. R. 9015, reprinted in BANKRUPTCY SERviCE § 62:175 (1987).
329. Article III provides in part:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme
and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour,
and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation,
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
330. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
331. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
332. Bankruptcy judges are appointed by the court of appeals for their cir-
cult "for a term of fourteen years." 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (Supp. mI 1985). Dur-
ing the term of appointment, they may be removed from office by a majority
vote of the judicial council of their circuit for "incompetence, misconduct, ne-
glect of duty, or physical or mental disability." Id. at § 152(e).
333. For a discussion of Northern Pipeline, see supra notes 84-85, 347, 357
and accompanying text.
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ruptcy courts' independence from district courts.334 Because of
this independence, the Court held that bankruptcy courts were
not constitutionally permissible "adjuncts" to the article III
courts.3 3 5 The Court did not suggest, however, that article III
would always be violated if bankruptcy judges conducted jury
trials.
Jury trials conducted by other non-article III judges sug-
gest that the practice is not absolutely prohibited by article III.
As the Pernell case illustrates,3 3 6 District of Columbia judges
preside over jury trials despite their lack of article III status,
and the Supreme Court has acknowledged their right to do
so.337 In addition, United States magistrates, also non-article
III judges,33 8 are statutorily authorized to preside over jury tri-
als with the consent of the parties.3 3 9 Several courts of appeals
have held that this grant of authority to magistrates is consis-
tent with article III.34 0
Affirming the constitutionality of jury trials conducted by
some non-article III judges, however, does not settle the ques-
tion with respect to bankruptcy judges. Northern Pipeline
334. The plurality opinion in Northern Pipaeline stated that "the bank-
ruptcy courts exercise all ordinary powers of district courts, including the
power to preside over jury trials, 28 U.S.C. § 1480 (1976 ed., Supp. IV), the
power to issue declaratory judgments, § 2201, the power to issue writs of
habeas corpus, § 2256, and the power to issue any order, process, or judgment
appropriate for the enforcement of the provisions of Title 11." 458 U.S. at 85.
335. 458 U.S. at 87 ("We conclude that 28 U.S.C. § 1471... has impermissi-
bly removed most, if not all, of 'the essential attributes of the judicial power'
from the Art. HI district court, and has vested those attributes in a non-Art.
M adjunct. Such a grant of jurisdiction cannot be sustained as an exercise of
Congress' power to create adjuncts to Art. III courts.") (quoting Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)).
336. See supra notes 324-25 and accompanying text.
337. See Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 383 (1974).
338. Magistrates lack the protections mandated by article HI. They are ap-
pointed for terms of eight years, 28 U.S.C. § 631(e) (1982), and may be removed
by district court judges for the district in which they serve "for incompetency,
misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability," id. § 631(i). In
addition, "[a] magistrate's office shall be terminated if the [judicial] conference
determines that the services performed by his office are no longer needed."
Id. Though magistrates are statutorily protected from the reduction of their
salaries during the term for which they are appointed, id. § 634(b), such statu-
tory protection could be eliminated by Congress. See Geras v. Lafayette Dis-
play Fixtures, 742 F.2d 1037, 1039 (7th Cir. 1984).
339. See supm note 289.
340. See Fields v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 743 F.2d 890, 894
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Geras, 742 F.2d at 1045; Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108, 120
(2d Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 870 (1984); Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32,
34 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 852 (1984); Williams v. Mussomelli, 722 F.2d
1130, 1132 (3d Cir. 1983).
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makes clear that under article III bankruptcy judges are unlike
District of Columbia judges,341 and the statutory authority
given bankruptcy judges differs in significant respects from
that given federal magistrates. s42 The specific circumstances in
which bankruptcy judges might be asked to preside over jury
trials must therefore be analyzed in the light of article III's
requirements.
1. Core Proceedings
Under the procedural scheme established by the 1984
Amendments,s43 bankruptcy judges are authorized to "hear and
determine" all core proceedings referred to them by district
courts.3 44 This authorization includes the power to "enter ap-
propriate orders and judgments," subject to appellate review by
the district court.345 When presiding over these matters, bank-
ruptcy judges are essentially independent of the district
courts.
3 4 6
Assuming that it is constitutional to permit bankruptcy
judges to hear and enter final judgments in core proceedings,3 7
341. See 458 U.S. at 71 ("The courts created by the Bankruptcy Act of 1978
do not lie exclusively outside the States of the Federal Union, like those in the
District of Columbia and the Territories.").
342. Magistrates, for example, are only permitted to enter final judgments
in civil cases when the parties consent. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1982). Bankruptcy
judges, however, are authorized to enter final judgments in core proceedings
without the consent of the parties. Id. § 157(b) (Supp. m 1985).
343. See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
344. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (Supp. III 1985).
345. Id. Although the statute authorizing bankruptcy judges to enter final
judgments in core proceedings has been sustained by one court of appeals and
several district courts, see Arnold Print Works v. Apkin (In re Arnold Print
Works), 815 F.2d 165, 169 (1st Cir. 1987); Associated Grocers of Neb. Coop. v.
American Home Prods. Corp. (In re Associated Grocers of Neb. Coop.), 62
Bankr. 439, 447 (D. Neb. 1986); Production Steel v. Bethelehem Steel Corp. (In
re Production Steel), 48 Bankr. 841, 846 (M.D. Tenn. 1985); Danning v. Lum-
mis (In re Tom Carter Enters., Inc.), 44 Bankr. 605, 609 (C.D. Cal. 1984), its
constitutionality remains uncertain. See infra note 347. It is beyond the scope
of this Article, however, to analyze the challenging constitutional issues
presented by this provision of the 1984 Amendments.
346. The independence of the bankruptcy judge from the district court in a
core proceeding is not complete, however, because the district judge retains
authority to "withdraw, in whole or in part, any case or proceeding referred
[to the bankruptcy judge], on its own motion or on timely motion of any party,
for cause shown." 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (Supp. II 1985). This withdrawal power
is infrequently exercised in the case of core proceedings, however.
347. Despite several decisions upholding it, see supra note 345, the constitu-
tional question raised by granting bankruptcy judges authority to issue final
judgments remains unresolved. Northern Pipeline held that the 1978 grant to
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it remains to be determined whether conducting jury trials is a
bankruptcy courts of jurisdiction over bankruptcy-related state law actions
was not supported by any Supreme Court decision permitting non-article III
judges to exercise the judicial power of the United States. 458 U.S. at 76, 87
(plurality opinion); id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Whether the bank-
ruptcy judges' current authority over core proceedings may be sustained under
one of the Court's previous decisions is also questionable. Northern Pipeline
acknowledged that in some circumstances Congress can assign adjudicatory
functions to non-article M officers who act as adjuncts to article III courts.
When it does so, however, "'the essential attributes' of judical power [must be]
retained in the Art. m court." Id. at 81 (plurality opinion) (quoting Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932)); see also id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
(bankruptcy court not acting as adjunct to article M court when it resolves
"[a]ll matters of fact and law... with only traditional appellate review by Art.
M courts apparently contemplated"). Because bankruptcy judges are permit-
ted to hear and enter final judgments in core proceedings, subject only to nor-
mal appellate review, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b), 158 (Supp. III 1985), their
exercise of authority does not seem justifiable under the adjunct model. But
see Tom Carter Enters., 44 Bankr. at 609 (noting district court retains control
over core proceedings by its authority to withdraw reference to bankruptcy
judge).
Northern Pipeline also acknowledged that Congress has greater latitude
to use non-article III adjudicators when public rights are involved. 458 U.S. at
67-70 (plurality opinion); id. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Although the
Court concluded that the state law contract dispute before it did not involve
public rights, it did not rule out the application of the concept to all bank-
ruptcy matters. The plurality opinion noted that "the restructuring of
debtor-creditor relations, which is at the core of the federal bankruptcy
power,... may well be a 'public right."' Id. at 71. The concurring Justices
likewise suggested that some "powers granted under [the 1978] Act might be
sustained under the 'public rights' doctrine." Id. at 91.
Although this has been the basis on which some courts have sustained the
authority given bankruptcy judges over core matters, see cases cited supra
note 345, a significant expansion of the public rights concept is required to
make it cover all the matters Congress has specified as core. See, e.g., Baird,
supra note 258, at 44 ("[Why does a statute that readjusts rights between
debtor and creditor confer a 'public right' on the debtor and transform the re-
maining state-created rights of the creditor into rights that an Article I tribu-
nal can adjudicate?"); Currie, supra note 258, at 452 n.65 ("If the entry of
judgment in a bankruptcy case is enough to transform a purely private litiga-
tion into one involving 'public rights,' the Court's carefully repeated distinc-
tion is entirely without substance."). But cf. Briden v. Foley, 776 F.2d 379, 381
(1st Cir. 1985) (holding constitutional the application of clearly erroneous stan-
dard of review to bankruptcy court's findings of fact in preference action, be-
cause "[i]t is perfectly permissible for a core proceeding with respect to a
public right to be decided in a legislative court"). Moreover, even if all core
proceedings are properly viewed as involving public rights, a question remains
whether Congress reserved sufficient control over these proceedings for the
article I courts. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473
U.S. 568, 599 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that Northern Pipeline
"was careful to leave open the question whether and to what extent even the
resolution of public rights disputes might require some eventual review in an
Art. M court").
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power uniquely reserved for article III judges. In other words
is article III so protective of jury trials that it precludes bank-
ruptcy judges from conducting them even though it permits
those judges to conduct bench trials and to enter final
judgments?
The policies underlying article III provide no basis for con-
cluding that jury trials were intended to be singled out for spe-
cial treatment. It is well accepted that the tenure and salary
requirements of article III were included to ensure the inde-
pendence of federal judges from the other branches of govern-
ment.- 8  Indeed, article III serves the dual function of
"protect[ing] 'the role of the independent judiciary within the
constitutional scheme of tripartite government,' and . . . [of]
safeguard[ing] litigants' 'right to have claims decided before
judges who are free from potential domination by other
branches of government.' ,,9 The potential for domination of
the federal judiciary, however, is greater in the case of a bench
348. The Supreme Court has explained that "[t]he Federal Judiciary was
... designed by the Framers to stand independent of the Executive and Legis-
lature-to maintain the checks and balances of the constitutional structure,
and also to guarantee that the process of adjudication itself remained impar-
tial." Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 58; see also Currie, supra note 258, at 443-
44 (noting consistent authority that article III was intended to protect indepen-
dence of federal judges from the executive and legislative branches);
Krattenmaker, Article III and Judicial Independence: Why the New Bank-
ruptcy Courts Are Unconstitutional, 70 GEO. L.J. 297, 303 (1981) ("Te framers
intended that if Congress and the President wished to establish a federal judi-
cial office, they first would have to guarantee members of that office indepen-
dence from the other two branches."); Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article
III Courts, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 581, 613 (1985) (suggesting that article I's ten-
ure and salary requirements protect federal judges in their battles with the
other branches of government); Note, Article III Limits on Article I Courts:
The Constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Court and the 1979 Magistrate Act, 80
COLUM. L. REv. 560, 582 (1980) (arguing that tenure and salary "provisions en-
sure that the legislative and executive branches will not be able to dominate
the judiciary through coercive manipulation of judges' livelihood and continu-
ance in office"). Some commentators suggest that article III was not limited to
protecting against interference by the other branches of government. See
Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681, 711 (1979) (argu-
ing that judicial independence from other judges needs to be protected as
well); Sager, The Supreme Cour4 1980 Term-Foreword.- Constitutional Limi-
tations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 64 n.151 (1981) (arguing that tenure and salary
provisions were also intended to protect independence of judiciary from
majoritarian pressures).
349. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3256
(1986) (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568,
582-83 (1985), and United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980)) (citation
omitted).
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trial, when the judge is the factfinder, than it is in the case of a
jury trial. Jurors, it has been noted, "are not controlled by any
branch of the federal government, and indeed are traditionally
relied upon as a protection against governmental tyranny."350
If there is a difference between the status of bench and jury tri-
als under article III, it is the bench trial that may require more
protection.351
Moreover, insofar as core proceedings are concerned, bank-
ruptcy courts are comparable to the District of Columbia
courts. The Supreme Court has recognized Congress's power
under article I to establish the District of Columbia courts and
to permit them to operate outside the constraints of article
111.352 District of Columbia courts are permitted to conduct
jury trials with no apparent offense to article III.353 If granting
authority to bankruptcy judges over core matters is also upheld
as a permissible exercise of Congress's article I powers,354 then
these judges should similarly be able to exercise all powers in
such proceedings, including presiding over jury trials.
2. Noncore Proceedings
The issue of jury trials in noncore proceedings is more
complicated. In response to Northern Pipeline, Congress at-
tempted to satisfy article III by limiting the authority of bank-
ruptcy judges over certain matters identified as noncore.355
Unless the parties consent to the entry of judgment, the bank-
ruptcy judge may only hear noncore matters and propose find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law to the district judge. The
district judge is required to review de novo any matter to which
a party objects before entering a final judgment.3 56 Although
the constitutionality of the entire procedure is not free from
doubt,357 the specific issue addressed in this Article is the pro-
350. Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the North-
ern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197, 227.
351. See also infra notes 383-89 and accompanying text.
352. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 410 (1973).
353. See Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 383 (1974).
354. See supra note 347.
355. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1)-(2) (Supp. HI 1985); supra notes 193-94 and
accompanying text.
356. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c) (Supp. HI 1985).
357. By limiting the authority of bankruptcy judges over noncore matters,
Congress apparently relied on Supreme Court precedents permitting adjudica-
tion by adjuncts to article m courts. See 130 CoNG. REC. E1109 (daily ed. Mar.
20, 1984) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier). It is unclear, however, whether that
authority permits the use of adjuncts over primarily state-law noncore mat-
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priety of accommodating jury trials within this structure. That
is, even if article III permits a bankruptcy judge to exercise the
powers just discussed, does it also permit a bankruptcy judge to
preside over jury trials of noncore matters?
Assuming the consent provision is valid under article 111,358
the authority of bankruptcy judges to enter final judgments in
noncore matters with the parties' consent does not differ signif-
ters. The plurality in Northern Pipeline stressed that "when Congress creates
a substantive federal right, it possesses substantial discretion to prescribe the
manner in which that right may be adjudicated." 458 U.S. at 80. The plurality
opinion expressly rejected the argument that "Congress possesses the same de-
gree of discretion in assigning traditionally judicial power to adjuncts engaged
in the adjudication of rights not created by Congress." Id. at 81-82 (emphasis
in original). In Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245
(1985), the Court noted that "where private, common law rights are at stake,
our examination of the congressional attempt to control the manner in which
those rights are adjudicated has been searching." Id. at 3259. In light of these
limiting statements, there is substantial doubt whether Supreme Court prece-
dent permits Congress to utilize adjuncts in the adjudication of noncore
proceedings.
358. A recent Supreme Court decision strongly suggests that a litigant's
consent to non-article III adjudication does not eliminate all constitutional
concerns. In Schor the Court stated that to the extent that article I ensures
that litigants have impartial decision makers, that protection may be waived.
106 S. Ct. at 3256 (holding that "as a personal right, Article I's guarantee of
an impartial and independent federal adjudication is subject to waiver, just as
are other personal constitutional rights that dictate the procedures by which
civil and criminal matters must be tried"). The Court explained, however,
that article III also "serves as 'an inseparable element of the constitutional sys-
tem of checks and balances."' Id. at 3257 (quoting Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S.
at 58). This aspect of article III's protection may not be waived by litigants
"for the same reason that the parties by consent cannot confer on federal
courts subject matter jurisdiction beyond the limitations imposed by Article
III, § 2." Id. Thus, even when the parties consent to non-article M adjudica-
tion, the Court must still ensure that article III's commands are not violated.
"When these [structural] Article III limitations are at issue, notions of consent
and waiver cannot be dispositive because the limitations serve institutional in-
terests that the parties cannot be expected to protect." Id. at 3257-58; see also
id. at 3266 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Because the individual and structural in-
terests served by Article III are coextensive, I do not believe that a litigant
may ever waive his right to an Article III tribunal where one is constitution-
ally required."); Krattenmaker, supra note 348, at 306. Professor Krat-
tenmaker argues that "[t]he tenure and salary protection provisions of article
III are essentially structural. They disperse power, preserve the appearance of
fairness, protect the independence and integrity of federal judges, and elimi-
nate the need for case-by-case supervision of a judge's independence under the
rubric of due process." Id. It appears, then, that the constitutional difficulties
identified by Northern Pipeline involving non-article III bankruptcy judges
hearing and entering final judgments in state common-law actions are not en-
tirely eliminated by gaining the litigants' consent to the non-article I
adjudication.
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icantly from the authority they possess in core proceedings.35 9
Because the bankruptcy judge is authorized to take final action,
subject only to normal appellate review,3 60 it should not matter
for article III purposes that the facts are found by a jury rather
than a judge.
A similar situation is presented by a provision of the Fed-
eral Magistrates Act authorizing magistrates, with the parties'
consent, to conduct proceedings and to enter judgments in jury
or nonjury civil matters.361 Nine courts of appeal have upheld
this provision, each concluding that article III permits parties to
consent to adjudication by a non--article III adjunct.362 None of
these decisions suggests that magistrates possess less constitu-
tional authority to conduct jury, rather than nonjury, trials.363
Indeed, five of the decisions were issued in appeals from jury
trial cases.364 It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that
article III poses no obstacle to the conduct of jury trials by
bankruptcy judges in noncore proceedings in which the parties
consent to the entry of judgment by the bankruptcy judge.
A different problem is raised by noncore proceedings in
which the parties do not consent to the entry of judgment by
the bankruptcy judge. Under article III, is a bankruptcy judge
permitted to conduct a jury trial here as well? Initially, a statu-
tory impediment must be noted. Bankruptcy judges are re-
quired to propose findings of fact and conclusions of law.3 65
Because juries normally serve as fact finders, the statutory lan-
guage suggests that Congress did not intend that bankruptcy
judges conduct jury trials in noncore proceedings.3 66 But even
359. See supra notes 343-54 and accompanying text.
360. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (Supp. II 1985).
361. Id. § 636(c) (1982).
362. See Fields v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 743 F.2d 890, 894-
95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (jury trial case); Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, 742
F.2d 1037, 1041-42 (7th Cir. 1984) (same); Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb v. Clark
Oil & Ref. Corp., 739 F.2d 1313, 1315 (8th Cir. 1984) (en bane), cert denied, 469
U.S. 1158 (1985); Puryear v. Ede's Ltd., 731 F.2d 1153, 1154 (5th Cir. 1984); Col-
lins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108, 114-20 (2d Cir.) (same), cert denied, 469 U.S. 870
(1984); Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32, 36 (1st Cir.) (same), cert denied, 469
U.S. 852 (1984); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am. v. Instromedix, 725 F.2d
537, 546 (9th Cir.) (en bane), cert denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984); Williams v. Mus-
somelli, 722 F.2d 1130, 1132 (3d Cir. 1983) (jury trial case); Wharton-Thomas v.
United States, 721 F.2d 922, 929-30 (3d Cir. 1983); D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma
Graphics Corp., 753 F.2d 1029, 1032 (Fed. Cir.), cert denied, 474 U.S. 825 (1985).
363. But see Geras, 742 F.2d at 1048-49 (Posner, J., dissenting) (pointing out
limitations on appellate review of jury trials).
364. See supra note 362.
365. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
366. See, e.g., Pied Piper Casuals v. Insurance Co., 72 Bankr. 156, 159-60
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if the jury's findings could be incorporated into this procedure,
another statutory obstacle is the requirement of de novo re-
view, and possibly a second jury trial,367 by the district judge.368
A number of courts have concluded that this requirement
makes it impractical for bankruptcy judges to conduct jury tri-
als in noncore proceedings, reasoning that two jury trials would
be too costly and time consuming.369
The difficulty posed by the de novo review requirement,
however, is more fundamental. Subjecting the factual findings
of a bankruptcy court jury to de novo review by a district court
would violate the reexamination clause of the seventh amend-
ment.370 Under that provision the district court's ability to re-
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that "the jurisdictional provision for non-core proceed-
ings by its terms envisions a bench trial rather than a trial by jury").
Some courts have suggested that the jury's findings could be incorporated
into the bankruptcy judge's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
See, e.g., Price-Watson Co. v. Amex Steel Corp. (In re Price-Watson Co.), 66
Bankr. 144, 159 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986) ("I see no inconsistency in a jury mak-
ing fact findings which are then reported by the Bankruptcy Court to the Dis-
trict Court along with any supplemental findings and with conclusions of law
and a recommended judgment."); cf. Lugenbeel v. Schutte, 600 F. Supp. 698
(D. Md. 1985). In Lugenbeel the court stated that "the magistrate may impanel
a jury, conduct the trial, and obtain the jury's verdict on the factual issues in
dispute. The magistrate will then include the jury's verdict in his report and
recommendation to this Court." Id. at 701.
367. See infra notes 372-73 and accompanying text.
368. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
369. See cases cited supra note 294.
370. The second clause of the seventh amendment provides that "no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law." U.S. CONST. amend.
VII. This provision has been consistently interpreted to preclude a reviewing
court from setting aside facts found by a jury except under the narrow circum-
stances permitted at common law. In 1812, Justice Story, sitting as a circuit
justice, explained the principles embodied by this provision:
Now, according to the rules of the common law the facts once tried by
a jury are never re-examined, unless a new trial is granted in the dis-
cretion of the court, before which the suit is depending, for good cause
shown; or unless the judgment of such court is reversed by a superior
tribunal, on a writ of error, and a venire facias de novo is awarded.
This is the invariable usage settled by the decisions of ages. Upon a
writ of error, the appellate court can examine in general errors of law
only, and never can re-try the issues already settled by a jury, where
the judgment of the inferior court is affirmed.
United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750).
Justice Story held that the United States could not appeal from a judgment
entered on a verdict by the district court to receive a new jury trial in the cir-
cuit court. Instead, the United States could seek review only of errors of law.
Id. at 750. Similarly, in The Justices v. Murray, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 274 (1870),
the Supreme Court held that a statute permitting removal to federal court fol-
lowing a jury trial in state court, with a new jury trial afforded in the federal
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view the results of the bankruptcy court jury trial would be
limited. It could only review the bankruptcy jury's findings ac-
cording to ordinary principles of appellate review.3 71 This lim-
ited review, however, would not satisfy the review de novo
required by the statute. Although the district court is not nec-
essarily required to conduct a new hearing or convene a new
jury in every case,3 72 de novo review does require the district
court "to make an independent judgment of the issues... with-
out giving deference to the bankruptcy court's findings and con-
clusions."3 73 Because the reexamination clause requires that
deference be given to the facts found by a jury, allowing bank-
ruptcy judges to conduct jury trials in noncore, nonconsensual
proceedings would preclude the district court from complying
with its statutorily mandated scope of review.
In an analogous context, several courts of appeal have in-
terpreted the Federal Magistrates Act so as to avoid a similar
clash between the seventh amendment and a statutory de novo
review requirement. 374 Magistrates are authorized to "conduct
hearings, including evidentiary hearings" in certain criminal
and civil proceedings,375 and to propose findings of fact and con-
court, violated the seventh amendment. Id. at 277; see also Atlantic & Gulf
Stevedores v. Ellerman Lines, 369 U.S. 355, 359 (1962); Capital Traction Co. v.
Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13 (1899); Knickerbocker Ins. Co. v. Comstock, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 258, 269 (1873); Barreda v. Silsbee, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 146, 166-67 (1859).
371. Unless the district court found that an error of law was committed or
that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to go to the jury, it would
be required to accept the facts found by the bankruptcy court jury. See Slo-
cum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 379-80 (1913); Parsons v. Bedford,
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 448 (1830); 5 J. MooRE, J. LuCAS & J. WicKE, supra note
45, at 38-58 to 38-59.
372. Cf. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 674-76 (1980) (holding re-
quirement of Magistrate Act for de novo determination satisfied even though
district judge did not rehear the testimony on which magistrate based pro-
posed findings and recommendations).
373. Moody v. Amoco Oil Co., 734 F.2d 1200, 1210 (7th Cir.), cert denied,
469 U.S. 982 (1984); accord Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 675-76; id. at 690 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) ("The phrase 'de novo determination' ... means an independent
determination of a controversy that accords no deference to any prior resolu-
tion of the same controversy."); United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386
U.S. 361, 368 (1967) (review de novo means "that the court should make an in-
dependent determination of the issues" without giving "any special weight" to
the prior determination of the agency). But see King, supra note 14, at 681
(questioning thoroughness with which district judges will review bankruptcy
proceedings).
374. See infra notes 378-79.
375. The statute authorizes hearings with respect to "applications for post-
trial relief made by individuals convicted of criminal offenses and of prisoner
petitions challenging conditions of confinement." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)
(1982).
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clusions of law to the district court.3 76 The district judge is re-
quired to make a "de novo determination of those portions of
the ... proposed findings or recommendations to which objec-
tion is made. '377 The Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have
held that the provision authorizes magistrates to conduct non-
jury trials only.37 8 Among the reasons relied on by the courts
was that "a jury trial before the magistrate involves factfinding
intrinsically incapable of review de novo. ' '379
Similarly, even if it is permissible for bankruptcy judges to
conduct hearings in noncore proceedings without the parties'
consent, that authority should not be interpreted to embrace
the power to conduct jury trials. Although such a trial would
satisfy the seventh amendment's requirement of a "trial by
jury," the subsequent de novo review required by the statute
would violate the seventh amendment's reexamination
clause.380 To avoid this conflict, jury trials of noncore matters
must take place in the district court, unless the parties consent
to the entry of judgment by the bankruptcy judge.38 '
376. Id.
377. Id. § 636(b)(1).
378. See In re Wickline, 796 F.2d 1055, 1059 (8th Cir. 1986); Wimmer v.
Cook, 774 F.2d 68, 75-76 (4th Cir. 1985); Ford v. Estelle, 740 F.2d 374, 380-81
(5th Cir. 1984).
379. Ford, 740 F.2d at 380. The Fifth Circuit explained that
The reference employed here [of the case to the magistrate]
either effectively denies the right to trial by jury, or impermissibly
abrogates the decisive role of the district judge, or both. We fail to see
how a district court's review de novo of a jury's verdict could pass
muster under the Seventh Amendment's mandate that "no fact tried
by a jury, shall be otherwise examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law." We need not
reach the Seventh Amendment question, however, for it is hard to im-
agine that Congress intended to rely on so uncertain a constitutional
interpretation with nary a comment in the statute or its legislative
history.
Id. (citation omitted).
380. See supra notes 309-28, 370-73 and accompanying text.
381. A bankruptcy court noted that in a core proceeding the district court
may withdraw the reference to the bankruptcy judge and exercise complete
authority over the proceeding, even if the bankruptcy judge has rendered a fi-
nal decision. In this manner, the court reasoned, the district court can exer-
cise de novo review of the core proceeding, rather than appellate review.
Danning v. Lummis (In re Tom Carter Enters., Inc.), 44 Bankr. 605, 609 (C.D.
Cal. 1984). If this procedure were to be adopted by a district court, the same
arguments concerning the impropriety of de novo review of a jury's verdict
would be applicable.
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3. May Congress Eliminate the De Novo Requirement?
Assigning noncore proceedings to a district court to await
jury trial frequently delays the underlying bankruptcy case,
precisely the problem Congress sought to alleviate by ex-
panding the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction.3 2 If the problem
under the current scheme is the requirement for de novo re-
view, could Congress, consistent with article III, eliminate that
requirement?
An argument can be made that article III does not require
a district judge to review de novo facts found by a bankruptcy
court jury. Instead, the bankruptcy judge could conduct a jury
trial of a noncore matter and submit the verdict and proposed
judgment to the district court. The district court could then re-
view de novo all of the bankruptcy judge's rulings to which an
objection was made, according them no deference. The jury's
factual findings, however, would not be reexamined except ac-
cording to principles normally governing appellate review of
jury verdicts. In this manner the article III district judge would
ultimately decide all questions on the law and enter the judg-
ment. The jury's factual findings, however, would not be re-
examined in violation of the seventh amendment.
The strongest support for this argument comes from the
Supreme Court's decision in Crowell v. Benson.38 3 The Court
there held that permitting an administrative agency to make
conclusive factual findings did not violate article III,384 so long
as the district court retained authority to review de novo all
questions of law38 5 and those jurisdictional facts upon which
the agency's authority to act depended.38 6 The Court supported
382. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5963, 5975 (discussing need for expedi-
tion in bankruptcy as one reason for expanding bankruptcy jurisdiction).
383. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
384. Id. at 47 ("[Ihe efficacy of the plan depends upon the finality of the
[agency's] determinations of fact with respect to the circumstances, nature, ex-
tent and consequences of the employee's injuries and the amount of compensa-
tion that should be awarded."); id. at 54 ("[W]e are unable to find any
constitutional obstacle to the action of the Congress in availing itself of a
method shown by experience to be essential in order to apply its standards to
the thousands of cases involved ....").
385. Id. at 54 ("The reservation of full authority to the court to deal with
matters of law provides for the appropriate exercise of the judicial function in
this class of cases.").
386. Id. at 63 (interpreting statute so as to avoid unconstitutionality, noting
"there is no violation of the purpose of the Congress in... denying finality to
[the deputy commissioner's] conclusions as to the jurisdictional facts upon
which the valid application of the statute depends"). The Court's holding de-
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its conclusion regarding the finality of the nonjurisdictional
factfinding by analogizing to the use of juries:
[I]n cases [involving private rights], there is no requirement that, in
order to maintain the essential attributes of the judicial power, all de-
terminations of fact in constitutional courts shall be made by judges.
On the common law side of the Federal courts, the aid of juries is not
only deemed appropriate but is required by the Constitution itself.
3 8 7
If article III permits non-article III officers to make final deter-
minations of fact because they are acting in a manner analogous
to jurors, does it not necessarily permit those officers to utilize
jurors to accomplish the same task?3 88 And is it really constitu-
tionally significant whether a jury sits in a bankruptcy court-
nying finality to agency findings of jurisdictional facts has since been substan-
tially eroded. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 82 n.34 (plurality opinion); St.
Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 53 (1936); Louis, Allocat-
ing Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial and Appellate
Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and
Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C.L. REV. 993, 1030 n.281 (1986) (asserting that "as
the Court's fear of administrative adjudication receded, it began to back away
from this foolish position [regarding jurisdictional facts], which effectively was
put to rest in Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, [3]48-
49 (1951)").
387. 285 U.S. at 51.
388. In United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980), the Court upheld the
provision of the Magistrates Act permitting district courts to refer suppression
motions to magistrates. Id. at 707. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Bren-
nan, dissented, arguing that the Court's opinion rested on the "understanding
that the requirements of Art. III are fully applicable when the issues are ones
of law, but not when the issues are factual in nature." Id. Although the dis-
senters disagreed with this view of article III, they acknowledged that there
were "admittedly few contexts in which independent factfinding by an Art. III
judge is constitutionally required." Id. at 712. Justice Marshall identified only
criminal and deportation cases as situations in which a litigant was "constitu-
tionally entitled to an independent determination of the case-dispositive facts
by an Art. III court." Id.
Some courts have upheld the authority of magistrates to conduct hearings
and enter final judgments with the consent of the parties based upon this dis-
tinction between determinations of fact and law. The Seventh Circuit, for ex-
ample, found that the applicable provision of the Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c) (1982), did not violate article III, even though the magistrate's decision
was not reviewed de novo by an article III court. Geras v. Lafayette Display
Fixtures, 742 F.2d 1037, 1045 (7th Cir. 1984). In so ruling, the court stressed
the ability of the reviewing court to consider fully all questions of law:
Deference to a magistrate with respect to fact-finding thus does not
seem to implicate questions of judicial independence because the re-
viewing court-whether a district court or a court of appeals--would,
of course, give any determinations of law full independent considera-
tion. Thus, entry of final judgment by a magistrate is not of constitu-
tional significance if the result is deference only to fact-finding and
with full review of legal questions in the Article III courts.
Id. at 1044.
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room rather than in a district courtroom, so long as the district
judge retains authority to review all questions of law?3 9
Although some support can be found for the argument that
article III is not violated if a bankruptcy judge or a magistrate
conducts a jury trial under circumstances in which adjudication
by an article III judge is ultimately required, the argument is
flawed. It assumes that a litigant's constitutional rights are
fully vindicated by the district judge's nondeferential review of
questions of law. The plurality in Northern Pipeline rejected
such an assumption. It stated that "the constitutional require-
ments for the exercise of the judicial power must be met at all
stages of adjudication, and not only on appeal, where the court
is restricted to considerations of law, as well as the nature of
the case as it has been shaped at the trial level."390 The opinion
does not identify the values protected by article III that would
be lost by allowing a non-article III judge to preside over a jury
trial. Nevertheless, the Court's concern appears to involve the
many discretionary rulings inevitably made by a presiding
judge that are simply not amenable to appellate review. 391
The unreviewable aspects of a jury trial have been dis-
389. A district court advanced this argument in upholding the authority of
magistrates to conduct jury trials without the parties' consent:
Of course, the district judge cannot review de novo the jury's findings
of fact. Even if the trial were conducted by a district judge, however,
the judge could not revisit the record and review a jury's factual find-
ings. The judge's proper role in reviewing a jury trial conducted by a
magistrate is functionally equivalent to the role a judge would play if
the judge conducted the jury trial. In other words, the role of a judge
is to ensure that the evidence is properly admitted, the instructions
properly given, and the trial otherwise properly conducted, so that the
jury's fact-finding process is not prejudiced by any errors of law. That
role may be performed by the district judge whether or not he actu-
ally conducts the trial.
Lugenbeel v. Schutte, 600 F. Supp. 698, 700 (D. Md. 1985). Although every
court of appeals that has considered the question has disagreed with the con-
clusion reached by the district court in Lugenbeel, none has addressed its argu-
ment in constitutional terms. Rather, they have held that de novo review of
factual as well as legal determinations is statutorily required. See cases cited
supra note 378.
390. 458 U.S. at 86 n.39 (emphasis added). Moreover, the actual holding of
Northern Pipeline is arguably inconsistent with the proposition that article III
permits a non-article III judge to conduct a jury trial without the parties' con-
sent so long as the rulings of law are subject to de novo review. The tort and
contract issues in Northern Pipeline were of a nature to be triable to a jury
(although it is not clear that either party demanded a jury trial), and the bank-
ruptcy judge's legal rulings could have been reviewed de novo on appeal; nev-
ertheless, the Supreme Court refused to sustain the bankruptcy judge's
authority over the case. Id. at 87-88.
391. See id. at 86 n.39.
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cussed in related contexts. Judge Posner, dissenting from the
Seventh Circuit's opinion upholding magistrates' authority to
conduct jury trials with the parties' consent, argued that the
availability of appellate review in an article III court did not
satisfy the Constitution:
Appellate control over the conduct of jury trials, as in this case, is es-
pecially limited. The tone in which the trial judge addresses the ju-
rors, counsel, and witnesses; his rulings on evidence (especially
evidence sought to be excluded as cumulative or prejudicial); his man-
agement of the pace of the trial; his decisions on the length and phras-
ing of the jury instructions; the manner in which he reads or
paraphrases the instructions to the jury; his supervision of the jury's
deliberations-these discretionary aspects of the trial judge's responsi-
bility are largely beyond the power of an appellate court to correct,
yet they can influence a jury's verdict. 392
In bankruptcy cases, even if review is de novo, the deference
necessarily given the jury's verdict would, in effect, insulate
from review the bankruptcy judge's discretionary rulings. Thus
the district judge's de novo review of legal rulings, with only
limited review of the jury's factual findings, would not serve as
the constitutional equivalent of a jury trial conducted by the
district judge.
Moreover, even if it were possible for a district court judge
to consider de novo each of the bankruptcy judge's discretion-
ary actions, the demands of the district judge's caseload make it
unlikely that she would do so. As Judge Swygert noted with
regard to magistrates, the reviewing district judge will not be
eager to substitute her judgment for that exercised by the mag-
istrate during the trial.393 Instead, the district judge is likely
merely to determine if the magistrate's trial rulings are argua-
bly supportable. Judge Swygert emphasized that because the
district judge assigned the trial to the magistrate in the first
place, she will be reluctant to take it back to conduct the trial
all over again.394
392. Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, 742 F.2d 1037, 1048-49 (7th Cir.
1984); see also Louis, supra note 386, at 1041-42 (discussing discretionary deci-
sions by trial judge as to which "the record imperfectly conveys the relevant
facts and the [reviewing] court is at a decisional disadvantage"); Note, supra
note 348, at 592 (arguing that "appellate review is an inadequate corrective [be-
cause] [i]t reaches only errors of law, not the subtler corruptions"); id. at 594
("De novo review of the record by a district judge of a magistrate-conducted
jury trial may not be sufficient to interject the judicial role that is constitu-
tionally required, because the evidentiary rulings and instructions that funda-
mentally shape the verdict will have been rendered by the magistrate.").
393. Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247, 1255 (7th Cir. 1979) (Swygert, J.,
dissenting).
394. Id.
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Perhaps the most fundamental problem caused by author-
izing bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials in cases requiring
an article III judge is that, in exercising this power, the bank-
ruptcy judge crosses the hazy line separating adjunct and
judge.395 No longer is the bankruptcy judge just an assistant
acting under the close supervision of the district judge. Instead,
the bankruptcy judge in effect exercises final, unreviewable au-
thority over matters that may significantly affect the outcome
of the case.
The premise of article III, according to Professor Resnik, is
"that it matters that final decisions are made by specially em-
powered actors. ' 396 If this is an accurate conclusion,397 then
even if bankruptcy judges are constitutionally valid adjuncts to
the district court, they should not be permitted to conduct jury
trials of noncore matters without the parties' consent. Al-
lowing them to do so vests too much authority in these unpro-
tected actors.
CONCLUSION
Critics of the seventh amendment complain about the cost,
inefficiency, and unreliability of jury trials.398 Nevertheless,
the seventh amendment remains a vital part of the Constitu-
tion. Its commands may not be ignored just because a matter
happens to fall within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.
Viewing bankruptcy courts as courts of equity operating outside
the scope of the seventh amendment is no longer accurate. In-
stead, bankruptcy courts are courts of law and equity author-
ized to hear matters retaining their legal nature even though
asserted in bankruptcy proceedings. Consequently, the Consti-
tution requires that jury trial rights in these cases be recog-
nized, whether or not Congress statutorily acknowledges the
existence of such rights.
395. See Geras, 742 F.2d at 1044 (noting need for "some clear line of demar-
cation between the power of an Article III judicial officer and a magistrate");
id. at 1046 (Posner, J., dissenting) ("If [a statute] assigns judges' work to mag-
istrates, who do not have the tenure and compensation guarantees in Article
I, it violates Article III."); id. at 1047 ('"The proper role of the judicial ad-
junct... is to advise and assist the real judge.").
396. Resnik, supra note 348, at 616.
397. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 683 (1980) (holding that
"delegation [to adjunct] does not violate Art. I so long as the ultimate deci-
sion is made by the district court").
398. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 162, at 502-07 (discussing literature critical
of civil jury trials).
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Although the understandable desire for efficiently adjudi-
cating disputes cannot justify overriding the seventh amend-
ment, it is relevant in determining how to implement the
seventh amendment's commands. The present procedural
structure of the bankruptcy courts is poorly suited for the effi-
cient conduct of jury trials. Notwithstanding the seventh
amendment's applicability to certain core proceedings, most
cases in which parties are entitled to a jury trial are noncore.
Without the parties' consent to entry of judgment by the bank-
ruptcy judge, jury trials in noncore cases must be conducted by
a district judge to avoid an unconstitutional de novo review of
the jury's verdict.
The substantial delay in the underlying bankruptcy pro-
ceedings that will inevitably result from bifurcating adjudica-
tions of bankruptcy matters demonstrates the need for article
III bankruptcy judges. Congress's decision in 1984 to continue
to staff the bankruptcy courts with fixed-term judges, while
maintaining the broad scope of bankruptcy jurisdiction intro-
duced by the 1978 Act, invites uncertainty and constitutional
challenge. The core-noncore scheme itself is difficult to apply,
and its validity under article III is arguable. Assuming it is con-
stitutional, however, the inefficient jury trial procedure will re-
main. Congress wisely decided in 1978 to consolidate all
bankruptcy-related matters in the bankruptcy court. It should
not undercut that policy by retaining a clumsy and inefficient
court structure that requires some matters to be tried in the
district court and forces the bankruptcy proceeding into abey-
ance while awaiting the district court's decision. Instead, in rec-
ognition of the need to execute the seventh amendment's
requirements efficiently, Congress should reconstitute the
bankruptcy courts as article III courts with full powers to con-
duct jury trials in all types of bankruptcy proceedings.
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